V  PRINCETON,  N.J.  ^ 


Presented   by   &  .  5-V(7.n\eU  (7ib\DoV 


BL  200  .A32  1888 
''l8?6:i9Sr'^  Ellingwood, 
Scientific  theism 


SCIENTIFIC   THEISM 


SCIENCE. 

E  se  '1  mondo  laggiii  ponesse  mente 
Al  fondamento  che  Natura  pone, 
Seguendo  lui,  avria  buona  la  gente. 

DANTE:    Paradiso,  VIII.  140-142. 

And  if  the  world  below  wonld  fix  its  mind 

On  the  foundation  which  is  laid  by  Nature, 
Pursuing  that,  'twuiild  have  the  people  good. 

Longfellow's  Translatiok. 


THEISM. 

La  gloria  di  Colui  che  tutto  muove 
Per  r  universo  penetra,  e  risi)]ende 
In  una  parte  piu,  e  meno  altrove. 

DANTE:    ParaDISO,  I.  1-8. 

The  glory  of  Him  who  moveth  everything 
Doth  penetrate  the  universe,  and  shine 
Iji  one  part  more  and  in  another  less. 

Longfellow's  Translation. 


ORGANIC   SCIENTIFIC   PHILOSOPHY 


NOV    7 

SCIENTIFIC    THEISM 


BY 


FRANCIS  ELLINGWOOD  ABBOT,  Ph.D. 


THIRD   EDITION. 


BOSTON 
LITTLE,   BROWN,   AND  COMPANY 

1888 


Copyright,  1885, 
By  Francis  Ellingwood  Abbot. 

All  rights  reserved. 


University  Press: 
John  Wilson  and  Son,  Cambridge. 


Cfte   ©allotoeD   iMemorp 


Etwtitx  anU  true,  bjit!j  lobe's  'Uttp  totstiom  biise, 

E\]ou  taufifjt'st  tf)e  (S:f)ilO  tl)c  free,  pure  CrutJj  to  frabc, 

IHore  tban  eartfj's  golU  tJje  golO  of  ©oD  to  pri5c; 
^nti  nob  tfje  ilHan,  bjfjo  tnlg  burneU  to  tjabe 

2rf)S  jog  for  fji's  rchjarH,  bjttf}  bltntJcK  eges 
Hags  tfje  toon  galtr,  un^reUctr,  on  t!)jj  grabe. 


NOTE  TO  THE   THIRD  EDITION. 


I  DESIRE  to  express  my  acknowledgments  to  the 
public,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  for  the  favor  with 
which  it  has  received  a  book  so  abstruse  as  this,  and 
so  condensed  in  thought  as  to  be  intelligible  only  by 
very  thoughtful  and  patient  readers.  If  the  call  for 
a  third  edition  had  not  been  so  sudden  and  unex- 
pected, I  should  have  added  an  appendix,  contain- 
ing further  explanations  in  connection  with  certain 
really  valuable  criticisms,  —  such  as  those  of  Dr.  J.  F. 
Clarke,  in  the  "  Unitarian  Keview  "  of  March,  1886  ; 
Professor  H.  A.  P.  Torrey,  in  the  "  Andover  Eeview  " 
of  May,  1886 ;  Ex-President  John  Bascom,  in  the 
"New  Englander"  of  April,  1887;  M.  Eenouvier,  in 
"La  Critique  Philosophique "  of  Dec.  31,  1887;  and 
M.  Ludovic  Carrau,  in  Chapter  IX.  of  his  "  La  Phi- 
losophic Eeligieuse  en  Angleterre  "  (Paris,  1888). 

But  perhaps  it  is  better  as  it  is.  A  larger  and  fuller 
treatise,  to  be  eventually  completed  and  published  if 


viii  PREFACE, 

persistently  adverse  circumstances  do  not  forbid,  will 
furnish  the  needed  explanations  in  the  only  form 
satisfactory  to  my  own  mind,  —  that  of  a  constructive 
philosophical  system,  founded  on  the  theory  of  uni- 
versals  which  lies  latent  in  the  scientific  method,  and 
which  is  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  practical  work- 
ing of  Darwinism  in  modern  science.  That  nothing 
short  of  such  a  philosophy  can  effectually  oppose  the 
agnostic  tendencies  of  the  unscientific  but  widespread 
modern  phenomenism,  or  furnish  an  adequate  founda- 
tion for  the  profounder  and  better-instructed  theism 
which  will  inevitably  replace  it,  is  my  strongest  con- 
viction, —  a  conviction  only  deepened  by  the  failure 
of  so  many  of  my  critics  to  understand  what  they 
were  trying  to  criticise. 

For  instance.  Prof.  Josiah  Eoyce,  in  "  Science  "  of 
April  9,  1886,  represents  the  main  purport  of  this 
book  to  be  "the  well-known  idealism  of  Plato,"  — 
the  "objective  idealism  .  .  .  which  we  all  know  so 
well."  No  answer  could  be  made  to  such  a  criticism 
as  that,  except  the  answer  which  Kaiit  made  to  a  like 
critic:  "A  glance  at  this  line  soon  showed  me  the 
sort  of  criticism  likely  to  ensue,  much  as  though  some 
one  who  had  never  seen  or  heard  of  geometry,  having 
found  a  Euclid,  and  coming  upon  various  figures  in 
turning  over  its  leaves,  were  to  say,  on  being  asked 
his  opinion  of  it:  'The  book  is  a  systematic  guide 


PREFACE.  j^ 

to  drawing;  the  author  uses  a  peculiar  language,  in 
order  to  give  dark,  incomprehensible  directions,  which 
in  the  end  teach  nothing  more  than  what  every  one 
can  effect  by  a  fair  natural  accuracy  of  eye,  etc' " 

Until  a  new  and  better  book  can  be  got  ready,  the 
present  one  may  as  well  go  out  once  more  for  what 
it  is  really  worth. 

F.  K  A. 

Cambridge,  March  1,  1888. 


PREFACE, 


The  foundation  and  immediate  occasion  of  this 
little  book,  whose  size,  I  trust,  is  no  necessary 
measure  of  its  usefulness,  was  a  lecture  given  before 
the  Concord  Summer  School  of  Philosophy,  July  30, 
1885,  in  a  "  symposium"  on  the  question  :  "  Is  Pan- 
theism the  Legitimate  Outcome  of  Modern  Science?" 
The  other  lecturers  on  this  subject  were  Mr.  John 
Fiske,  Prof.  William  T.  Harris,  Eev.  Dr.  Andrew  P. 
Peabody,  Prof.  George  H.  Howison,  and  Dr.  Edward 
Montgomery.  —  the  lectures  of  the  last  two  gentle- 
men being  read  by  Mr.  Thomas  Davidson.  The 
contents  of  my  own  lecture,  entirely  re-written  from 
the  first  page,  constitute  less  than  one  third  of  what 
is  here  printed. 

The  real  origin  of  the  book,  however,  was  two 
articles  published  in  1864  in  the  North  American 
lievievj,  while  it  was  still  under  the  scholarly  care 
and  joint  editorial  management  of  Professors  James 
Paissell  Lowell  and  Charles  Eliot  Norton,  —  one 
in  the  July  number  on  ''  The  Philosophy  of  Space 


xii  PRE  FA  CE. 

and  Time,"  and  the  other  in  the  October  number  on 
"  The  Conditioned  and  the  Unconditioned." 

Some  of  the  criticisms  here  made  on  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer's  philosophy,  for  much  of  which  I  have  the 
highest  admiration,  were  embodied  in  a  general  arti- 
cle on  his  First  Principles,  entitled  "Positivism  in 
Theology,"  and  published  in  the  now  discontinued 
Christian  Examiner  in  Boston,  March,  1866 ;  and  in 
a  special  and  elaborate  review  of  his  Principles  of 
Biology,  published  in  the  North  American  Review 
for  October,  1868,  under  the  caption  "  Philosophical 
Biology."  To  both  of  these  articles  Mr.  Spencer 
made  replies,  which  to  my  mind  were  eminently  in- 
adequate and  unsuccessful,  —  to  the  former,  through 
Prof.  E.  L.  Youmans,  in  a  subsequent  issue  of  the 
Christian  Examiner,  and  to  the  latter  in  a  special 
pamphlet,  entitled  Spontaneous  Generation,  and  pub- 
lished by  D.  Appleton  and  Company  in  1870.  I 
make  these  references  in  fairness  to  Mr.  Spencer, 
that  those  who  wish  may  investigate  the  subject 
more  fully. 

The  theory  of  Phenomenism  versus  the  theory 
of  Noumenism ;  the  theory  of  Idealistic  Evolution 
versus  the  theory  of  Eealistic  Evolution ;  and  the 
Mechanical  theory  of  Realistic  Evolution  versus  the 
Organic  theory  of  Eealistic  Evolution,  —  these  are 
the  vital  philosophical  problems  of  our  century,  and 
their  solution  must  determine  and  decide  that  of  the 
vital  religious  problem  of  Theism,  Atheism,  and 
Pantheism.     The  discussion  ot  these  problems  con- 


PREFACE.  xiii 

stitutes  the  substance  of  this  book;  and  I  must 
express  my  belief  (not,  I  trust,  without  becoming 
modesty,  for  I  submit  my  own  belief  unreservedly 
to  the  final  verdict  of  the  universal  reason  of  man- 
kind) that  it  formulates  a  philosophical  revolution, 
since  it  substitutes  the  philosophized  scientific  method 
for  the  now  accepted  phenomenistic  method,  in  the 
settlement  of  all  philosophical  questions.  In  the 
opening  lecture  of  the  "  symposium "  above  men- 
tioned, Mr.  Fiske  referred  to  the  "  revolution  effected 
by  the  influence  of  modern  science  upon  modern 
philosophy"  (I  quote  from  memory  only),  but  did 
not  show  what  this  revolution  is.  To  show  what  it 
is,  and  to  what  it  leads  in  the  sphere  of  religious 
belief,  is  the  special  object  of  my  book. 

For  a  quarter  of  a  century  it  has  been  my  growing 
conviction  that  the  solution  of  all  the  problems 
named  can  only  be  accomplished  by  the  principle 
of  the  Objectivity  of  Kelations,  together  with 
its  correlative  and  derivative  principle  of  the  Per- 
ceptive Understanding.  In  my  article  on  ''  The 
Philosophy  of  Space  and  Time,"  published  (as 
already  stated)  in  the  North  American  Review  for 
July,  1864,  occurs  the  following  passage,  which  not 
obscurely  hints  at  these  two  fundamental  principles 
of  a  reformed  modern  philosophy :  — 

"  Now  the  five  modifications  of  extension  above 
described  [magnitude,  form,  position,  distance,  and 
direction]  are  all  relations  among  the  limits  of  ex- 
tension ;  and,  inasmuch  as  relations  cannot  possibly 


xiv  PRE  FA  CE. 

be  objects  of  sensuous  perception,  but  only  of  a 
higher  faculty,  it  follows  that  extension  alone,  and 
not  its  modifications,  is  immediately  cognized  by 
sense.  Whether  these  relations  can  in  any  way  be 
cognized  immediately,  or  only  by  a  process  of  infer- 
ence, it  is  unnecessary  here  to  inquire ;  suffice  it 
to  say  that,  if  we  really  know  the  objective  relations 
of  things,  there  must  be  some  faculty  of  pure  and 
immediate  cognition  of  relations." 

The  novelty  of  this  book  lies  in  its  acceptance,  on 
the  warrant  of  modern  science  and  the  scientific 
method,  of  the  fact  that  we  do  "  hioiv  the  objective 
relations  of  things,"  and  in  its  attempt  to  develop 
the  necessary  philosophical  implications  and  conse- 
quences of  this  fact,  which  phenomenistic  modern 
philosophy  steadily  denies.  From  1864  to  the 
present  time,  I  have  followed  the  clew  of  the  two 
fundamental  principles  above  emphasized,  and  have 
been  guided  by  them  to  results  which,  if  true,  must 
prove  to  be  of  incalculable  importance  and  influence, 
not  only  in  philosophy,  but  also  in  religion.  This 
thin  volume  was  written  at  Nonquitt  Beach  in  five 
summer  weeks;  but  it  took  five  times  five  years  to 
think  it  out.  It  is  a  mere  resume  of  a  small  portion 
of  a  comprehensive  philosophical  system,  so  far  as  I 
have  been  able  to  work  it  out  under  most  distract- 
ing, discouraging,  and  unpropitious  circumstances  of 
many  years ;  and  for  this  reason  I  must  beg  some 
indulgence  for  the  unavoidable  incompleteness  of 
my  work.     It  is  not  the  last  word  I  hope  to  say  on 


PREFACE.  XV 

philosophy,  if  this  word  is  kindly  welcomed ;  but 
that  remains  to  be  proved,  and  in  the  afternoon  of 
life  the  time  is  growing  short. 

Hegel  argues  that,  just  as  the  other  sciences  start 
with  the  subjective  presupposition,  or  postulate,  of 
the  existence  of  their  object-matter,  so  it  would  seem 
that  philosophy  must  start  with  the  subjective  pre- 
supposition, or  postulate,  of  the  existence  of  its  own 
object-matter,  thought  But  he  denies  the  parallelism 
of  the  two  cases.  He  maintains  that,  though  phi- 
losophy must  start  with  some  initial  position  or 
"  immediate  standpoint,"  this  immediate  standpoint 
must,  in  the  course  of  the  science,  be  converted  into 
a  final  result;  and  that  in  this  manner  philosophy 
exhibits  the  form  of  a  closed  or  "  self-returnins: 
circle "  {ein  in  sich  ziirilckgehender  Kreis),  whose 
curve  sweeps  back  to  its  starting  point,  and,  by 
meeting,  effaces  it.  "  The  only  end,  act,  and  aim  of 
philosophy  is  to  attain  to  the  notion  of  its  own 
notion,  and  thus  to  its  own  self -return  and  self- 
satisfaction."  1 

I  might  perhaps  claim  that,  even  by  this  Hegelian 
canon,  Scientific  Eealism  may  be  adjudged  to  be  a 
true  philosophy,  notwithstanding  Hegel's  other  canon 
that  "  every  true  philosophy  is  Idealism."  ^  For  the 
existence  of  the  Eeal  Universe,  which  the  scientific 
method  in  its  empirical  use  apparently  presupposes 

1  Werlce,  VI.  25,  26. 

2  "Jede  wahrhafte  Philosophie  ist  deswegen  Idealism  us." 
(  Werke,  VI.  189.) 


xvi  PREFACE. 

as  a  mere  postulate,  and  which  I  adopt  as  my  own 
initial  position  on  the  warrant  of  the  scientific 
method,  is  at  the  end  (§  87)  explained  as  a  specu- 
lative final  result  in  the  Eternal  Creative  Act: 
"  The  absolute  '  full-filling '  of  Thought-in-itself ,  there- 
fore, or  the  embodiment  of  the  Ideal  in  the  Eeal,  is 
the  eternal  self-legislation  of  Tliought-in-itself  into 
Though t-in-Being  —  of  the  subjective  relational  sys- 
tem into  the  objective  relational  system  of  the  Eeal 
Universe."  In  thus  "  attaining  to  the  notion  of  its 
own  notion,"  my  philosophy  may  be  justly  said  to 
constitute  a  closed  or  "  self -returning  circle." 

But  the  apparent  postulate  of  the  scientific 
method  is  no  postulate,  no  "  subjective  presupposi- 
tion," at  all.  On  the  contrary,  the  presuppositions 
of  the  scientific  method  are  formulated  objective 
perceptions ;  they  are  made  on  the  authority  of  the 
perceptive  understanding  (§  50),  which  is  every  whit 
as  valid  as  that  of  the  philosophic  reason,  is  itself 
"  presupposed "  by  the  latter,  needs  no  higher  sanc- 
tion than  itself,  and  at  last,  as  the  supreme  organon 
of  Verification,  summons  the  philosophic  reason  it- 
self to  its  own  tribunal  for  the  judicial  valuation  of 
its  "  final  results."  Here  lies  the  profound  difference 
between  scientific  realism  and  philosophical  idealism, 
stated  as  follows  in  the  text  (§  69):  "Hegel  sub- 
limely disregards  the  distinction  between  Finite 
Thought  and  Infinite  Thought:  the  latter  indeed 
creates,  while  the  former  finds,  its  object.  And, 
since  human   philosophy  is   only  finite,  it   follows 


PREFACE.  Xvii 

that  no  true  philosophy  is  Idealism,  except  the  In- 
finite Philosophy  or  Self-Thinking  of  God." 

I  call  attention  to  these  points  here,  that  the 
Hegelian  antipathy  to  "presuppositions"  may  not 
lead  any  of  my  readers,  when  they  see  that  scien- 
tific theism  rests  ultimately  on  the  presuppositions 
of  the  scientific  method,  to  lay  down  my  book  in 
disgust.  I  venture  to  ask  them  to  read  it  through 
to  the  end,  and  to  consider  thoughtfully  whether 
there  may  not  be  truth,  after  all,  in  results  which 
are  undeniably  at  variance  with  current  philosophic 
opinions. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  say  to  my  critics :  "  May 
you  be  fair  and  just  enough  to  take  pains  to  under- 
stand before  you  criticise!  For  then  I  shall  be 
only  too  glad  to  profit  by  your  criticisms."  And, 
believLQg  that  there  are  innumerable  minds  in 
this  age  which  have  lost  faith  in  the  old  with- 
out finding  faith  in  the  new,  I  would  say  to  my 
readers:  "May  the  hard-won  thought  of  my  little 
book  be  so  clearly  truth  to  your  minds,  that  it  may 
bring  you  renewed  peace,  serenity,  and  repose  in 
the  Infinite  Soul  of  All!'* 


F.  E.  A. 


Cambridge,  Massachusetts, 
September  15,  1885. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

INTRODUCTION 1 


PART  I. 
THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF   SCIENCE. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE   PRESUPPOSITIONS   OF   THE    SCIENTIFIC   METHOD. 

§  1.    Science  a  Totality  of  Established  Truths       ....  59 

§  2.  These  Truths  rest  on  the  Scientific  Method  ...  60 
§  3.   The    Scientific    Method  rests    on    its    Presupposed 

Realism 62 

§  4.   Its  Realistic  Presuppositions  Stated 64 

§  5.   Scientific  Realism  not  the  "Philosophy  of  Common 

Sense" 65 

§  6.    Scientific  ReaUsra  not  a  "Begging  of  the  Question"  .  67 

§  7.  Scientific  Realism  Opposed  by  Philosophical  Idealism  .  70 
§  8.   Issue  between  Philosophy  and  Science  as  Plienome- 

nism  and  Noumenism 71 


XX  CONTENTS, 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE  THEORY  OF  PHENOMENISM. 

PAGE 

§  9.   Statement  of  the  Theory 74 

§  10.  Its  Principle  the  Subjectivity  of  Uelations  ....  76 
§  11.   Its  Method  the  "  Immanent  Method,"  or  Analysis 

of  Subjective  Representation 11 

§  12.   Criticisms  of  Phenomenism 79 

§  13.  Pirst  Objection :  Phenomenism  Disproved  by  Science  79 
§  14.   Reply  of  Phenomenism:   Science  is  Knowledge  of 

Phenomena  Alone 79 

§  15.  This  Reply  a  Misrepresentation  of  Science  ...  80 
§  16.   Phenomenism  is  Scepticism  and  a  Secret  Poe  to 

Science 82 

§  17.   Second  Objection:   Phenomenism  contradicts  itself  84 

§  18.   It  gives  a  Noumenon-Universe 84 

§  19.  It  gives  a  Noumenon-Representation 85 

§  20.  It  gives  a  mere  Hypostasis  of  Thought-Pmictions  .  86 
§  21.   It  gives  an  Impossible  Principle,  since  "Phenomena 

Alone  "  instantly  become  Noumena 87 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   THEORY  OF  NOUMENISM. 

22.  Kant's  Two  Oppositions 89 

23.  Kant  Subjectivized  Relations 89 

24.  Kant's  Inversion  of  the  Meaning  of  "  Noumenon  "  90 

25.  Greek  Objectivism 93 


CONTENTS.  XXI 

PAGE 

§  26.   The  Inversion  Explained 97 

§  27.   The  Inseparability  of  Noumenon  and  Phenomenon  .  99 

§  28.   The  Intelligibility  of  Things 101 

§  29.   The  Fundamental  Opposition  between  Phenomenism 

and  Noumenism 102 

§  30.   True  Meanuig  of  "  Phenomenon/'  ''  Noumenon/* 

and  "  Experience  " 102 

§  31.   The  Noumenon  no  Unintelligible  "  Substratum/'  —  105 
§  32.   But  the  Intelligible  and  Immanent  Relational  Con- 
stitution of  the  Tliing-m-itself 107 

§  33.   Necessity  of  a  Perceptive  Understanding   ....  108 

§  3tt.   Theory  of  Noumenism  Stated 109 

§  35.   Synoptical  Tables :  — 

Table      I.   Kant's  Two  Oppositions    ....  113 

Table    II.   Phenomenism 114 

Table  III.  Noumenism 115 


PART  n. 
THE  RELIGION  OF   SCIENCE. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

§  36.   The  Coming  Philosophy  of  the  Scientific  Method     .  119 

§  37.   The  Noumenistic  Conception  of  the  Universe      .     .  120 

§  38.   The  Noumenal  Universe  Known  by  Science  .    .     .  121 

§  39.   The  Universe  Infinitely  Intelligible 123 

§  40.   Infinite  InteUigibiHty  of  the  Universe  the  Corner- 
stone of  Scientific  Theism 125 


xxii  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

§41.  Unscientific  Character  of  Plieuomenism     ....  125 

§  42.   Whatislutelligibility? 128 

§  43.   Nothing  is  Intelligible  but  Relations 128 

§  44.  The  Thing-in-itself,  and  its  Principle  of  Individuation  128 

§45.   Chaos  an  absolute  Unreality 130 

§  46.  Infinite  Intelligibility  of  the  Universe  lies  in  the 

System  of  Nature 132 

§  47.   What  is  Intelligence  ? 133 

§  48.   How  to  Answer  this  Question 133 

§  49.  The  Understanding  is  the  Faculty  of  Relations    .     .  134 

§  50.   The  Perceptive  Understanding 135 

§  51.   The  Conceptive  Understanding 138 

§  52.  The  Creative  Understanding 143 

§  53.  Intelligence  is  either  the  Discoverer  or  the  Creator 

of  Relational  Systems 144 

§  54.  Identity  of  Intelligence  in  all  Forms  and  Degrees     .  147 

§  55..   The  Universe  Infinitely  Intelligent 150 

§  56.  The  Universe  an  Infinite  Self-Conscious  Intellect     .  155 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   UNIVERSE:    MA.CHINE    OR  ORGANISM? 

§  57.   Scientific  Discovery  is  Divine  Revelation   .     .     .     .  157 

§  58.   Nature  a  Perfect  System 157 

§  59.   Monadology  and  Materialism  conceive  Nature  as  an 

Imperfect  System 158 

§  60.   The  Organism  the  One  Perfect  System      ....  160 
§  61,   Man  creates  Machines  —  the  Universe  creates  Or- 
ganisms    161 


CONTENTS.  xxiii 

PAGE 

§62.  The  Organism  — Finite  and  Infinite 163 

§  63.    The  Fact  of  Evolution 165 

§  64.   God  does  not  "  Come  to  Consciousness  in  Man  "     .  166 

§  65.   God  does  not  "Exist  Outside  of  Space  and  Time  "     .  168 

§  66.   Idealistic  Evolution 169 

§  67.    Soliloquy  of  the  '•'  Consistent  Idealist "      ....  171 

§  68.   Inconsistent  Idealism 177 

§  69.   Science   Rejects    Idealism,   and    is   itself  Verified 

Realism 178 

§  70.   Realistic  Evolution :  Mechanical  or  Organic  ?      .     .  180 
§  71.   The  Mechanical  Theory  Partial,  the  Organic  Theory 

Universal 181 

§  72.  Their  Coincidence  and  tlieir  Divergence     ....  181 

§  73.   Machine  and  Organism 182 

§  74.    Nature  either  Wholly  Organic  or  Wholly  Inorganic  1S5 
§  75.   Both  Machme  and  Organism  Teleologically  Consti- 

tuted  Systems 1S6 

§  76.   Concept  of  the  Machine 187 

§  77.  The  Mechanical  Theory  Destroys  itself  by  Denying 

Teleology  and  Refusing  to  be  Dualistic      .     .     .  189 

§78.   Concept  of  the  Organism 19q 

§  79.   The  Organic  Theory  finds  the  One  in  the  Many  .     .  193 
§  80.   The  Mechanical  Theory  only  Exists  by  Begging 
the  Question,  and  Presupposing  the  Truth  of 

Teleology I94 

§  81.   Illustration  in  Herbert  Spencer I94 

§  82.   Illustration  in  Ernst  Haeckel 196 

§  83.   Inevitable  Decadence  of  the  Mechanical  Tlieory,  and 

Inevitable  Rise  of  the  Organic  Theory  ....  199 


xxiv  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE    GOD   OY   SCIENCE. 

PAGE 

§  84.   The  Infinite  Creative  Life  of  God 202 

§  85.   His  Infinite  Wisdom  and  Infinite  Will 203 

§  86.   His  Infinite  Beatitude  and  Infinite  Love    .     .     .     .  204 

§  87.   His  Infinite  Moral  Rectitude  and  Holiness     .     .     .  205 

§  88.   The  Problem  of  Evil 207 

§89.   Condensed  Review  of  the  Argument 208 

§  90.   The  Scientific  Idea  of  God 209 

§91.   Is  it  Pantheism  ? 210 

§  92.   Personality  of  God 211 

§  93.   The  Transcendence  and  the  Immanence  of  God  .     .  213 

§94.    "Head  "and  "Heart  "in  Religion 214 

§95.   The  Lament  of  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson 215 

§  96.   The  Essential  Religiousness  of  Scientific  Theism      .  216 


GENERAL    SYNOPSIS 


ARGUMENT  FOR  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 


I.  The  roundation  of  Scientific  Theism  is  the  Philosophized 
Scientific  Method. 

II.  The  Ground-Principle  of  the  Philosophized  Scientific 
Method  is  the  Infinite  Intelligibility  of  the  Universe 
per  se. 

1.  What  is  Intelligibility  ? 

Ans.   Intelligibility  is  the  Possession  of  an  Imma- 
nent Relational  Constitution. 

2.  What  is  Intelligence  ? 
Ans.  Intelligence  is  — 

(1)  The  Sole  Discoverer  of  Immanent  Relational 

Constitutions. 

(2)  The  Sole  Creator  of  Immanent  Relational 

Constitutions. 

(3)  Identical   in   all  Forms,   and  in  all  Teleo- 

logical. 


xxvi  SYNOPSIS  OF  ARGUMENT, 

III.  The  Infinite   Intelligibility  of  the   Universe  proves  its 

Infinite  Intelligence,  because  only  an  Infinite  Intelli- 
gence could  create  an  Infinite  Relational  Constitution. 

IV.  The  synchronous  Infinite  Intelligibility  and  Infinite  Intel- 

ligence of  the  Universe  prove  that  it  is  an  Infinite 
Subject-Object,  or  Infinite  Self-conscious  Intellect. 

V.  The  Immanent  Helational  Constitution  of  the  Universe- 
Object,  being  Infinitely  Intelligible,  must  be  an  Abso- 
lutely Perfect  System  of  Nature  :  therefore  — 

1.  Not  Chaos,  which  would  be  no  System  at  all. 

2.  Not  a  mere   Multitude   of  Monads   or  Atoms, 

which  would  be  an  Unintelhgible  Aggregate  of 
Systems. 

3.  Not  a  mere  Machine,  which  would  be  an  Imper- 

fect System. 

4.  But  a   Cosmical   Organism,  which  is  the   only 

Absolutely  Perfect  System. 

VI.  The  Infinitely  IntelHgible  and  Absolutely  Perfect  Organic 
System  of  Nature  proves  that  the  Universe-Object  is 
the  Eteraal,  Organic,  and  Teleological  Self-Evolution 
of  the  Universe-Subject  — the  Eternal  Self-Realization 
or  Self-Fulfilment  of  Creative  Thought  in  Created 
Being  —  the  Infinite  Life  of  the  Universe  per  se. 

VII.  The  Infinite  Organic  and  Organific  Life  of  the  Universe 
per  se  proves  that  it  is  Infinite  Wisdom  and  Infinite 
Will  —  Infinite  Beatitude,  and  Infinite  Love  —  Infinite 
Rectitude  and   Infinite   Holiness  —  Infinite  Wisdom, 


SYNOPSIS  OF  ARGUMENT.  xxvii 

Goodness,  and  Power  —  Infinite  Spiritual  Person  — 
the  Living  and  Life-Giving  God  from  "VYhom  All 
Things  Proceed. 

VIII.  Therefore,  the  Philosophized  Scientific  Metl",od  creates 
the  only  Idea  of  God  which  can  at  once  satisfy  both 
Head  and  Heart;  and  Scientific  Theism  creates  the 
only  Real  Reconciliation  of  Science  and  Religion. 


INTRODUCTION.' 


In  the  Preface  to  the  Second  Edition  of  the  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason,  Kant  has  this  remarkable  passage  :  — 

"It  has  hitherto  been . assumed  that  our  cognition 
must  conform  to  the  objects ;  but  all  attempts  to  as- 
certain anything  about  these  a  priori,  by  means  of 
conceptions,  and  thus  to  extend  the  range  of  our 
knowledge,  have  been  rendered  abortive  by  this  as- 
sumption. Let  us,  then,  make  the  experiment  whether 
we  may  not  be  more  successful  in  metaphysics,  if  we 
assume  that  the  objects  must  conform  to  our  cognition. 
.  .  .  We  here  propose  to  do  just  what  Copernicus 
did  in  attempting  to  explain  the  celestial  movements. 
When  he  found  that  he  could  make  no  progress  by 
assuming  that  all  the  heavenly  bodies  revolved  around 
the  spectator,  he  reversed  the  process,  and  tried  the 
experiment  of  assuming  that  the  spectator  revolved, 
while  the  stars  remained  at  rest.  We  may  make  the 
same  experiment  with  regard  to  the  intuition  of  objects. 
If  the  intuition  must  conform  to  the  nature  of  the 

1  Reprinted  from  the  London  Mind  for  October,  1882,  where 
it  appeared  with  the  title,  "  Scientific  Philosophy :  A  Theory  of 
Human  I^owledge." 

1 


2  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

objects,  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  know  anything  of  them 
a  priori.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  object  conforms 
to  the  nature  of  our  faculty  of  intuition,  I  can  then 
easily  conceive  the  possibility  of  such  an  a  priori 
knowledge.  .  .  .  This  attempt  to  introduce  a  complete 
revolution  in  the  procedure  of  metaphysics,  after  the 
example  of  the  geometricians  and  natural  philoso- 
phers, constitutes  the  aim  of  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Speculative  Keason." 

Lange,  in  his  History  of  Ifaterialism  (II.  156),  thus 
alludes  to  the  foregoing  passage,  and  correctly  states 
the  conclusions  logically  deducible  from  it :  — 

"Kant  himself  was  very  far  from  comparing  him- 
self with  Kepler;  but  he  made  another  comparison 
that  is  more  significant  and  appropriate.  He  com- 
pared his  achievement  with  that  of  Copernicus.  But 
this  achievement  consisted  in  this,  that  he  reversed 
the  previous  standpoint  of  metaphysics.  Copernicus 
dared,  'by  a  paradoxical  but  yet  true  method,'  to 
seek  the  observed  motions,  not  in  the  heavenly  bodies, 
but  in  their  observers.  Not  less  'paradoxical'  must 
it  appear  to  the  sluggish  mind  of  man,  when  Kant 
lightly  and  certainly  over^turns  our  collective  experience, 
with  all  the  historical  and  exact  sciences,'^  by  the  simple 
assumption  that  our  notions  do  not  regulate  themselves 
according  to  things,  but  things  according  to  our  notions. 
It  follows  immediately  from  this  that  the  objects  of 
experience  altogether  are  only  our  objects;  that  the 
whole  objective  world  is,  in  a  word,  not  absolute  ob- 
jectivity, but  only  objectivity  for  man  and  any  simi- 
larly organized  beings,  while,  behind  the  phenomenal 
world,  the  absolute  nature  of  things,  the  'thing-in- 
itself,'  is  veiled  in  impenetrable  darkness." 
1  The  italics  are  ours. 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

Now  when  the  great  Kant,  whose  towering  and 
consummate  genius  there  is  no  one  to  dispute,  founded 
the  Critical  Philosophy  on  this  cardinal  doctrine  that 
"  things  conform  to  cognition,  not  cognition  to  things," 
and  when  he  claimed  thereby  to  have  created  a  mighty 
"revolution"  in  philosophy  comparable  only  with  that 
of  Copernicus  in  astronomy,  did  he  really  occupy  a 
new  philosophical  standpoint,  or  really  adopt  a  new 
philosophical  method  ? 

No.  On  the  contrary,  he  merely  completed,  organ- 
ized, and  formulated  the  veritable  revolution  which 
was  initiated  in  the  latter  half  of  the  eleventh  cen- 
tury by  Eoscellinus  the  Nominalist,  —  which  was 
condemned  in  his  person  by  the  Kealist  Council  of 
Soissons,  revived  in  the  fourteenth  century  by  William 
of  Occam,  and  finally  made  triumphant  in  philosophy 
towards  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century,  not  so  much 
by  the  inherent  strength  of  Nominalism  as  by  the 
weakness  of  its  expiring  rival,  Scholastic  Kealism. 

The  essence  of  Nominalism  was  the  doctrine  that 
universals,  or  terms  denoting  genera  and  species, 
correspond  to  nothing  really  existent  outside  of  the 
mind,  but  are  either  mere  empty  names  (Extreme 
Nominalism)  or  names  denoting  mere  subjective 
concepts  (Moderate  Nominalism  or  Conceptualism). 
Nominalism  distinctly  anticipated  the  Critical  Phi- 
losophy in  referring  the  source  of  all  general  concep- 
tions (and  thereby  of  all  human  knowledge),  not  to 
the  object  alone  or  to  the  object  and  subject  together, 
but  to  the  subject  alone ;  it  distinctly  anticipated  the 
doctrine  that  "things  conform  to  cognition,  not  cogni- 
tion to  things."  Since  genera  and  species  are  classifi- 
cations of  things  based  on  their  supposed  resemblances 
and  differences,  the  denial  of  all  objective  reality  to 


4  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

genera  and  species  is  the  denial  of  all  objective  real- 
ity to  the  supposed  resemblances  and  differences  of 
things  themselves  ;  the  denial  of  all  knowledge  of  the 
relations  of  objects  is  the  denial  of  all  knowledge  of 
the  objects  related;  and  this  denial  is  tantamount 
to  the  assertion  that  things-in-themselves  are  utterly 
unknown. 

Wrapped  up  in  the  essential  doctrine  of  Komi- 
nalism,  therefore,  was  the  doctrine  that  things-in- 
themselves  are  utterly  unknown  ;  that  the  knowledge 
of  their  supposed  resemblances  and  differences  is  de- 
rived only  from  the  supposing  mind  ;  that  "things 
conform  to  cognition,  not  cognition  to  things;'^  in 
short,  that  the  only  knowledge  possible  to  man  is  the 
knowledge  of  the  a  priori  constitution  of  his  own 
mind,  and  the  relations  which  it  imposes  upon  things 
(if  they  exist),  totally  irrespective  of  what  things 
really  are. 

Nothing  can  be  plainer,  then,  than  that  the  Critical 
Philosophy  did  but  logically  develop  the  prime  tenet 
of  Nominalism,  formulate  it  successfully,  and  expand 
it  to  a  self-consistent  philosophical  system.  This, 
and  this  alone,  was  the  true  merit  of  Kant.  The 
^'  revolution  "  by  which  philosophy  was  made  to  trans- 
fer its  fundamental  standpoint  from  the  world  of 
things  to  the  world  of  thought,  and  in  consequence 
of  which  modern  philosophy  in  both  its  great  schools 
has  inherited  an  irresistible  tendency  towards  Ideal- 
ism, had  been  substantially  effected  and  definitely 
established  some  four  hundred  years  before.  Kant 
did  but  bring  to  flower  and  fruitage  the  seed  sown 
by  Roscellinus,  and  his  Critical  Philosophy  was 
only  the  logical  evolution  and  outcome  of  Mediaeval 
Nominalism. 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

By  Kant's  masterly  development  of  Nominalism 
into  a  great  philosophical  system,  it  has  exercised 
upon  subsequent  speculation  a  constantly  increasing 
power.  In  truth,  all  modern  philosophy,  by  tacit 
agreement,  rests  upon  the  Nominalistic  theory  of  uni- 
versals.  Hence  alone  can  be  explained  the  fact,  so 
patent  and  so  striking,  yet  so  little  understood  or 
even  inquired  into,  that  both  the  great  schools  of 
modern  philosophy,  the  Transcendental  and  the  Asso- 
ciational,  equally  exhibit  in  its  full  force  the  tendency 
to  Idealism  latent  in  that  theory.  Nominalism  logi- 
cally reduces  all  experience,  actual  or  possible,  to  a 
mere  subjective  affection  of  the  individual  Ego,  and 
does  not  permit  even  the  Ego  to  know  itself  as  a  nou- 
menon.  The  historical  development  of  the  Critical 
Philosophy  into  the  subjective  idealism  of  Eichte, 
the  objective  idealism  of  Schelling,  and  the  absolute 
idealism  of  Hegel,  only  shows  how  impossible  it  is 
for  that  philosophy  to  overstep  the  magic  circle  of 
Egoism  with  which  Nominalism  logically  environed 
itself.  No  less  striking  is  the  inability  of  the  Eng- 
lish school  to  escape  from  the  idealistic  tendencies  in- 
herent in  its  purely  subjective  principle  of  Association 
—  one  of  the  innumerable  aliases  by  which  Nominalism 
eludes  detection  at  the  bar  of  contemporary  thought ; 
for  Locke's  successors,  Berkeley,  Hume,  Hartley,  the 
Mills,  Bain,  Spencer,  and  others,  drift  towards  Ideal- 
ism as  steadily  as  Kant  and  his  successors.  It  is, 
in  fact,  logically  impossible  to  draw  any  but  idealistic 
conclusions  from  the  premises  of  Nominalism  —  and 
those,  too,  idealistic  conclusions  which  cannot  stop 
short  of  absolute  Solipsism. 

That  modern  philosophy  in  both  its  great  branches 
irresistibly  tends  to  Idealism  is  a  position  that  will 


6  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

scarcely  be  disputed.  Dr.  Krauth,  in  his  admirable 
edition  of  Berkeley's  Pidncix^les  of  Human  Knowledge 
(p.  122),  thus  sums  up  the  grounds  of  this  general 
and  admitted  tendency,  while  yet  not  perceiving  that 
in  the  last  analysis  they  are  all  reducible  to  the 
almost  universal  acceptance  of  the  Nominalistic  view 
of  genera  and  species,  with  its  implied  negation  of 
the  objectivity  of  relations  :  — 

"It  [Idealism]  rests  on  generally  recognized  prin- 
ciples in  regard  to  consciousness.  Its  definition  of 
consciousness  is  the  one  most  widely  received :  the 
mind's  recognition  of  its  own  conditions.  It  main- 
tains that  the  cognitions  of  consciousness  are  abso- 
lute and  infallible,  and  that  nothing  but  these  is,  in 
their  degree,  knowledge.  In  all  these  postulates  the 
great  mass  of  thinkers  agree  with  Idealism.  The 
foundation  of  Idealism  is  the  common  foundation 
of  nearly  all  the  developed  philosophical  thinking 
of  all  schools.  Idealism  declares  that,  while  con- 
sciousness is  infallible,  our  interpretations  of  it, 
on  which  we  base  inferences,  may  be  incorrect;  and 
nearly  all  thinkers  of  all  schools  agree  with  Idealism 
here.  No  inference,  or  class  of  inferences,  in  which 
a  mistake  ever  occurs  is  a  basis  of  positive  knowledge. 
Hence,  says  Idealism,  only  that  which  is  directly 
in  consciousness  is  positively  known,  and  nothing 
is  directly  in  consciousness  but  the  mind's  own 
states.  Therefore  we  know  nothing  more.  So  com- 
pletely has  this  general  conviction  taken  posses- 
sion of  the  philosophical  mind,  that  even  antagonists 
of  Idealism,  who  would  cut  it  up  by  the  roots 
if  they  could  cut  this  up,  have  not  pretended 
that  it  could  be  done."  (The  italics  are  all  Dr. 
Krauth's.) 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

The  "  strength  of  Idealism/'  thus  described  by  Dr. 
Krauthj  is  the  strength  of  Nominalism  —  no  more, 
no  less.  If  all  the  general  and  special  relations  of 
things,  conceived  by  the  mind  and  expressed  by 
general  terms,  exist  in  the  mind  alone,  nothing  is 
known  of  things  themselves ;  for  knowledge  of  things 
is  knowledge  of  their  relations.  Nominalism,  there- 
fore, is  the  original  source  of  the  definition  of  knowl- 
edge adopted  by  Idealism,  as  shown  above  :  that  is, 
the  contents  of  consciousness  alone.  Inasmuch,  more- 
over, as  the  notion  of  a  common  consciousness  is  itself 
a  general  notion,  and  consequently  destitute  of  all 
objectivity,  nothing  is  "knowledge,''  so  defined,  that 
is  outside  of  the  individual  consciousness.  Beginning 
with  ISTominalism,  therefore.  Idealism  must  end  in 
Solipsism,  on  penalty  of  stultifying  itself  by  arbitrary 
self-contradiction.  This  was  the  path  marked  out  for 
the  Critical  Philosophy  by  inexorable  logic,  and  Fichte 
was  more  Kantian  than  Kant  himself  when  he  reso- 
lutely pursued  it.  Solipsism  is  the  very  reductio  ad 
absurdum  of  Idealism,  yet  it  is  the  rigorously  logical 
consequence  of  its  own  definition  of  knowledge,  which 
again  is  the  rigorously  logical  consequence  of  the 
Nominalistic  view  of  universals.  On  this  point,  a 
further  quotation  from  Dr.  Krauth  will  be  extremely 
pertinent :  — 

"While  Idealism  has  here  a  speculative  strength, 
which  it  is  not  wise  to  ignore,  it  is  not  without  its 
w^eakness,  even  at  this  very  point,  for  its  history 
shows  that  it  is  ra.rely  willing  to  stand  unreservedly 
by  the  results  of  its  own  principle  as  regards  con- 
sciousness. If  it  accept  only  the  direct  and  infallible 
knowledge  supplied  in  consciousness,  it  has  no  com- 
mon ground  left  but  this  —  that  there  is  the  one  train 


8  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

of  ideas,  which  passes  in  the  consciousness  of  a  par- 
ticular individual.  A  consistent  Idealist  can  claim  to 
know  no  more  than  this  —  that  there  exist  ideas  in  his 
consciousness.  He  cannot  know  that  he  has  a  sub- 
stantial personal  existence,  or  that  there  is  any  other 
being,  finite  or  infinite,  beside  himself.  And  as  many 
Idealists  are  not  satisfied  with  maintaining  that  we 
do  not  know  that  there  is  an  external  world,  but  go 
further,  and  declare  that  we  know  that  there  is  not  an 
external  world,  they  must  for  consistency's  sake  hold 
that  an  Idealist  knows  that  there  is  nothing,  thing  or 
person,  beside  himself.  Solipsism,  or  absolute  Egoism, 
with  the  exclusion  of  proper  personality,  is  the  logic 
of  Idealism,  if  the  inferential  be  excluded.  But  if 
inference,  in  any  degree  whatever,  be  allowed,  not 
only  would  the  natural  logic  and  natural  inference  of 
most  men  sweep  away  Idealism,  but  its  own  principle 
of  knowledge  is  subverted  by  the  terms  of  the  suppo- 
sition. Idealism  stands  or  falls  by  the  principle  that 
no  inference  is  knowledge.  We  may  reach  inferences 
by  knowledge,  but  we  can  never  reach  knowledge  by 
inference"  (p.  123). 

Against  both  schools  of  modern  philosophy,  there- 
fore, committed  as  thej^  both  are  to  the  definition  of 
knowledge  drawn  from  Nominalism  and  ending  in 
Solipsism,  the  charge  of  logical  inconsistency  and 
self-contradiction  may  be  fairly  brought,  just  so  far  as 
they  hesitate  to  follow  up  the  path  to  cloudland  which 
begins  with  that  definition.  But  any  philosophy 
which  hesitates  to  be  logical  forfeits  all  claim  to  the 
respectful  consideration  of  mankind. 

The  great  Koscellino-Kantian  "  revolution "  by 
which  Nominalism  was  made  to  supplant  Scholastic 
Realism,  and  philosophy  to  transfer  its  fundamental 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

standpoint  from  the  world  of  things  to  the  world  of 
thought,  was  a  revolution  which  logically  contracts 
"  human  knowledge  ''  to  the  petty  dimensions  of  indi- 
vidual self -consciousness  —  renders  it  valueless  as  to 
things  themselves  and  valuable  only  as  to  the  cl  priori 
constitution  of  the  individual's  own  mind  —  and  in. 
effect  reduces  it  to  a  grand  hallucination.  Like  the 
French  Eevolution,  the  Nominalistic  revolution  can 
live  only  by  the  guillotine,  and  decapitates  every  per- 
ception which  pretends  to  bring  to  the  miserable 
solipsist,  shut  up  in  the  prison  of  his  own  conscious- 
ness, the  slightest  information  as  to  the  great  outside 
world.  Defining  knowledge  as  the  mere  contents  of 
consciousness,  it  relegates  to  non-entity,  as  pseudo- 
knowledge,  whatever  claims  to  be  more  than  that. 
Under  its  sway,  philosophy  is  blind  to  the  race,  and 
beholds  the  individual  alone.  What  wonder  that,  in 
the  hands  of  those  who  insist  on  their  right  to  reduce 
theory  to  practice,  philosophy  is  so  often  found  pan- 
dering to  the  moral  lawlessness  of  an  Individualism 
that  sets  mere  personal  opinion  above  the  supreme 
ethical  sanctities  of  the  universe  ?  In  human  so- 
ciety, individual  autonomy  is  universal  antinomy  ;  for 
the  law  that  binds  only  one  binds  none.  Yet,  with 
Nominalism  for  its  root.  Idealism  for  its  flower,  and 
Solipsism  for  its  fruit,  how  can  modern  philosophy, 
teaching  in  both  its  great  schools  that  the  individual 
mind  knows  nothing  except  the  states  of  its  own  con- 
sciousness,, discover  any  law  that  shall  have  recog- 
nized authority  over  all  consciousnesses  ?  For  such  a 
discovery  it  is  hopelessly  incompetent.  So  far,  there- 
fore, as  the  social  and  moral  interests  of  mankind  are 
concerned,  the  present  philosophical  situation  has 
become  simply  intolerable. 


10  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

Fortunately  for  the  future  of  society,  however,  the 
principle  of  cognition  embodied  in  the  Nominalistic 
definition  of  knowledge  has  never  obtained  general 
assent  outside  of  the  circle  of  purely  speculative 
thought.  The  protest  of  "  common  sense  "  against  it 
was  even  taken  up  by  the  Scotch  school  in  the  name 
of  philosophy  itself  ;  but  the  same  Nominalism  which 
paralyzes  all  modern  philoso]3hy  paralyzed  the  Scotch 
school,  and  the  protest  died  on  its  tongue.  Without 
any  conscious  protest,  however,  though  with  an  in- 
stinctive hostility  to  "  metaphysics  "  and  to  the  phi- 
losophy which  it  confounds  with  "  metaphysics," 
physical  science  has  immovably  planted  itself  on  a 
new  definition  of  knowledge,  and  fortified  it  impreg- 
nably  against  all  comers;  and,  on  the  principle  of 
cognition  which  it  establishes,  universal  science,  car- 
rying up  the  physical  and  the  mental  into  the  higher 
unity  of  the  cosmical,  is  even  now  beginning  to  build 
a  temple  of  truth  destined  to  be  coeval  with  the 
human  race. 

1.  Modern  Philosophy  defines  knowledge  as  the 
recognition  by  the  Ego  of  its  own  conscious  states. 

2.  Modern  Science  defines  knowledge  as  twofold, 
—  individual  knoivledge,  or  the  mind's  cognition  of  its 
own  conscious  states  plus  its  cognition  of  the  Cosmos 
of  which  it  is  a  part,  and  universal  knowledge,  or  the 
sum  of  all  human  cognitions  of  the  Cosmos  which 
have  been  substantiated  by  verification  and  certified 
by  the  unanimous  consensus  of  the  competent. 

This  latter  definition  may  never  have  been  formu- 
lated before,  but  it  is  tacitly  assumed  in  all  investiga- 
tions conducted  according  to  the  scientific  method ; 
and  the  results  of  that  method  would  be  completely 
invalidated,  if  the  definition  itself  should  be  essen- 


INTRODUCTION.  11 

tially  erroneous.     Science  does  not  present  its  truths 
as  anybody's  "states  of  consciousness,"  but  as  cos- 
mical    facts,   acknowledgment   of    wliicb   is   binding 
upon  all  sane  minds.     The  principle  of  cognition  on 
which  it  proceeds  is  utterly  antagonistic  to  the  ISTomi- 
nalism   which   denies   all   objectivity  to  genera  and 
species  :    it   is   drawn  from   Realism   alone,  not  the 
Scholastic  Eealism  of  the  Middle  Ages,  but  the  Scien- 
tihc  Realism  or  Relationism  which  will  be  explained 
below.     Nominalism  teaches  that  things  conform  to 
cognition,  not  cognition  to  things  ;  Scientific  Realism 
teaches  that  cognition  conforms  to  things,  not  things 
to  cognition.     It  is  futile  to  seek  a  reconciliation  of 
these   positions ;    the   contradiction  is   absolute  and 
insoluble.      Modern    philosoj^hy   counts    nothing    as 
''  known "  which  is   outside  of  the   individual   con- 
sciousness ;  modern  science  presents  as  "  known "  a 
vast  mass  of  truths,  of  which  only  an  insignificant 
fraction  can  be  to-day  comprised  within  the  narrow 
limits  of  a  single  consciousness,  and  which  in  their 
totality  can  be  contained  only  in  the  universal  mind 
of  man.     Under  the  influence   of  the  all-prevailing 
Nominalism  of  the  present  day,  philosophy  has,  and 
must  have,  its  beginning-point  in  the  individual  Ego  ; 
under  the  influence  of  its  own  unsuspected  Realism, 
science  begins  with  a  Cosmos  of  which  the  individual 
Ego  is  merely  a  part.     The  one  is  exclusively  and 
narrowly  subjective,  just  so  far  as  it  is  logically  faith- 
ful to  its  own  clearly  proclaimed  principle  of  cogni- 
tion ;  the  other  is  objective,  in  a  sense  so  broad  as  to 
include  the  subjective  within  itself.     In  truth,  so  far 
was  the  old  battle  of  Nominalism  and  Realism  from 
being  fought  out  by  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century, 
that  it  is  to-day  the   deep,  underlying  problem   of 


12  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM, 

problems,  on  the  right  solution  of  which  depends  the 
life  of  philosophy  itself  in  the  ages  to  come.  But  let 
it  not  be  forgotten  that  the  old  Eealism  of  Scholasti- 
cism is  by  no  means  the  new  Realism  of  Science  ;  the 
former  perished  as  rightfully  before  Nominalism  as 
Nominalism  itself  will  perish  before  the  latter. 
'  That  the  scientific  point  of  view  is  a  thoroughly 
objective  one,  and  that  the  cosmical  facts  discovered 
by  science  can  by  no  means  be  made  to  vanish  in  the 
universal  solvent  of  Nominalistic  subjectivism,  easily 
appears.     One  or  two  illustrations  will  suffice. 

Prof.  Jevons,  in  the  Princi2:>les  of  Science  (3d  ed., 
pp.  8,  9),  thus  speaks  of  the  objective  validity  of 
mathematical  formulae ;  — 

"  A  mathematician  certainly  does  treat  of  symbols, 
but  only  as  the  instruments  whereby  to  facilitate  his 
reasoning  concerning  quantities  ;  and  as  the  axioms 
and  rules  of  mathematical  science  must  be  verified  in 
concrete  objects  in  order  that  the  calculations  founded 
upon  them  may  have  any  validity  or  utility,  it  follows 
that  the  ultimate  objects  of  mathematical  science  are 
the  things  themselves.  .  .  .  Signs,  thoughts,  and  ex- 
terior objects  may  be  regarded  as  parallel  and  analo- 
gous series  of  phenomena,  and  to  treat  any  one  of  the 
three  series  is  equivalent  to  treating  either  of  the 
other  series." 

Prof.  Tyndall,  in  his  Light  and  Electricity  (pp.  60, 
61),  thus  illustrates  the  unhesitating  and  uncondi- 
tional objectivity  with  which  the  science  of  physics 
presents  its  truths,  as  facts  of  a  veritably  existent 
and  actually  known  Cosmos  :  — 

"  The  justification  of  a  theory  consists  in  its  exclu- 
sive competence  to  account  for  phenomena.  On  such 
a  basis  the  Wave  Theory,  or  the  Undulatory  Theory 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

of  Light,  now  rests,  and  every  day's  experience  only 
makes  its  foundations  more  secure.  .  .  .  This  sub- 
stance is  called  the  luminiferous  ether.  It  fills  space ; 
it  surrounds  the  atoms  of  bodies  ;  it  extends,  without 
solution  of  continuity,  through  the  humors  of  the 
eye.  The  molecules  of  luminous  bodies  are  in  a  state 
of  vibration.  The  vibrations  are  taken  up  by  the 
ether,  and  transmitted  through  it  in  waves.  These 
waves  impinging  on  the  retina  excite  the  sensation." 

Prof.  Cooke,  in  his  Neiv  Chemistry^  illustrates  the 
same  point  still  more  strikingly  and  emphatically, 
with  reference  to  the  atomic  theory  :  — 

"The  new  chemistry  assumes  as  its  fundamental 
postulate  that  the  magnitudes  we  call  molecules  are 
realities  ;  but  this  is  the  only  postulate.  Grant  the 
postulate,  and  you  will  find  that  all  the  rest  follows 
as  a  necessary  deduction.  Deny  it,  and  the  'New 
Chemistry'  can  have  no  meaning  for  you,  and  it  is 
not  worth  your  while  to  pursue  the  subject  further. 
If,  therefore,  we  would  become  imbued  with  the  spirit 
of  the  new  philosophy  of  chemistry,  we  must  begin 
by  believing  in  molecules ;  arid,  if  I  have  succeeded 
in  setting  forth  in  a  clear  light  the  fundamental  truth 
that  the  molecules  of  chemistry  are  definite  masses  of 
matter,  whose  weight  can  be^  accurately  determined, 
our  time  has  been  well  spent." 

Kem ember ing  that  the  weight  of  the  hydrogen- 
atom  is  taken  as  the,  unit  of  molecular  weight,  or 
microcrith,  and  that,  according  to  calculations  based 
on  the  figures  of  Sir  William  Thomson,  this  atom 
weighs  approximately,  in  decimals  of  a  gramme, 
0.000,000,000,000,000,000,000,109,312,  or  109,312  oc- 
tillionths  of  a  gramme,  one  can  easily  perceive  the 
impossibility  of  construing  this  utterly  unimaginable 


14  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

quantity  under  any  terms  expressive  of  human  con- 
sciousness. To  consciousness  it  is  equivalent  to  abso- 
lute zero  ;  but  the  "  New  Chemistry  "  demands  belief 
in  it  as  an  actual  quantity  in  Nature,  an  objectively 
existent  reality  in  a  Cosmos  not  resolvable  into  con- 
sciousness by  any  Nominalistic  legerdemain. 

It  would  be  superfluous  to  cite  further  passages  in 
order  to  illustrate  the  thoroughly  objective  spirit, 
method,  and  results  of  modern  science,  as  contrasted 
with  those  of  modern  philosophy.  All  scientific  in- 
vestigations are  founded  on  a  theory  diametrically 
opposed  to  that  of  Kant :  namely,  that  things  can 
be  known,  though  incompletely  known,  as  they  are  in 
themselves,  and  that  cognition  must  conform  itself  to 
them,  not  they  to  it.  This  is  the  philosophical  trans- 
lation of  the  principle  of  verification.  The  Nomi- 
nalism that  inculcates  the  contrary  doctrine  is  an 
excrescence  upon  modern  philosophy,  a  cancerous 
tumor  feeding  upon  its  life.  Science  has  achieved  all 
its  marvellous  triumphs  by  practically  denying  the 
fundamental  principle  laid  down  by  Kant,  and  by 
practically  proceeding  upon  its  exact  opposite ;  and 
it  is  a  scandal  to  philosophy  that  she  has  not  yet 
legitimated  this  practical  procedure,  overwhelmingly 
justified  as  it  is  by  its  incontrovertible  results.  The 
time  has  come  for  philosophy  to  reverse  the  Koscel- 
lino-Kantian  revolution,  and  give  to  science  a  theory 
of  knowledge  which  shall  render  the  scientific  method, 
not  practically  successful  (for  that  it  already  is),  but 
theoretically  impregnable  The  present  article  is  the 
beginning  of  an  attempt  in  that  direction.  A  glance 
at  the  course  of  speculation  in  the  past  will  render 
clearer  the  nature  of  the  problem  which  philosophy 
has  now  to  solve. 


INTRODUCTION,  15 


II. 

The  pre-Socratic  philosophy  of  Greece  was  unquali- 
fied Kealism,  of  a  naive  and   primitive  type.     The 
earlier  Ionic  philosophers,  Thales,  Anaximander,  and 
Anaximenes,  sought  only  to  generalize  the  phenomena 
of  the  outer  world,  as  products  of  a  single  original 
cause   or    principle   (dpx^)  —  water,    undifferentiated 
chaotic   matter   (ro    airupov),   air,  —  but    they   never 
dreamed   of   doubting   its   objective   existence.      The 
Pythagoreans  sought  the  causal  unity  of  the  universe 
in  its  most  general  relations,  as  number,  proportion, 
harmony,  order,  law,  which  they  conceived  as  at  once 
the  abstract  and  concrete  directive  force  of  nature ; 
their  cosmology  was  no  less  objective  than  that  of 
their   predecessors.     The  Eleatics,  Xenophanes,  Par- 
menides,    Zeno   of    Elea,   Melissus,   maintained    the 
principle  of   objective  Monism ;  their  h  kol  Trai/  was 
illimitable   and  immutable   Being,   devoid   of    every 
positive   attribute   save   that  of  thought,   while   the 
manifold  appearances  under  which  it  presents  itself 
to  man  were  only  mere  seeming  and  delusion.     But 
there  was  no  element  of  subjectivism  in  their  cos- 
mology ;   they  attributed   to  the  Cosmos  permanence 
without  change,   unity   without    multiplicity,    as   its 
constitutive   objective   principle.      Heraclitus    taught 
that  the  principle  of  all  things  was  fire,  as  the  type  of 
ceaseless  and  universal  change  (TrdvTa  x^pet),  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  Eleatics  ;  but  his  cosmology  was  none 
the  less  objective  because  he  discovered  in  it  only 
change    without    permanence,    multiplicity    without 
unity.     Empedocles  sought  to  mediate  between  the 
Eleatic  and  Heraclitean  views  by  positing  four  change- 
less elements,  air,  earth,  fire,  and  water,  with  two  con- 


15  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

stant  forces,  love  and  hate,  and  by  conceding  endless 
chano-e  in  the  combinations  and  mutual  relations  of 
these  permanent  factors  of  creation ;  but  he  was 
wholly  as  realistic  and  objective  as  his  predecessors. 
The  Atomists,  Leucippus  and  Democritus,  offered  a 
strictly  mechanical  ex^^lanation  of  Nature,  attributing 
independent  objective  reality  to  the  atoms  which 
alone  remained  changeless  in  the  midst  of  eternal 
change.  Anaxagoras  in  a  certain  sense  summed  up 
all  the  preceding  philosophies  in  his  own,  by  means 
of  his  theory  of  ojaoto^epctat  or  semina  rerum,  while  he 
introduced  a  new  principle  in  the  assumption  of  an 
immaterial  vov^  as  the  moving  and  guiding  cause  of 
the  universe  ;  and  he,  too,  was  unreservedly  objective 
in  his  cosmology. 

With  the  Sophists,  however,  appeared  the  first 
symptoms  of  true  subjectivism ;  and  they  may  be 
regarded  as  the  forerunners  of  Nominalism,  though 
only  in  a  feeble,  crude,  and  undeveloped  sense.  The 
Sophists  had  no  system,  no  school,  no  determinate 
principle  save  that  of  scepticism  as  to  objective  truth 
and  paradoxical  acquiescence  in  all  opinions  as  equally 
true  or  equally  false.  Their  movement  was  the  de- 
structive distillation  of  all  fixed  conviction  in  the 
heats  of  logomachy  and  interminable  word-quibbling. 
They  had  nothing  in  common  save  a  certain  unity  of 
spirit  and  method  —  a  spirit  of  universal  scepticism, 
and  a  method  of  adroit  disputation  by  the  employ- 
ment of  double  meanings  and  ambiguous  middle 
terms.  Sceptics  in  philosophy,  anarchists  in  ethics, 
their  greatest  historical  merit  is  that  of  having  polar- 
ized and  called  into  activity  the  noble  intellect  of 
Socrates.  They  held  no  definite  theory  of  subjectiv- 
ism at  all ;  but  the  manner  in  which  they  evacuated 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

general  terms  of  all  fixed  meaning  and  all  objective 
validity  challenged  and  arrested  the  attention  of 
Socrates,  as  the  true  secret  of  their  plausibility  and 
bewildering  success  in  debate.  It  was  this  fact  that 
fixed  and  determined  the  direction  taken  by  this 
mighty  genius.  The  Sophists  practically,  though  not 
theoretically,  anticipated  the  Nominalists  in  conced- 
ing only  subjective  validity  to  generic  and  specific 
terms,  which  constitute  the  very  alphabet  of  knowl- 
edge ;  and  Socrates,  piercing  to  the  ulterior  conse- 
quences of  this  procedure  in  the  dissolution  of  all 
intellectual  verity  and  all  moral  obligation,  rose,  like 
a  giant  in  his  strength,  to  combat  a  great  tendency  of 
his  time  which  threatened  to  cause  the  fatty  degener- 
ation of  Greek  civilization,  the  melancholy  decay  of 
Greek  thought  and  life. 

The  astounding  success  of  Socrates  in  this  great 
struggle  is  the  most  splendid  monument  to  the  power 
of  individual  genius  that  the  history  of  philosophy 
can  show.  Alone  and  unaided,  he  checked  and  re- 
versed the  Nominalistic  revolution  already  far  ad- 
vanced, annihilated  the  Sophists  as  a  practical  power 
in  philosophy,  and  determined  the  course  of  specula- 
tion for  a  millennium  and  a  half  in  the  direction  of 
Eealism.  No  other  victory  such  as  this  was  ever  won 
in  the  annals  of  human  thought ;  and  yet  what  histo- 
rian of  philosophy  has  perceived,  much  less  celebrated 
it  ?  It  will  never  be  appreciated  until  the  dominant 
Nominalism  of  modern  philosophy  has  given  place  to 
the  dawning  New  Eealism  of  modern  science  —  a  day 
perhaps  less  distant  than  now  appears.  What  gave 
success  to  Socrates  in  this  vast  encounter  was  the  fact 
that  he  planted  himself  on  an  immovable  rock,  the 
objective  significance  and  validity  of  general  terms, 


18  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM, 

as  opposed  to  their  purely  subjective  import  and 
value.  Even  Schwegler,  blind  as  he  is  to  the  enor- 
mous importance  of  the  struggle  between  ]^ominalism 
and  Kealism  (to  which  in  his  History  of  Philoso2^hy 
he  devotes  less  than  one  page  !),  says  of  Socrates  that 
"  there  begins  with  him  the  philosojohy  of  objective 
thought "  (p.  38,  Stirling's  translation  —  the  italics 
are  his).  Aristotle  explicitly  declares  in  the  Meta- 
fhysics  (XII.  4)  that  "  Socrates  was  engaged  in  form- 
ing systems  in  regard  to  the  ethical  or  moral  virtues, 
and  was  the  first  to  institute  an  investigation  in 
regard  to  the  univjersal  definition  of  these.  .  .  .  There 
are  two  improvements  in  science  which  one  might 
justly  ascribe  to  Socrates  —  I  allude  to  his  employ- 
ment of  inductive  arguments  and  his  definition  of  the 
universal.  .  .  .  Socrates  did  not,  it  is  true,  constitute 
universals  a  thing  involving  a  separate  subsistence, 
nor  did  he  regard  the  definitions  as  such ;  the  other 
philosophers,  however,  invested  them  with  a  separate 
subsistence."  But  Socrates  did  attribute  universal 
objective  authority  to  the  virtues  he  defined;  he 
refuted  the  Sophistic  construction  of  them  as  merely 
subjective  ;  he  repudiated  the  Sophistic  notion  that 
nothing  is  good  or  bad  by  nature  (<j!)uorci),  but  only  by 
statute  (vo>a)),  and  vindicated  the  objectivity  of 
general  terms  in  some  sense,  without  reaching  that 
luminous  doctrine  of  the  objectivity  of  relations 
which  alone  explains  it  clearly.  That  Socrates  con- 
ceived of  universals  as  objective  realities,  without 
arriving  at  any  definite  conclusions  as  to  the  mode  of 
this  reality,  sufficiently  appears  from  the  subsequent 
course  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  both  of  whom  inherited 
from  Socrates  the  undefined  objectivity  of  universals, 
and  each  of  whom  proceeded  to  define  it  in  his  own 


INTRODUCTION.  19 

way.  The  point  to  be  here  specially  noted  is  the  fact 
that  Socrates  rolled  back  the  advancing  tide  of  Nomi- 
nalism let  loose  by  the  Sophists,  accomplished  the 
feat  by  means  of  the  definition  of  universals  as  objec- 
tively valid  and  real,  and  stamped  the  thought  of 
fifteen  hundred  years  with  the  impress  of  his  own 
Eealism. 

The  impending  Nominalistic  revolution  having  been 
thus  definitely  arrested  by  Socrates,  —  the  great  ques- 
tion of  universals  having  been  bequeathed  by  him  to 
succeeding  generations  for  a  full  and  final  solution,  — 
the  existence  of  an  objective  outer  world  was  a  com- 
mon and  undisputed  premise  among  his  followers. 
In  particular,  the  assumption  of  the  objective  reality 
of  genera  and  species,  as  necessarily  involved  in  that 
of  a  cognizable  outer  world,  and  as  constituting  the 
objective  ground  of  all  general  terms,  became  a  com- 
mon point  of  departure  to  Plato  and  Aristotle.  But, 
while  Plato  erected  on  this  assumption  his  theory  of 
Ideas,  Aristotle  erected  on  it  his  opposing  theory  of 
Essences  or  Forms  —  to  which  reference  will  be  more 
particularly  made  below.  Both  the  Platonic  and 
Aristotelian  points  of  view  were  fundamentally  and 
equally  objective,  and  equally  alien  to  the  point 
occupied  by  modern  philosophy  since  the  triumph 
of  Nominalism  over  Realism,  when  the  tides  of 
thought  began  to  set  irresistibly  in  the  direction  of 
subjectivism. 

The  Stoics  betrayed  to  some  extent  the  influence  of 
the  Sophists  in  their  theory  of  universals.  They  dis- 
carded alike  the  Platonic  theory  of  Ideas  and  the  Aris- 
totelian theory  of  Forms,  and  were  apparently  the  first 
to  proclaim  distinctly  the  doctrine  of  subjective  con- 
cepts,  formed  through  abstraction.      This   doctrine, 


20  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

however,  did  not  attain  in  their  hands  a  full  logical 
development  into  the  theory  of  Nominalism  ;  in  fact, 
it  did  not  at  all  prevent  the  Stoics  from  advancing  to 
the  construction  of  a  positively  objective  cosmology 
and  theology  of  their  own;  and,  although  with  a 
serious  logical  inconsistency,  they  maintained  on  the 
whole  an  objective  point  of  view. 

The  Epicureans,  with  their  doctrine  of  the  atoms 
and  the  truth  of  all  perceptions  of  matter,  may  be 
considered  quite  free  from  the  tendency  to  subjectiv- 
ism, so  far  as  the  present  discussion  is  concerned. 

The  Sceptics  — the  earlier  with  their  "  Ten  Tropes,'' 
and  the  later  with  their  ^'  Five  Tropes  "  —  did  not  so 
much  deny  the  existence  of  an  outer  world  as  the 
trustworthiness  of  human  knowledge  of  it,  and  ad- 
vanced no  definite  doctrine  respecting  universals. 
They  occupied  mainly  negative  and  critical  ground, 
and  exerted  no  great  influence  in  that  controversy. 
Their  arguments  mostly  rest  on  the  assumption  of 
Eealisra. 

During  the  third  great  period  of  Greek  philosophy, 
including  the  Grseco-Judaic,  the  Neo-Pythagorean, 
and  the  Neo-Platonic  schools,  the  predominant  ten- 
dency was  pre-eminently  objective,  since  the  mystical 
or  theosophical  contemplation  of  a  Divine  Transcen- 
dent Object  by  means  of  the  '^  ecstatic  intuition  "  is 
incompatible  with  an  exclusive  subjectivity.  Theoso- 
phy,  in  fact,  tends  to  reduce  the  subject  to  a  state  of 
pure  passivity,  and  to  absorb  him  completely  in  con- 
templation of  the  Object  of  worship. 

In  no  period  of  Greek  philosophy,  therefore,  did 
the  Nominalistic  tendency  gain  much  force  or  head- 
way after  it  had  once  been  checked  by  Socrates.  Its 
hour  had  not  yet  come. 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

Passing  now  to  tlie  Christian  Era,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  Patristic  period  was  devoted  to  the  develop- 
ment of  systematic  or  dogmatic  theology,  without 
interference  from  pagan  philosophy  after  the  closing 
of  the  School  at  Athens,  in  a.d.  529,  by  edict  of  the 
emperor  Justinian.  Since  dogmatic  theology,  by  the 
very  nature  of  its  conceptions,  is  unqualifiedly  objec- 
tive, the  Patristic  and  in  main  the  Scholastic  periods 
are  chiefly  noticeable  here  as  having  carried  the  prin- 
ciple of  objectivity  to  so  abnormal  and  oppressive  a 
degree  of  development  as  to  cause  speculation  to 
rebound  to  the  opposite  extreme.  The  creation  of  a 
great  body  of  doctrine  held  by  the  Catholic  Church  to 
be  the  absolute  and  unmixed  truth  of  God,  and  the 
terrible  intolerance  with  which  the  Church  stamped 
out  all  dissent  from  this  fixed  standard  of  belief,  in- 
evitably tended  to  excite  a  reaction  against  it,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  mental  activity  of  the  age.  Moreover, 
the  Church  had  planted  itself  in  philosophy  upon  the 
Eealism  of  Plato  and  Aristotle ;  and  it  was  equally 
inevitable  that  the  reaction  should  be  against  this,  no 
less  than  against  the  theology  of  the  Church.  There 
is  no  room  for  wonder,  then,  at  the  fact  that  the  cause 
of  Nominalism  came  to  be  identified  with  the  cause  of 
intellectual  and  religious  freedom,  and  the  triumph  of 
the  one  with  the  triumph  of  the  other.  Consequently 
it  is  to  the  Scholastic  period,  and  to  the  rise  of  the 
great  controversy  between  Eealism  and  Nominalism  — 
the  former  representing  Catholic  orthodoxy  and  the 
latter  heterodoxy,  —  that  must  be  traced  the  begin- 
ning of  the  general  subjective  movement  of  modern 
philosophy,  although  this  movement  did  not  gain 
full  headway  till  after  the  downfall  of  Scholasti- 
cism, when  victorious  Nominalism  had  time   to   de- 


22  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

velop  unrestrained  all  the  latent  tendencies  it  involved. 
Tennemann  has  significantly  and  truly  said  that  this 
momentous  controversy  was  "  never  definitely  settled." 
The  reason  is  that  both  sides  were  right,  yet  neither 
wholly  so;  they  did  but  bequeath  to  later  times  a 
problem  they  could  not  solve.  Disguised  as  it  is  by 
new  forms  and  new  names,  the  immeasurably  impor- 
tant issue  between  objectivism  and  subjectivism  in- 
volved in  that  ancient  controversy  survives  to-day. 
Nominalism,  by  virtue  of  the  truth  it  contained  and 
the  freedom  it  represented,  conquered  Realism  in 
philosophy,  and  culminated  in  the  splendid  genius 
of  Kant ;  Eealism,  by  virtue  of  the  truth  it  too  con- 
tained, conquered  Nominalism  in  science,  created  an 
army  of  experimental  investigators  of  Nature,  and 
culminated  in  the  establishment  of  the  scientific 
method,  which,  though  as  yet  purely  practical  and 
empirical,  demands  with  increasing  emphasis  from 
philosophy  a  theory  of  knowledge  that  shall  justify 
it  in  all  eyes.  Here  is  the  explanation  of  the  wide 
divergence,  the  virtual  divorce  and  even  antagonism, 
which  is  so  patent  a  fact  to  all  who  look  beneath  the 
surface  of  things,  between  science  and  philosophy. 
All  the  intellectual  interests  of  mankind  must  suffer 
greatly,  until  the  breach  is  effectually  healed ;  and 
the  first  step  to  the  reconciliation  so  much  to  be 
desired  must  be  a  clear  comprehension  of  the 
causes  which  have  created  the  division.  Hence  the 
necessity  of  surveying  the  ancient  battle-field  of 
Scholasticism. 

The  proximate  origin  of  the  great  mediaeval  dispute 
over  the  nature  of  universals  seems  to  have  been  a  pas- 
sage at  the  commencement  of  Porphyry's  Introduction 
to  Aristotle's  treatise  on  the  Categories,  known  at  the 


INTRODUCTION.  23 

time  only  through  the  Latin  translation  of  Boethius, 
in  which  these  three  problems  were  stated,  but  not 
elucidated,  with  respect  to  genera  and  species:  — 
"1.  Whether  they  have  a  substantive  existence,  or  re- 
side merely  in  naked  mental  conceptions.  2.  Whether, 
assuming  them  to  have  substantive  existence,  they  are 
bodies  or  incorporeals.  3.  AVhether  their  substantive 
existence  is  in  and  along  with  the  objects  of  sense,  or 
apart  and  separable."  Neglecting  minor  distinctions, 
refinements  and  subtilties,  and  without  following  the 
long  and  tedious  course  of  the  dispute,  it  will  amply 
suffice  for  present  purposes  to  state  concisely  the  five 
leading  positions  maintained  by  different  philosophers 
of  the  Scholastic  period,  as  follows  :  — 

1,  Extreme  Kealism  {Universalia  ante  rem)  taught 
that  universals  were  substances  or  things,  existing  in- 
dependently of  and  separable  from  particulars  or  indi- 
viduals. This  was  the  essence  of  Plato's  Theory  of 
Ideas,  and  Plato  was  the  father  of  Extreme  Eealism 
as  held  in  the  Scholastic  period.  Scotus  Erigena,  who 
died  A.D.  880,  was  the  first  to  revive  this  doctrine  in 
the  Schools,  borrowing  from  the  Pseudo-Dionysius 
Areopagita. 

2.  Moderate  Eealism  (JJniversalia  in  re)  also 
taught  that  universals  were  substances,  but  only  as 
dependent  upon  and  inseparable  from  individuals,  in 
which  each  inhered;  that  is,  each  universal  inhered 
in  each  of  the  particulars  ranged  under  it.  This  was 
the  theory  of  Aristotle,  who  held  that  the  To8e  n  or 
individual  thing  was  the  First  Essence,  while  universals 
were  only  Second  Essences,  real  in  a  less  complete  sense 
than  Eirst  Essences.  He  thus  reversed  the  Platonic 
doctrine,  which  attributed  the  fullest  reality  to  uni- 
versals only,  and  a  merely  "  participative  "  reality  to 


24  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

individuals.  Until  Scotus  Erigena  resuscitated  the 
Platonic  theory,  Aristotle's  was  the  received  doctrine 
in  the  Schools  ;  and  the  warfare  was  simply  between 
those  two  forms  of  Eealism  prior  to  the  advent  of 
Koscellinus. 

3.  Extreme  Nominalism  (Universalla  j^ost  retii) 
taught  that  universals  had  no  substantive  or  objective 
existence  at  all,  but  were  merely  empty  names  or  words 
(nomi?ia,  voces,  flatus  vocis).  Though  probably  not  the 
absolute  originator  of  this  sententia  vocum,  as  the  doc- 
trine came  to  be  called,  Eoscellinus,  Canon  of  Com- 
piegne,  was  the  first  to  give  it  currency  and  notoriety, 
and  the  Council  of  Soissons,  under  the  influence  of 
the  Eealist  Anselm  of  Canterbury,  his  chief  oppo- 
nent, forced  him  in  the  year  1092  to  recant  the  tri- 
theistic  interpretation  of  the  Trinity,  which  he  had 
consistently  and  courageously  avowed.  The  theory 
of  Extreme  Nominalism  was  thus  put  under  the 
ecclesiastical  ban. 

4.  Moderate  Nominalism  or  Coxceptualism 
{Universalla  post  rem)  taught  that  universals  have 
no  substantive  existence  at  all,  but  yet  are  more  than 
mere  names  signifying  nothing;  and  that  they  exist 
really,  though  only  subjectively,  as  concepts  in  the 
mind,  of  which  names  are  the  vocal  symbols.  Abailard 
is  claimed  by  some,  but  probably  incorrectly,  as  the 
author  of  this  modification  of  the  Nominalistic  view ; 
William  of  Occam,  who  died  in  1347,  seems  to  have 
been  the  chief,  if  not  the  earliest,  representative  of 
it.  The  Encyclopcedia  Britan7iica  (XVI.  284,  8th  ed.) 
says  :  "  The  theory  termed  Conceptualism,  or  concep- 
tual Nominalism,  was  really  the  one  maintained  by  all 
succeeding  Nominalists,  and  is  the  doctrine  of  ideas 
generally  believed  in  at  the  present  day." 


INTRODUCTION.  25 

5.  Albertus  Magnus  (died  1280),  Thomas  Aquinas 
(died  1274),  Duns  Scotus  (died  1308),  and  others,  fused 
all  these  views  into  one,  and  taught  that  universal s 
exist  in  a  three-fold  manner  :  Universalia  ante  rem,  as 
thoughts  in  the  mind  of  God ;  Universalia  in  re,  as  the 
essence  (quiddity)  of  things,  according  to  Aristotle  ; 
and  Universalia  post  rem,  as  concepts  in  the  sense  of 
Moderate  Nominalism.  This  is  to-day  the  orthodox 
philosophy  of  the  Catholic  Church,  as  opposed  to  the 
prevailingly  exclusive  Conceptualism  of  the  Protes- 
tant world. 

Thus  both  Extreme  Eealism  and  Moderate  Eealism 
maintained  the  objective  reality  of  genera  and  species  ; 
while  both  Extreme  Nominalism  and  Moderate  Nomi- 
nalism maintained  that  genera  and  species  possess  no 
objective  reality  at  all. 

In  contrast  with  all  the  views  above  presented,  an- 
other and  sixth  view  will  now  be  stated,  which,  taken 
as  a  whole  and  with  reference  to  the  vitally  important 
consequences  it  involves,  is  believed  to  be  both  novel 
and  true. 

6.  Eelationism  or  Scientific  Eealism  (of  which 
universalia  inter  res  may  be  adopted  as  an  apt  formula) 
teaches  that  universals,  or  genera  and  species,  are,  first, 
objective  relations  of  resemblance  among  objectively 
existing  things;  secondly,  subjective  concepts  of  these 
relations,  determined  in  the  mind  by  the  relations 
themselves ;  and,  thirdly,  names  representative  both 
of  the  relations  and  the  concepts,  and  applicable 
alike  to  both.  This  is  the  view  logically  implied 
in  all  scientific  classifications  of  natural  objects, 
regarded  as  objects  of  real  scientific  knowledge. 
But,  although  empirically  employed  with  dazzling 
success   in  the  investigation  of  Nature^  it  does  not 


26  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

appear  to  have  been  ever  theoretically  generalized 
or  stated. 

This  view  rests  for  its  justification  upon  a  broader 
principle;  namely,  that  of  the  OhjectiuiUj  of  Relations, 
as  opposed  to  the  principle  of  the  Suhjectivlty  of  Rela- 
tions, which  is  the  essence  of  the  Nominalistic  doctrine 
of  universals  inculcated  by  modern  philosophy.  Kant 
distinctly  made  "Eelation"  one  of  the  four  forms 
of  the  logical  judgment  which  determine  the  twelve 
"categories  of  the  understanding;"  ^.e.,  the  a  2yriori 
forms  of  thought,  totally  independent  of  "things-in- 
themselves/'  and  applicable  to  them  only  so  far  as 
they  are  objects  of  a  possible  "experience,"  which, 
however,  reveals  nothing  of  their  real  nature.  This 
doctrine  that  relations  do  not  inhere  at  all  in  "  things- 
in-themselves,"  but  are  simply  imposed  upon  them  by 
the  mind  in  experience  as  the  purely  subjective  form 
of  phenomena,  is  strictly  deducible  from  the  ISTomi- 
nalistic  doctrine  that  general  terms,  by  which  rela- 
tions are  expressed,  correspond  to  nothing  objectively 
real ;  and  Kant's  master-mind  is  nowhere  more  clearly 
apparent  than  in  the  subtilty  and  profundity  with 
which  he  thus  seized  the  prevalent  but  undeveloped 
Nominalism  of  the  modern  period,  and  erected  it 
into  the  most  imposing  philosophical  system  of  the 
world.  By  this  doctrine  of  the  Subjectivity  of  Eela- 
tions,  Kant  reduced  the  outer  world  to  utterly  un- 
known Dinge-an-sich,  and  paved  the  way  for  his  still 
more  thorough-going  disciple,  Fichte,  to  deny  their 
very  existence,  and  thereby  to  take  a  great  stride  in 
conducting  Nominalism  to  its  only  logical  terminus, 
Solipsism. 

The  principle  of  Eelationism,  however,  rests  on 
these  self-evident  propositions  :  — 


INTRODUCTION.  27 

1.  Eelations  are  absolutely  inseparable  from  their 
terms. 

2.  The  relations  of  things  are  absolutely  insepa- 
rable from  the  things  themselves. 

3.  The  relations  of  things  must  exist  where  the 
things  themselves  are,  whether  objectively  in  the 
Cosmos  or  subjectively  in  the  mind. 

4.  If  things  exist  objectively,  their  relations  must 
exist  objectively;  but  if  their  relations  are  merely 
subjective,  the  things  themselves  must  be  merely 
subjective. 

5.  There  is  no  logical  alternative  between  affirm, 
ing  the  objectivity  of  relations  in  and  with  that 
of  things,  and  denying  the  objectivity  of  things  in 
and  with  that  of  relations. 

For  instance,  a  triangle  consists  of  six  elements, 
three  sides  and  three  angles.  The  sides  are  things; 
the  angles  are  relations  —  relations  of  greater  or  less 
divergence  between  the  sides.  If  the  sides  exist  ob- 
jectively, the,  angles  must  exist  objectively  also ;  but 
if  the  angles  are  merely  subjective,  so  must  the  sides 
be  also.  To  affirm  that  the  sides  are  objective  reali- 
ties, even  as  incognizable  things-in-themselves,  while 
yet  the  angles,  as  relations,  have  only  a  subjective 
existence,  is  the  ne  plus  ultra  of  logical  absurdity. 
Yet  Kantianism,  Nominalism,  and  all  Nominalistic 
philosophy  (if  they  admit  so  much  as  the  bare  possi- 
bility of  the  existence  of  things-in-themselves)  are 
driven  irresistibly  to  that  very  conclusion. 

In  short,  it  is  because  modern  philosophy  rests  ex- 
clusively on  the  basis  of  Nominalism,  of  which  the 
only  logical  terminus  is  absolute  Egoistic  Idealism  or 
Solipsism,  and  because  modern  science  rests  exclu- 
sively  on   the   basis  of  Eelationism,  that  we  affirm 


28  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

unqualifiedly  an  irreconcilable  antagonism  between 
the  two  just  so  long  as  their  respective  bases  remain 
unchanged.  It  seems  needless,  but  may  be  neverthe- 
less advisable,  to  point  out  explicitly  that  Eelationism 
carefully  shuns  the  great  error  of  Scholastic  Eealism, 
i.e.,  the  hypostatization  of  universals  as  substances, 
entities,  or  things ;  it  teaches  that  genera  and  species 
exist  objectively,  but  only  as  relations,  and  that  things 
and  relations  constitute  two  great,  distinct  orders  of 
objective  reality,  inseparable  in  existence,  yet  distin- 
guishable in  thought. 

The  philosophic  value  of  the  principle  of  Eela- 
tionism is  strikingly  illustrated  in  the  ease  with 
which,  applied  as  a  key,  it  unlocks  the  secret  and 
lays  bare  the  signification  of  the  ancient  and 
still  unfinished  controversy  between  Eealism  and 
Nominalism. 

1.  It  shows  that  Extreme  Eealism  was  right  in 
upholding  the  objectivity  of  universals,  but  wrong 
in  classing  them  as  independent  and  separable  sub- 
stances or  things. 

2.  It  shows  that  Moderate  Eealism  was  right  in 
upholding  the  objectivity  of  universals,  but  wrong 
in  making  them  inherent  in  individuals  as  indi- 
viduals (in  re)  rather  than  in  individuals  as  groups 
(inter  res).  Eelations  do  not  inhere  in  either  of 
the  related  terms  taken  singly,  but  do  inhere  in  all 
the  terms  taken  collectively. 

3.  It  shows  that  Extreme  Nominalism  was  right 
in  denying  the  objectivity  of  universals  as  sub- 
stances or  things  (the  great  error  of  its  opponent), 
and  right  in  affirming  the  existence  of  universals 
as  names  ;  but  wrong  in  denying  their  objectivity 
as  relations  and  their  subjectivity  as  concepts. 


INTRODUCTION.  29 

4.  It  shows  that  Moderate  Nominalism  or  Conceptu- 
alism  was  right  in  denying  the  objectivity  of  uni- 
versals  as  substances,  and  also  right  in  affirming 
their  subjectivity  as  concepts  ;  but  wrong  in  deny- 
ing their  objectivity  as  relations. 

Thus  every  element  of  truth  is  gathered  up,  and 
every  element  of  error  is  eliminated,  by  rejecting  the 
four  historic  theories  already  recapitulated,  together 
with  the  merely  syncretistic  fifth  theory,  and  by  sub- 
stituting in  their  place  the  propounded  sixth  theory 
of  Eelationism.  Its  precision,  lucidity,  comprehen- 
siveness, and  adequacy  to  account  for  all  the  facts, 
will  become  so  evident  to  any  one  patient  enough  to 
master  it  fully  in  all  its  bearings,  as  to  warrant  the 
indulgence  of  a  hope  that  it  may  permanently  solve 
the  great  problem  declared  by  Tennemann  to  have 
never  been  '^  definitely  settled." 

III. 

When  Scholasticism  fell,  the  theory  of  Eelationism 
had  occurred  to  no  one.  Each  of  the  competing 
theories  discerned  the  weakness  of  its  rivals,  yet 
could  not  discern  its  own,  and  was  therefore  unable 
to  arrive  at  the  real  truth  respecting  universals. 
Consequently,  as  has  just  been  pointed  out,  the  truth 
was  divided  among  them.  Nominalism  gradually  won 
the  ascendency  among  philosophers  in  the  form  of 
Conceptualism ;  while  Eelationism  became,  not  indeed 
a  received  theory,  since  as  a  theory  it  did  not  yet 
exist,  but  yet  the  unformulated  and  empirical  prin- 
ciple of  the  actual  practice  of  scientific  observers,  ex- 
perimenters, and  investigators  of  nature.  Philosophy 
divorced   itself   from  a  true   objectivity,  and  surren- 


30  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

dered  itself  to  subjectivism  in  the  form  of  Moderate 
Nominalism;  while  science,  ceasing  to  philosophize, 
turned  its  back  upon  the  barren  metaphysics  of  the 
schools,  because  they  could  yield  no  objective  knowl- 
edge, and  learned  the  sad  lesson  of  contempt  for 
philosophy  itself. 

A  period  of  transition  followed  the  downfall  of 
Scholasticism,  full  of  confusion  and  conflicting  ten- 
dencies. Spasmodic  resuscitation  of  various  ancient 
philosophies  —  Aristotelianism  in  a  more  accurately 
known  form,  Platonism,  Neo-Platonism.,  Stoicism,  Epi- 
cureanism, &c.  —  ensued ;  but  these  revived  systems 
did  not  materially  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the 
subjective  tendenc}^,  since,  as  has  been  shown,  ancient 
philosophy  in  the  post-Socratic  periods  had  been  pre- 
vailingly objective  in  all  its  forms.  The  true  origin 
of  the  increasing  subjectivism  of  philosophy,  and 
therefore  the  true  secret  of  the  increasing  repugnance 
of  science  for  philosophy  itself,  lay  in  the  triumph 
of  Nominalism  over  the  relatively  inferior  Eealism  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  in  its  denial  of  all  objective  knowl- 
edge save  of  particulars  as  isolated  and  unrelated^  and 
in  its  claim  of  a  strictly  subjective  genesis  for  uni- 
versals  as  concepts  or  names  alone.  Philosophy  in 
this  manner  stripped  the  objective  world  of  every- 
thing that  was  really  intelligible  —  genera,  species, 
relations  of  all  kinds ;  while  science,  bereft  of  all  phi- 
losophical aid,  took  refuge  in  a  rude  sort  of  common 
sense  and  fortified  itself  in  a  spirit  of  defiance  to  all 
speculative  thought.  Bacon's  popularity  rested  really 
on  no  stronger  foundation :  he  merely  headed  an  un- 
reasoning revolt  against  Nominalism,  hardly  knowing 
what  he  did,  yet  practically  rendering  an  immense 
service  by  rallying  the  enterprising  and  curious  spirits 


INTRODUCTION.  31 

of  the  time  about  the  standard  of  "  induction."  He 
too  joined  in  the  wide-spread  outcry  against  Aristotle 
and  his  followers,  mistakenly  believing  that  Aristotle 
was  really  responsible  for  the  Nominalism  of  the  age 
which  he  vaguely  felt  to  be  the  chief  obstacle  to 
science.  The  results  of  this  open  feud  between  sci- 
ence and  philosophy  were  disastrous  to  both  in  the 
end;  for,  while  the  latter  tended  steadily  towards 
Idealism  and  Solipsism,  the  former  as  steadily  tended 
towards  Materialism.  For  the  time  being,  however, 
the  revolt  of  science  against  philosophy  was  most 
salutary. 

While  science  adopted  a  purely  empirical  objective 
method,  took  Nature  for  granted,  investigated  things 
and  their  relations  by  observation  and  experiment  on 
the  hypothesis  of  their  equal  objectivity,  and  entered 
on  a  career  of  dazzling  conquest,  without  troubling 
itself  to  invent  any  philosophical  justification  for  a 
method  so  prolific  of  discoveries  as  to  silence  all 
criticism  or  cavil  by  the  brilliancy  of  its  achieve- 
ments, philosophy  had  already  entered  upon  a  path 
wdiich  led  indeed  to  the  construction  of  numerous 
subjective  systems  of  unsurpassed  ability,  yet  to  none 
that  could  endure.  The  history  of  philosophy  has 
been  for  three  centuries  only  a  succession  of  gayly- 
colored  pictures,  each  more  startlingly  beautiful  than 
the  last,  yet  each  doomed  to  disappear  at  the  next 
turn  of  the  kaleidoscope.  While  science  can  proudly 
point  to  a  vast  store  of  verified  and  established  truths, 
which  it  is  a  liberal  education  to  have  learned  and 
the  merest  lunacy  to  impugn,  philosojjhy  has  achieved 
nothing  that  is  permanently  established.  The  cause 
of  this  vast  difference  in  result  is  a  radical  difference 
in  method.     Objectivism,  albeit  solely  empirical,  has 


'62  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

created  the  glory  of  science;  subjectivism,  albeit 
elaborately  and  ostentatiously  reasoned,  lias  created 
the  shame  of  philosophy.  And  philosophy  can  never 
redeem  itself  from  this  shame  of  utter  barrenness 
until  it  rei)udiates  subjectivism  with  Nominalism,  its 
cause. 

The  epoch  of  Scholasticism  is  regarded  by  some  as 
closed  by  the  death  of  Gabriel  Biel,  the  ^^  last  Scho- 
lastic," in  1495,  when  Nominalism  had  acquired  almost 
undisputed  sway. 

Now  the  essential  method  of  Scholasticism  had 
been,  as  Tennemann  well  expresses  it,  to  "draw  all 
knowledge  from  conceptions.'^  So  long  as  Eealism 
flourished,  and  universals,  as  entities,  were  held  to 
possess  substantial  objective  existence,  the  analysis 
of  concepts,  independently  of  experience  or  veritica- 
tion,  was  held  to  yield  real  knowledge  of  their  objec- 
tive correlates  —  a  mistake  impossible  to  the  New 
Eealism  or  Eelationism.  But  when  Nominalism  had 
destroyed  the  objectivity  of  universals,  it  had  also 
destroyed  the  possibility  of  deriving  objective  knowl- 
edge from  concepts.  A  dilemma  thus  arose  :  either 
objective  knowledge  is  unattainable,  or  it  must  be 
attained  otherwise  than  by  the  mere  analysis  of  con- 
cepts as  such.     But  how  ? 

In  this  manner  was  developed  a  new  and  momen- 
tous problem,  that  of  the  Origin  of  Knowledge,  which 
now  displaced  the  old  and  still  unsolved  problem  of 
the  Nature  of  Universals  —  not  at  all  fortuitously, 
but  logically  and  inevitably  as  a  direct  result  of  the 
triumph  of  Nominalism.  Nominalism  had  answered 
the  old  question  after  its  own  manner  by  resolving 
universals  into  merely  subjective  notions  ;  and  this 
answer,  false  as  it  was,  was  accepted  as  satisfactory. 


INTRODUCTION.  33 

But  the  acceptance  of  it  involved  some  awkward  con- 
sequences. If  objective  knowledge  cannot  be  derived 
from  concepts,  whence  can  it  be  derived  ?  Or  is 
there  no  such  thing  as  objective  knoAvledge  ? 

Science  met  these  questions  by  boldly  adopting  the 
principle  of  Objective  Verification — a  principle  de- 
pending absolutely  for  its  philosophical  justification 
on  the  theory  of  Kelationism,  but  adopted  by  Bacon 
and  the  inductionists  in  general  as  a  purely  empirical 
method,  in  utter  indifference  to  such  justification. 
From  that  time  forward,  scientific  men  have  quietly 
assumed  the  objectivity  of  relations,  and  steadily 
pursued  the  path  of  discovery  in  total  disregard  of 
the  disputes  of  metaphysicians  —  not,  however,  with- 
out a  serious  loss  to  science  itself,  in  the  growth  and 
spread  of  the  false  belief  that  science  can  legitimately 
deal  only  with  physical  investigations,  and  that  the 
scientific  method  has  no  applicability  in  the  "  higher 
sciences.'^ 

But  philosophy  met  the  same  questions  by  dividing 
into  two  hostile  camps.  The  sufficiency  of  the  ISTomi- 
nalistic  answer  to  the  question  of  universals  —  that 
they  are  exclusively  of  subjective  origin  —  was  taken 
for  granted  by  both  parties ;  genera,  species,  relations 
of  all  kinds,  were  unanimously  conceded  to  possess 
no  objective  validity  whatever.  Logically,  this  is  the 
total  surrender  of  all  objective  knowledge ;  and  in 
the  long  run  modern  philosophy  has  come  to  accept 
this  result,  as  shown  by  the  almost  entire  unanimity 
of  modern  philosophers  in  the  opinion  that  things- 
in-them selves,  or  noumena,  are  utterly  incognoscible. 
But  it  is  impossible  to  maintain  this  opinion  in  logi- 
cal consistency,  and  on  this  point  not  a  single  logically 
consistent  philosopher  can  be  pointed  out ;  if  he  can 

3 


34  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

be  found,  he  will  prove  to  be  an  inexorably  rigorous 
Solipsist,  not  afraid  to  deny  the  existence  of  all  minds 
save  his  own,  no  less  than  that  of  the  material  world. 
It  would  be  refreshing  to  meet  with  a  subjectivist 
possessed  of  the  courage  of  his  opinion  ;  but  he  would 
be  the  terror  of  all  his  brother-subjectivists,  perhaps  a 
candidate  for  premature  interment. 

The  division  that  now  arose  and  separated  modern 
philosophy  into  two  great  contending  parties  did  not 
concern  the  question  whether  knowledge  originated  in 
the  object  or  in  the  subject,  —  for  both  parties  agreed 
in  the  Nominalistic  answer  to  this  question,  —  but 
whether,  in  the  subject  mind  itself,  it  originated  in 
the  senses  or  in  the  intellect.  That  was  the  great  new 
question  started  at  the  recognized  dawn  of  modern  phi- 
losophy by  Descartes  and  Locke ;  and  both  parties  to 
the  controversy,  both  the  a  jyriori  and  the  a  lyosterlori 
schools,  were  equally  switched  off  upon  the  false  track 
of  Nominalism  that  conducts  to  Egoism  or  to  nothings 

Descartes'  theory  of  "  innate  ideas  "  encountered  a 
vigorous  rival  in  Locke's  theory  of  experience  as 
limited  to  the  data  of  "  sensation  and  reflection ; " 
and  thus  the  two  armies  took  position  for  the  long 
warfare  that  is  resultless  still.  There  is  not  the 
slightest  occasion,  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  to 
follow  the  course  of  this  dispute,  or  to  repeat  the 
argumentation  and  counter-argumentation  by  which  it 
has  been  maintained.  The  point  of  view  here  taken 
is  that  both  these  famous  schools  have  logically  im- 
mured themselves  in  the  dungeon  of  subjectivism,  and 
are  utterly  powerless  to  release  themselves ;  that  the 
one  is  just  as  incompetent  as  the  other  to  explain  the 
"  origin  of  knowledge  "  about  which  they  have  been 
contending  so  long ;  and  that,  like  Venus  and  Mars 


INTRODUCTION.  35 

suspended  in  Vulcan's  cage  to  provoke  the  "  inextin- 
guishable laughter"  of  the  Odyssean  gods,  they  do 
but  enact  a  farce  at  which  philosophy  hangs  her  head. 
Travelling  round  the  same  circle  of  subjectivism  in 
opposite  directions,  these  two  schools  are  fated  to 
re-unite  on  the  farther  rim  in  one  identical  point  — 
the  stand-point  of  Absolute  Egoistic  Idealism.  That 
is  the  only  possible  terminus  of  a  subjectivism  that, 
beginning  with  the  definition  of  knowledge  as  only 
the  mind's  recognition  of  its  own  states,  dares  to  obey 
the  logic  of  its  own  fundamental  principle  ;  and  what 
is  the  philosophy  worth  that  contradicts  itself  ?  No 
sequent  thinker  who  begins  with  the  Ego  as  sole 
starting-point  will  fail  to  end  with  the  Ego  as  sole 
terminus,  unless  he  stoops  to  unworthy  tricks  or 
evasions;  and  that  is  the  suicide  of  philosophy. 

The  triumph  of  Nominalism  did  indeed  force  upon 
thought  a  new  problem  in  the  question  of  the  "  origin 
of  knowledge  ; "  but  great  is  the  delusion  of  the  two 
schools  which  imagine  the  solution  of  that  question  to 
lie  with  one  of  themselves. 

The  a  priori  school  started  with  Descartes*  Cogito 
ergo  sum ;  that  is,  with  an  original  positing  of  the  Ego 
as  an  individual  thinking  being.  The  a  posteriori 
school  started  with  Locke's  "  sensation ; "  that  is, 
with  an  original  positing  of  the  Ego  as  an  individual 
feeling  being.  That  is  essentially  the  only  difference 
—  the  difference  between  beginning  with  individual 
thought  or  individual  feeling  as  the  prior  element 
of  individual  consciousness, — both  beginnings  being 
equally  and  incontrovertibly  egoistic.  But  this  is  a 
trivial  difference  indeed,  compared  with  the  abysmal 
difference  between  both  these  egoistic  schools,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  modern  science,  on  the  other  ;  for  here 


36  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

the  issue  is  a  broad,  deep,  fundamental  one  —  namely, 
whether  the  real  "origin  of  knowledge  "  is  in  the  Ego 
or  in  the  Non-Ego,  or  in  both.  Knowledge  itself,  in 
the  conception  of  both  these  Nominalistic  schools,  is 
confined  to  the  series  of  changes  that  go  on  in  con- 
sciousness ;  and  all  their  mutual  discussions  are  mere 
child's-play,  compared  with  the  discussions  that  await 
philosophy  the  moment  she  comes  abreast  of  the 
time. 

Science  is  to-day  challenging  emphatically  the  very 
foundation  of  both  a  j^riorl  and  a  posteinori  philoso- 
phies ;  and  the  challenge  is  none  the  less  menacing 
or  deep-toned,  because  it  has  been  hitherto  uttered  in 
deed  rather  than  word.  She  denies,  not  by  a  theory 
as  yet,  but  by  the  erection  of  a  vast  and  towering 
edifice  of  verified  objective  knowledge,  that  genera 
and  species  are  devoid  of  objective  reality,  or  that 
general  terms  are  destitute  of  objective  correlates; 
she  denies  that  Nominalism  has  rightly  solved  the 
problem  of  universals,  when  that  solution  would  in  an 
instant,  if  conceded,  sweep  away  all  that  she  has  won 
from  Nature  by  the  sweat  of  her  brow.  Her  very 
existence  is  the  abundant  vindication  of  Relationism, 
as  the  stable  and  solid  foundation  of  real  knowledge 
of  an  objective  universe.  As  the  case  now  stands, 
philosophy  has  two  great  schools,  equally  founded  on 
a  reasoned  subjectivism  which  denies  the  possibility  of 
knowing,  in  any  degree,  an  objectively  existent  cosmos 
as  it  really  is  ;  while  science  rests  immovably  on  the 
fact  that  she  actually  knoivs  such  a  cosmos,  and  proves 
by  verification  the  reality  of  that  knowledge  which 
philosophy  loudly  and  emphatically  denies.  Science 
must  be  all  a  huge  illusion,  if  philosophy  is  right ; 
philosophy  is  a  sick  man's  dream,  if  science  is  right. 


INTRODUCTION.  37 

One  or  the  other  must  speedily  effect  a  total  change  of 
base ;  and  it  is  safe  to  predict  that  the  change  will  not 
be  made  by  science. 

Three  answers  are  given,  therefore,  to  the  question 
as  to  the  Origin  of  Knowledge ;  two  by  Nominalism, 
with  its  two  schools  of  modern  philosophy,  and  one 
by  Eelationism,  interpreting  the  silent  method  of 
science.     They  are  substantially  as  follows  :  — 

1.  The  a  2^riori  school  teaches  that  knowledge  has 
two  ultimate  origins,  the  experience  of  the  senses  and 
the  constitution  of  the  intellect  —  the  senses  contribut- 
ing its  a  posteriori  "matter"  and  the  intellect  con- 
tributing its  a  priori  "  form ;  "  that  the  intellect  is 
the  source  of  certain  universal  and  ante-experiential 
principles  of  knowledge  which  cannot  be  in  any 
manner  derived  from  the  senses ;  that  these  prin- 
ciples or  "forms"  are  themselves  an  object  of  pure 
a  priori  cognition,  independently  of  experience ;  that 
experience  consists  solely  of  sense-phenomena,  and 
sense-phenomena  give  no  knowledge  of  their  merely 
hypothetical  noumenal  causes,  i.e.,  of  "  things-in- 
themselves."  In  other  words,  things  (if  they  exist  — 
which  is  at  least  dubious)  conform  themselves  to 
cognition;  the  subject  knows  only  its  own  subjective 
modifications,  arranged  in  a  certain  order  according 
to  a  priori  laws  of  knowledge  which  are  only  sub- 
jectively valid.  This  is  Nominalistic  Subjectivism  of 
the  a  priori  type. 

2.  The  a  posteriori  school  teaches  that  knowledge 
has  only  one  ultimate  origin,  the  experience  of  the 
senses ;  that  the  intellect  is  indeed  the  source  of 
certain  universal  constitutive  principles  of  knowl- 
edge, but  that  these  were  originally  derived  from 
the   senses,  having  been   slowly  organized  and  con- 


38  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

solidated,  by  the  law  of  the  "association  of  ideas," 
into  hereditarily  transmissible  "forms"  of  experience; 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  "  pure  a  priori  cogni- ' 
tion/'  independent  of  experience;  that  experience 
consists  solely  of  sense-phenomena,  that  the  intellect 
itself  has  been  slowly  evolved  out  of  it,  and  that 
sense-phenomena  give  no  knowledge  of  their  merely 
hypothetical  noumenal  causes.  In  other  words,  things- 
in-themselves  (if  they  exist  —  which  is  equally  dubious 
by  this  theory)  conform  themselves  to  cognition ;  the 
subject  knows  only  its  own  subjective  modifications, 
arranged  in  a  certain  order  according  to  a  posteriori 
laws  of  knowledge,  which  are  only  subjectively  valid. 
This  is  Nominalistic  Subjectivism  of  the  a  posteriori 
type. 

Thus  both  of  these  dominant  schools  thoroughly 
agree  in  planting  themselves  upon  the  foundation  of 
Moderate  Nominalism  or  Conceptualism ;  they  agree 
that  universals,  the  genera  and  species  by  which  alone 
sense-phenomena  are  reducible  to  intelligible  order, 
are  merely  subjective  concepts  without  objective  cor- 
relates. They  agree  that  things-in-thera selves  are 
unknown  and  unknowable,  and  that  the  subject  knows 
its  own  conscious  states  alone.  By  both  schools, 
consequently,  the  principle  of  Kelationism  is  either 
unknown  or  ignored;  relation  itself  is  hj  both  re- 
duced to  a  merely  subjective  category,  valid  only 
as  the  subjective  order  imposed  on  subjective  sense- 
phenomena,  and  utterly  meaningless  as  applied  to 
noumena;  and  noumena — intelligible  objective  reali- 
ties, as  presented  by  the  various  sciences  —  are  totally 
incognoscible.  But  when  the  vitally  pertinent  question 
is  put :  "  Why  should  the  series  of  sense-phenomena, 
or  sensations,  or  consciousness  in  general,  be  what 


INTRODUCTION.  39 

it  is  ?  Why  should  the  senses  aud  understanding 
conspire  to  give  a  coherent  appearance  of  objective 
knowledge,  when  no  objective  knowledge  is  possible  ?" 
neither  school  has  any  reply  to  make.  The  only  re- 
ply consistent  with  their  common  premises  would  be 
Fichte's  reply,  that  the  apparent  objects  of  knowledge 
are  given  by  the  subject  to  itself,  according  to  some 
inscrutable  law  working  subtly  beneath  consciousness 
itself.  This  reply  has  at  least  the  merit  of  consistency 
with  the  ground-principles  of  subjectivism,  and  does 
not  flinch  from  landing  philosophy  in  Solipsism  undis- 
guised. But  few  subjectivists  possess  sufficient  hardi- 
hood to  make  this  consistent  reply;  they  prefer  to 
"have  their  cake  and  eat  it  too." 

3.  The  theory  of  Scientific  Philosophy  (by  which 
is  meant  simply  the  philosophy  that  founds  itself 
theoretically  upon  the  practical  basis  of  the  scientific 
method)  teaches  that  knowledge  is  a  dynamic  cor- 
relation of  object  and  subject,  and  has  two  ultimate 
origins,  the  cosmos  and  the  mind ;  that  these  origins 
unite,  inseparably  yet  distinguishably,  in  experience, 
i.e.,  the  perpetual  action  of  the  cosmos  on  the  mind 
jdus  the  perpetual  reaction  of  the  mind  on  the  cosmos 
and  on  itself  as  affected  by  it;  that  experience,  thus 
understood,  is  the  one  proximate  origin  of  knowledge; 
that  experience  has  both  an  objective  and  a  subjective 
side,  and  that  these  two  sides  are  mutually  dependent 
and  equally  necessary ;  that  the  objective  side  of  ex- 
perience depends  on  the  real  existence  of  a  known 
universe,  and  its  subjective  side  on  the  real  existence 
of  a  knowing  mind ;  that  experience  includes  all  mutual 
interaction  of  these,  whether  sensitive  or  cognitive, 
and  is  utterly  inexplicable  even  as  subjective  sensa- 
tion, unless  its  sensitive  and  cognitive  elements  are 


40  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

equally  recognized ;  that  this  extended  conception 
of  experience  destroys  the  distinction  of  noumena 
and  phenomena,  as  merely  verbal  and  not  real ;  that 
"  things-in-themselves "  are  partly  known  and  partly 
unknown;  that,  just  so  far  as  things  are  known  in 
their  relations,  they  are  known  both  phenomenally 
and  noumenally,  and  that  the  possibility  of  experi- 
mentally verifying  at  any  time  their  discovered  rela- 
tions is  the  practical  proof  of  a  known  noumenal 
cosmos,  meeting  every  demand  of  scientific  certitude 
and  furnishing  the  true  criterion  and  definition  of 
objective  knowledge.  In  other  words,  science  pro- 
ceeds upon  a  principle  diametrically  opposite  to  that 
of  Nominalism,  already  explained  under  the  name  of 
Eelationism.  It  assumes  that  cognition  conforms 
itself  to  things,  not  things  to  cognition,  —  that 
being  determines  human  thought,  not  human  thought 
being,  —  that  the  subject  knows  not  only  its  own 
subjective  modifications  but  also  the  objective  things 
and  relations  which  these  modifications  reveal.  Kant 
did  but  "  assume  "  the  counter-principle ;  and  if  he 
considered  his  assumption  as  at  last  ''  demonstrated  " 
by  his  system  as  a  whole,  science  equally  considers 
its  assumption  as  demonstrated  by  the  actual  exist- 
ence of  its  verified  and  established  truths  as  a  body 
of  objective  knowledge. 

These  three  answers  to  the  question  as  to  the  origin 
of  knowledge  show  how  vast  is  the  divergence  between 
modern  philosophy  and  modern  science.  Philosophy 
has  never  yet  entirely  shaken  off  the  blighting  influ- 
ence of  Scholasticism,  even  while  fancying  itself 
wholly  emancipated  from  it ;  for  Nominalism,  no  less 
than  the  old  Eealism,  was  the  legitimate  offspring 
of  Scholasticism.     It  was  only  one  of  the  two  great 


INTRODUCTION.  41 

answers,  both  one-sided  and  both  wrong,  which  Scho- 
lasticism gave  to  the  question  of  universals.  Phi- 
losophy is  still  Scholastic  to-day;  it  has  never  yet 
modernized  itself  in  any  true  sense,  and  it  never  will 
do  so  until  it  sits  modestly  at  the  feet  of  science, 
imbues  itself  thoroughly  with  the  spirit  of  the  scien- 
tific method,  and  applies  the  principle  of  Eelation- 
isni  to  the  reconstitution  of  the  moral  sciences  and 
the  total  reorganization  of  human  knowledge.  This, 
though  a  vast  revolution  for  x)hilosophy  herself,  will 
be  simply  giving  in  her  adhesion  to  the  revolution 
which  science  made  long  ago,  and  has  rendered  irre- 
versible. But  it  will  also  be  x^utting  herself  at  the 
head  of  that  revolution,  and  conducting  it  to  conquests 
in  regions  of  the  highest  truth  of  which  science  her- 
self has  never  yet  dreamed. 


IV. 

Aristotle  taught,  with  truth,  that  the  proper  object 
of  science  is  the  universal  rather  than  the  particu- 
lar or  individual.  Although  it  was  his  doctrine  that 
individuals  are  First  Essences,  while  species  are  Sec- 
ond Essences,  and  genera  Third  Essences,  real  only  in 
a  lower  sense  than  the  former,  nevertheless  it  was 
also  his  doctrine  that  the  universal  inheres  in  each 
individual  substance  and  constitutes  its  conceptual  or 
intelligible  essence  (J]  Kara  rov  Xoyov  ovo-ta).  The  uni- 
versal and  the  individual  were  inseparable,  and  must 
therefore  be  known  together :  yet  the  universal,  being 
the  essence  of  the  individual,  was  itself  the  only 
proper  and  real  object  of  scientific  cognition. 

Translating  the  Moderate  Realism  of  Aristotle  into 
the  more  accurate  language  of  Eelationism,  and  not 


42  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

forgetting  to  correct  its  capital  error  of  making  the 
universal  inhere  in  each  individual  as  an  individual 
(m  re)  rather  than  in  all  the  individual?  as  a  group 
{^inter  7'es),  the  meaning  of  his  doctrine  is  that  science 
is  concerned  with  the  general  relations  of  things  rather 
than  with  the  things  themselves  —  with  general  laws 
rather  than  with  the  peculiarities  or  accidents  of 
individual  objects. 

Modern  science  proceeds  uniformly  according  to  this 
incontestable  principle.     Says  Prof.  Jevons :  — 

"  There  is  no  such  process  as  that  of  inferring  from 
particulars  to  particulars.  A  careful  analysis  of  the 
conditions  under  which  such  an  inference  appears  to 
be  made  shows  that  the  process  is  really  a  general  one, 
and  what  is  inferred  of  a  particular  case  might  be 
inferred  of  all  similar  cases.  All  reasoning  is  essen- 
tially general,  and  all  science  implies  generalization. 
In  the  very  birth-time  of  philosophy  this  was  held  to 
be  so  :  ^  Kulla  scientia  est  de  individuis,  sed  de  solis 
universalibus/  was  the  doctrine  of  Plato,  delivered 
by  Porphyry.  And  Aristotle  held  a  like  opinion: 
OvSefita  Be  rix^f]  (TKOirfi  to  KaO'  eKatrrov  .  .  .  to  Sk  KaO' 
lKa<TTov  airapov  Ka\  o^k  iin<TTr)T6v.  '  No  art  treats  of  par- 
ticular cases,  for  particulars  are  infinite  and  cannot  be 
known.'  No  one  who  holds  the  doctrine  that  reason- 
ing may  be  from  particulars  to  particulars  can  be  sup- 
posed to  have  the  most  rudimentary  notion  of  what 
constitutes  reasoning  and  science." 

It  is,  in  truth,  impossible  to  study  even  a  particular 
case  without  generalizing ;  all  knowledge  consists  in 
the  seizure  of  the  relations  of  things,  and  every  name 
of  a  relation  is  of  necessity  a  general  term.  Prof. 
Jevons  correctly  quotes  both  Plato  and  Aristotle  as 
concurring  in  this  fundamental  principle,  since  both 


INTROD U  ,  TION.  43 

of  them  occupied  the  standpoint  of  objectivism ;  and 
Prof.  Jevons  himself,  as  a  scientific  man,  can  occupy 
no  other,  although,  as  a  thinker  more  or  less  infected 
with  the  subjectivism  of  modern  philosophy,  he  has 
not  succeeded  in  occupying  it  always  or  with  entire 
consistency. 

Now  subjectivism  reduces  all  science  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  one  individual,  the  Ego,  —  which,  as  just 
shown,  is  no  science  at  all.  If  its  fundamental  defi- 
nition of  knowledge  means  anything,  or  is  faithfully 
adhered  to,  subjectivism  teaches  that  the  intelligent 
subject  has  no  intelligence  save  of  itself  —  has  no 
warrant  for  believing  in  the  existence  of  anything 
save  itself  —  knows  nothing  but  the  inexplicable 
order  of  its  own  sensations  and  thoughts.  It  reduces 
all  existence  to  an  unrelated  One,  while  of  an  unre- 
lated One  no  science  is  possible.  In  a  word,  subjec- 
tivism, if  logical,  annihilates  science  at  a  blow. 

There  is  no  logical  escape  from  this  inference, 
drawn  directly  from  the  subjectivist  definition  of 
knowledge.  Subjectivism  cannot  concede  the  knowl- 
edge of  any  existence  except  that  of  the  subject 
itself ;  it  cannot  concede  any  knowledge  of  the  sub- 
ject, except  that  of  its  seriated  conscious  states  ;  it 
cannot  concede  any  knowledge  of  these  conscious 
states  as  a  series,  but  only  as  single  and  unrelated ; 
and  it  thus  lands  us  ultimately  in  the  scepticism 
of  Hume.  For  to  generalize  a  series  of  thoughts  as 
tJiought,  or  a  series  of  sensations  as  sensation,  is  to 
use  a  general  term,  which,  ex  hypothesi,  corresponds  to 
no  existent  correlative  in  an  objective  sense  ;  the  gen- 
eral terms,  thought,  sensation,  consciousness,  on  the 
principle  of  Nominalism,  denote  nothing  real  in  the 
thoughts,   sensations,   or   consciousnesses   which  are 


44  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

geaeralized,  but  express  only  an  act  of  the  subject  as 
generalizing.  Apply  the  very  same  principle  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  subject  itself  which  subjectivism 
applies  to  the  knowledge  of  the  outer  world,  —  refuse 
that  objective  validity  to  general  terms  as  applied  to 
the  w^orld  of  consciousness  which  is  refused  to  general 
terms  as  applied  to  the  world  outside  of  conscious- 
ness, —  and  it  is  shown  irresistibly  that  subjectivism 
does  not  permit  "knowledge"  even  of  the  subject's 
own  "  conscious  states."  "  Consciousness  "  is  a  gen- 
eral term  ;  "  state "  is  a  general  term  ;  every  such 
term  denotes  a  relation  among  certain  related  objects ; 
and  if  this  relation  must  be  separated  from  the  related 
objects  w^hen  they  are  outside  of  the  subject,  why  must 
it  not  be  separated  from  the  related  objects  when 
they  are  within?  Subjectivism  necessarily  destroys 
itself  by  its  own  definition  of  knowledge  ;  it  cannot 
exist  an  instant  except  by  denying  the  very  principle 
it  asserts ;  it  escapes  self-annihilation  only  on  the 
hard  and  humiliating  condition  that  it  shall  perpet- 
ually contradict  itself.  The  sword  with  which  it  slays 
science  pierces  its  own  heart. 

Nothing  is  more  astonishing  than  the  utter  indif- 
ference of  subjectivists  to  their  own  innumerable  self- 
contradictions  on  these  vital  points  —  self-contradic- 
tions all  the  more  amusing  in  view  of  their  insistence 
that  objectivism  shall  be  rigorously  and  consistently 
reasoned.     Let  a  few  instances  be  here  noticed. 

Berkeley's  idealism  (a  direct  product  of  the  Nomi- 
nalistic  revolution)  is  usually  praised  to  the  skies  as 
unerringly  logical  and  self-consistent.  Yet  the  same 
reasoning  which  leads  him  to  deny  the  existence  of  a 
material  world  ought  to  lead  him  to  deny  the  exist- 
ence of  other  human  minds  —  of  which  there  is  no 


INTRODUCTION.  45 

proof  except  sight,  hearing,  and  touch  of  the  material 
bodies  by  which  these  minds  manifest  themselves. 
Berkeley's  great  paralogism  on  this  point  is  pointed 
out  even  by  his  own  editor,  Dr.  Krauth  (p.  400),  as 
follows :  — 

"Berkeley  is  a  realistic  idealist,  holding  that  the 
realistic  inference  is  invalid  as  regards  matter,  but 
conceding  it  as  regards  mind.  He  holds  to  real 
substantial  spirits,  God  and  man.  Hence,  too,  his 
monism  is  only  generic.  He  holds  to  a  monism  of 
genus,  —  to  spirit  alone  ;  but  he  concedes  a  dualism 
of  species,  —  infinite  Spirit,  the  cause  of  ideas,  and 
finite  spirits,  the  recipients  of  them.  But  this  his 
strength  is  also  his  weakness.  Every  moral  advan- 
tage of  his  Idealism  over  its  successors  is  secured  at 
the  expense  of  its  development  and  of  its  logical 
consistency." 

Dr.  Shadworth  H.  Hodgson,  in  his  Time  and  Space 
(Introduction,  p.  5),  says  :  — 

"  By  the  term  consciousness,  in  this  Essay,  is  always 
meant  consciousness  as  existing  in  an  individual  con- 
scious being ;  and  proofs  drawn  from  such  a  con- 
sciousness can  have  no  validity  for  other  conscious 
beings,  unless  they  themselves  recognize  their  truth 
as  descriptions  applicable  to  the  procedure  and  phe- 
nomena of  their  own  consciousness.  Doctrines,  if 
true,  will  ultimately  be  recognized  as  such  by  all 
individuals  whose  consciousness  is  formed  on  the 
same  type,  that  is,  by  all  human  beings." 

Here  is  luminously  presented  the  cardinal  and 
universal  contradiction  in  all  non-solipsistic  forms 
of  subjectivism :  (1)  The  assumption  that  the  Ego 
knows  only  the  changes  of  its  own  consciousness  ;  and 
(2)  the  assumption  that  the  Ego  knows  other  Egos  to 


46  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

exist  that  are  "  formed  on  the  same  type."     One  of 
these  assumptions  necessarily  destroys  the  other. 

There  are  countless  similar  self-contradictions  scat- 
tered all  through  the  writings  of  subjectivists,  some 
amusing  by  their  naivete,  some  ingenious  in  their 
subtilty,  some  amazing  by  their  evident  unconscious- 
ness, but  all  sufficiently  humiliating  and  mortifying 
to  those  who  would  fain  see  philosophy  comport  her- 
self with  the  dignity  of  science  rather  than  with  the 
agility  of  a  circus-clown.  One  further  illustration 
will  suffice. 

Prof.  Clifford,  in  his  Lectures  and  Essays  (II.  71), 
takes  the  ground  of  the  most  uncompromising  subjec- 
tivism at  the  outset,  and  then  coolly  proceeds  to  break 
loose  from  it  in  the  most  violently  illogical  style,  yet 
apparently  without  the  least  suspicion  of  the  exhibi- 
tion he  thereby  makes  of  himself  as  a  philosopher  :  — 

"The  objective  order,  qua  order,  is  treated  by 
physical  science,  which  investigates  the  uniform  rela- 
tions of  objects  in  time  and  space.  Here  the  word 
object  (or  phenomenon)  is  taken  merely  to  mean  a 
group  of  my  feelings,  which  persists  as  a  group  in 
a  certain  manner;  for  I  am  at  present  considering 
only  the  objective  order  of  my  feelings.  The  object, 
then,  is  a  set  of  changes  in  my  consciousness,  and 
not  anything  out  of  it.  .  .  .  The  inferences  of  physi- 
cal science  are  all  inferences  of  my  real  or  possible 
feelings;  inferences  of  something  actually  or  poten- 
tially in  my  consciousness,  not  of  anything  outside 
of  it." 

Bald  and  unblushing  as  is  the  egoism  of  this 
passage,  it  is  entirely  clear;  and  it  is  quite  possi- 
ble to  build  up  on  this  basis  an  idealistic  Solipsism 
which  shall  at  least  tolerably  cohere  with  itself.     But 


INTRODUCTION.  47 

Prof.  Clifford  immediately  proceeds  to  crucify  his 
own  subjectivism  in  this  manner :  — 

"  However  remote  the  inference  of  physical  science, 
the  thing  inferred  is  always  a  part  of  me,  a  possible 
set  of  changes  in  my  consciousness  bound  up  in  the 
objective  order  with  other  known  changes.  But  the 
inferred  existence  of  your  feelings,  of  objective  group- 
ings among  them  similar  to  those  among  my  feelings, 
and  of  a  subjective  order  in  many  respects  analogous 
to  my  own,  —  these  inferred  existences  are  in  the  very 
act  of  inference  thrown  out  of  my  consciousness,  recog- 
nized as  outside  of  it,  as  not  being  a  part  of  me.  I 
propose,  accordingly,  to  call  these  inferred  existences 
ejects,  things  thrown  out  of  my  consciousness,  to  dis- 
tinguish them  from  objects,  things  presented  in  my 
consciousness,  phenomena.  .  .  .  How  this  inference 
is  justified,  how  consciousness  can  testify  to  the  exist- 
ence of  anything  outside  of  itself,  I  do  not  pretend 
to  say  :  I  need  not  untie  a  knot  which  the  world  has 
cut  for  me  long  ago.  It  may  very  well  be  that  I  am 
myself  the  only  existence,  but  it  is  simply  ridiculous 
to  suppose  that  anybody  else  is.  The  position  of  ab- 
solute idealism  may,  therefore,  be  left  out  of  count, 
although  each  individual  may  be  unable  to  justify  his 
dissent  from  it." 

This  airy  distinction  of  "  object "  and  '-  eject "  does 
not  in  the  least  disguise  the  cardinal  contradiction 
into  which  Prof.  Clifford,  in  common  with  all  sub- 
jectivists  who  shrink  back  from  Solipsism,  falls. 
Ejects,  as  he  proceeds  to  define  them,  are  simply 
*'  other  men's  minds  ; "  but  other  men's  minds  are 
only  known  through  their  bodies,  and  their  bodies 
are  "  objects  "  like  trees  or  stones  ;  while  trees  and 
stones  are  just  as  truly  "ejects"  from  consciousness 


48  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

as  are  other  men's  minds.  In  a  word,  ejects  are 
objects,  and  objects  are  ejects ;  there  is  absolutely 
no  distinction  between  them,  on  Prof.  Clifford's  own 
showing ;  objects  and  ejects  must  be  both  objective 
or  both  subjective.  Yet  Prof.  Clifford  arbitrarily  (it 
would  almost  seem  wilfully)  objectifies  ejects  and 
subjectifies  objects!  He  flatly  refuses  to  "untie  a 
knot"  which  contains  the  whole  point  in  disi^ute, 
and  which  the  "world"  has  "cut"  just  as  effectively 
for  objects  as  for  ejects  ;  he  coolly  begs  the  whole 
question,  and  repudiates  tlie  Solipsism  from  which  his 
own  principles  permit  no  rational  escape. 

These  illustrations  of  the  self-contradiction  of  sub- 
jectivism are  tyijical,  not  sporadic;  they  show  how 
deep-seated  is  the  disease  under  which  modern  philo- 
sophy is  suffering.  Whenever  (if  ever)  subjectivism 
shall  dare  to  be  rigorously  logical,  it  will  be  the  reduc- 
tio  ad  ahsurdum  of  Nominalism,  and  compel  philosophy 
to  adopt  Eelationism  and  the  scientific  method  in  gen- 
eral. All  science  is  of  the  universal ;  all  sequent  sub- 
jectivism abolishes  the  universal,  and  leaves  only  the 
individual,  a  solitary,  unrelated,  incomprehensible 
Ego.  It  avails  nothing  to  create  a  phantom-science 
of  the  universal  in  a  world  of  sensations  alone ;  true 
philosophy,  no  less  than  true  science,  demands  an 
explanation  of  that  series  of  sensations  which  sub- 
jectivism can  accept  only  as  an  unintelligible  fact. 
Diogenes  commanded  a  certain  respect  so  long  as  he 
actually  lived  in  his  tub;  but  if,  having  fastened  to 
his  forehead  a  placard,  "I  am  Diogenes,  and  I  live 
in  this  tub,"  he  had  then  tied  the  tub  to  his  back, 
lived  in  a  house,  slept  in  a  bed,  and  behaved  like 
ordinary  mortals,  he  would  have  been  pelted  with  a 
storm  of  pitiless  gibes  from  the  keen-witted  Athenians. 


INTRODUCTION.  49 

And  when  philosopliy,  having  tied  the  tub  of  subjec- 
tivism to  its  back,  lives  and  lectures  in  a  world  of 
"ejects,"  and  expounds  to  them  a  science  of  the 
objective  relations  they  bear  to  each  other  and  to 
an  intelligible  cosmos,  human  nature  must  have  radi- 
cally changed  if  philosophy  fares  any  better. 

It  all  comes  to  this  ;  either  the  truth  of  subjectivism 
or  the  truth  of  science  is  a  pure  illusion.  The  possi- 
bility of  the  one  is  the  impossibility  of  the  other. 

The  conclusion  just  stated  finds  abundant  corrobo- 
ration in  contemporaneous  thought.  Subjectivism  in 
philosophy  has  created  a  new  type  of  scepticism  in 
science.  Urged  as  it  were  by  a  consciousness  that 
it  can  only  maintain  its  own  truth  by  discrediting  the 
truth  of  science,  philosophy  does  not  hesitate  to  under- 
take the  task.  Hence  it  has  formulated  a  law  of  philo- 
sophical scepticism  under  the  name  of  the  "  relativity 
of  knowledge,"  founded  upon  a  truism,  but  distorted 
into  a  falsity.  Unable  to  shake  the  conviction  of  the 
reality  of  a  known  objective  universe,  and  therefore 
unable  to  take  the  field  in  its  only  logical  form  of 
Solipsism,  subjectivism  nevertheless  covertly  saps 
the  truth  of  science  in  a  manner  which  hides  its  own 
fatal  inconsistency.  It  declares  that  all  knowledge 
is  merely  relative  to  human  faculties,  and  it  adroitly 
pushes  this  principle  as  if  relativity  were  unreality. 
A  quotation  from  Mr.  Frederic  Harrison's  essay  on 
"The  Subjective  Synthesis"  will  well  illustrate  the 
mode  of  its  attack :  — 

"The  truly  relative  conception  of  knowledge  should 
make  us  habitually  feel  that  our  physical  science,  our 
laws  and  discoveries  in  Nature,  are  all  imaginative 
creations  —  poems,  in  fact  —  which  strictly  correspond 
within  the  limited  range  of  phenomena  we  have  before 

4 


50  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM, 

us,  but  whicli  we  never  can  know  to  be  the  real  modes 
of  any  external  being.  We  have  really  no  ground 
whatever  for  believing  that  these  our  theories  are  the 
ultimate  and  real  scheme  on  which  an  external  world 
(if  there  be  one)  works,  nor  that  the  external  world 
objectively  possesses  that  organized  order  which  we 
call  science.  For  all  that  we  know  to  the  contrary, 
man  is  the  creator  of  the  order  and  harmony  of  the 
universe,  for  he  has  imagined  it." 

This  subjectivistic  scepticism,  be  it  remembered, 
has  its  root  in  the  Nominalism  which  universally 
prevails  in  philosophic  circles,  and  which  has  pro- 
foundly affected  those  scientific  men  who,  being  more 
than  mere  specialists,  have  felt  their  influence ;  and 
it  shows  exactly  where  science  must  seek  aid  from  a 
renovated  philosophy,  if  it  is  to  escape  suffocation  by 
the  fire-damp  of  scepticism  engendered  by  its  own 
operations.  "If  every  genus  is  only  a  mere  word," 
says  a  writer  in  the  Encyclopcedia  Britannica,  "it 
follows  that  individuals  are  the  only  realities,  and 
that  the  senses  are  at  bottom  the  only  sources  of 
knowledge.  And  not  only  so,  but  on  this  theory  no 
absolute  affirmation  respecting  truth  is  possible,  for 
such  an  affirmation  involves  of  necessity  a  general 
idea,  which  ex  hypothesi  is  destitute  of  real  validity. 
Hence  we  have  scepticism  at  the  next  remove."  Mr. 
Harrison  is  an  illustration  of  the  literal  accuracy  of 
this  statement.  But  the  case  is  not  bettered  if  the 
genus  is  "  only  a  mere "  concept,  instead  of  "  only  a 
mere  word ; "  for  Extreme  Nominalism  and  Conceptu- 
alism  (the  latter  of  which  this  writer  accepts)  are 
equally  sceptical  in  their  implications,  since  they 
equally  disown  the  objectivity  of  relations.  Only 
the  theory  of  Eelationism  fully  meets  the  case. 


INTRODUCTION.  51 

The   doctrine   of    the   ^^  relativity   of    knowledge," 
under  cover  of  which  subjectivism  makes  its  attack 
on  the  objective  truth  of  science,  undoubtedly  rests 
on  a  truism  :  namely,  that  knowledge  is  itself  a  rela- 
tion between  the  knowing  and  the  known,  and  that 
nothing  can  be  known  except  as  it  is  known  by  the 
knowing  faculties.     This,  surely,  is  a  very  innocent 
proposition.     It  simply  means  that  man  cannot  know 
everything ;  it  does  not  at  all  mean  that  he  does  not 
know  what  he  knows.     That  human  knowledge  of  the 
cosmos  is  incomplete,  partial,  inadequate,  could  be  con- 
troverted only  by  a  consistent  subjectivist,  to  whom 
the  cosmos  is  simply  the  sum  of  his  own  sensations  or 
consciousness,  which,  again,  exist  only  as  they  are 
known.    But  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowl- 
edge, properly  construed,  has  a  real  validity  and  pro- 
found significance  to  the  object! vist,  since  it  states 
the  fact  on  which  the  total  activity  of  science  rests 
—  the  fact  that  human  knowledge  is  small,  and  can 
be  increased.     There  is  nothing  whatever  in  this  doc- 
trine to  discourage  science  or  impugn  the  solid  char- 
acter of  its  acquisitions.     From  the  very  nature  of 
the  case,  nothing  but  relative  knowledge  is  possible. 
Increase  the  number  and  scope  of   man's   cognitive 
faculties   till   his  science  becomes   omniscience :    his 
knowledge  will  still  be  relative,  being  the  relation  of 
knowing  and  known,  and  that  unconditionally.     In 
fact,  "  non-relative  knowledge  "  is  a  contradiction  in 
adjecto.     As   Prof.   Terrier   puts    it  in  his  Remains: 
"  To  know  a  thing  per  se,  or  siyie  me,  is  as  impossible 
and  contradictory  as  it  is  to  know  two  straight  lines 
enclosing  space;  because  mind  by  its  very  law  and 
nature  must  know  the  thing  cum  alio,  i.e.,  along  with 
itself  knowing  it."     The  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of 


52  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

knowledge,  therefore,  is  a  truism  so  far  as  it  asserts 
the  co-essentiality  of  subject  and  object  to  the  rela- 
tion of  knowledge  ;  it  is  a  falsity  and  absurdity  so  far 
as  it  asserts  the  non-knowableness  of  the  object  by  the 
subject  in  that  very  relation  of  knowledge.  And  the 
blade  of  subjectivism  is  shivered  in  its  very  grasp  by 
the  adamantine  shield  of  science. 

Nevertheless  it  remains  true  that  the  progress  of 
science  is  retarded  and  embarrassed  by  the  preva- 
lence of  a  philosophy  which  secretly  undermines  its 
results,  controverts  its  fundamental  postulate  of  the 
knowableness  of  the  objective  universe,  and  dooms  it 
to  an  imperfect  comprehension  of  the  principles  which 
alone  justify  its  practical  procedure.  A  philosophical 
vindication  of  those  principles  which  should  establish 
the  scientific  method,  so  resplendently  successful  in  its 
empirical  employment,  upon  an  impregnable  rational 
theory,  could  not  fail  in  ten  thousand  ways  to  pro- 
mote the  advancement  of  knowledge,  and  dissipate 
that  cloud  which  hangs  over  the  deeper  thought  of 
our  own  age  —  the  cloud  of  an  intellectual  conscious- 
ness at  war  with  itself.  Every  attempt  in  this 
direction  should  be  greeted  with  a  hearty  welcome. 

Let  us  review  the  situation,  and  state  the  problem 
distinctly  which  philosophy  has  now  to  solve. 

Subjectivism  in  philosophy  takes  its  stand,  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously,  on  Nominalism.  Its  fun- 
damental principle  is  the  law,  accepted  by  both  the 
Transcendental  and  Associational  schools,  that  things 
conform  themselves  to  cognition,  not  cognition  to 
things.  The  necessary  corollary  of  this  law  is  the 
seimrability  of  phenomena  and  noumena,  phenomena 
having  their  existence  solely  as  modifications  of  the 
individual  consciousness,  and  noumena  either  having 


INTRODUCTION.  53 

no  existence  at  all  or  else  existing  solely  as  the 
unknown  and  unknowable  causes  of  phenomena.  Of 
these  two  alternatives,  the  former  alone  is  logically 
consistent  with  the  premises  of  subjectivism;  for, 
since  "cause"  is  a  universal  term  to  which  Nomi- 
nalism denies  all  objective  validity  or  significance,  it 
is  a  term  patently  inapplicable  to  anything  beyond  the 
sphere  of  subjective  consciousness.  Hence  the  final 
outcome  of  all  thoroughgoing  subjectivism  is  absolute 
egoistic  Idealism  or  Solipsism  —  a  mere  cosmos  of 
objectively  causeless  dreams. 

Objectivism  in  science  takes  its  stand,  consciously 
or  unconsciously,  on  Eelationism.  Its  fundamental 
principle  is  the  law  of  Objective  Verification, — that 
cognition  must  conform  itself  to  things,  not  things  to 
cognition.  The  necessary  corollary  of  this  law  is  the 
inseparability  of  noumena  and  phenomena,  phenomena 
being  the  "appearances"  of  noumena,  and  noumena 
being  that  which  "appears"  and  is  partially  under- 
stood in  phenomena ;  and  they  have  their  inseparable 
existence,  not  only  in  the  mind,  but  also  in  the  cosmos 
which  the  mind  cognizes.  The  only  utility  in  retain- 
ing the  distinction  at  all  is  to  mark  the  distinction 
between  complete  and  incomplete  knowledge  —  nou- 
mena being  taken  to  denote  things-in-themselves  as 
they  exist  in  all  the  complexity  of  their  objective 
attributes  and  relations,  and  phenomena  being  taken 
to  denote  these  same  things-in-themselves  so  far  only 
as  they  are  known  in  their  objective  attributes  and 
relations.  The  final  outcome  of  scientific  objectivism 
is  a  constantly  growing  knowledge  of  the  real  cosmos 
as  it  is,  in  which  the  human  mind  has  its  proper 
place  and  activity  in  entire  harmony  with  cosmical 
laws. 


54  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

This  is  the  unequivocal  issue  between  the  two  modes 
of  viewing  the  universe  which  are  confusedly  and  half- 
consciously  struggling  for  supremacy  in  the  modern 
mind.  Philosophy  is  prevailingly  subjective,  but  not 
wholly  so;  there  are  occasional  symptoms  of  secret 
restiveness  among  philosophers  under  the  iron  yoke 
of  JSTominalism,  such  as  the  appeal  of  the  Scotch 
School  to  "Common  Sense/^  the  "Natural  Kealism" 
of  Hamilton,  the  "  Reasoned  Kealism  "  of  G.  H.  Lewes, 
the  "  Transfigured  Eealism  "  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer^ 
the  "  Inferential  Eealism  "  of  Rev.  J.  E.  Walter  and 
many  others,  the  unmistakably  objective  tendencies 
of  the  historian  Ueberweg  —  who  explicitly  declares 
that  "the  objective  reality  of  relations  can  be  affirmed 
with  at  least  as  much  reason  as  it  can  be  disputed " 
{Hist.  Phil.  I.  374),  and  that  "the  demonstrative 
reasoning  by  which  we  go  beygnd  the  results  of  iso- 
lated experience,  and  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  the 
necessary,  is  not  effected  independently  of  all  experi- 
ence through  subjective  forms  of  incomprehensible 
origin,  but  only  by  the  logical  combination  of  ex- 
periences according  to  the  inductive  and  deductive 
methods  on  the  basis  of  the  order  immanent  in  things 
themselves"  {Ihid.  II.  162),  —  as  well  as  of  others 
that  might  be  named  in  this  connection.  But  no  one, 
even  among  these  uneasy  insurgents  against  the  estab- 
lished tyranny  of  Nominalism,  seems  to  comprehend 
exactly  what  the  tyranny  or  who  the  tyrant  is  ;  no 
one  of  them  seems  to  have  traced  back  the  origin  of 
his  oppression  to  the  half-forgotten  decision,  arrived 
at  centuries  ago  by  the  now  despised  Schoolmen,  as 
to  the  nature  of  universals ;  and  no  one  seems  to  com- 
prehend precisely  what  will  free  him  from  fetters  that 
are  invisible,  yet  strong  as  steel.     Hence  every  one  of 


INTRODUCTION.  55 

them  continually  falls  into  concessions  which  rivet 
the  fetters  more  closely  about  his  limbs.  The  hos- 
tility secretly  existing  and  working  between  the  sub- 
jectivist  and  objectivist  methods,  even  in  one  and  the 
same  mind,  is  one  of  the  curious  and  striking  features 
of  contemporaneous  thought,  and  will  not  fail  to  arrest 
the  attention  of  the  future  historians  of  philosophy. 
Yet  this  antagonism  between  science  and  philosophy 
is  really  unnatural  and  injurious  in  the  last  degree, 
for  they  are  the  natural  complements  and  alhes  of 
each  other.  Science  needs  the  intellectual  order- 
liness and  systematic  unity  which  philosophy  alone 
can  create ;  philosophy  needs  the  verified  basis  and 
thoroughly  objective  spirit  of  science.  Hence  our  age 
presents  no  problem  more  profound  in  its  nature,  or 
more  wide-reaching  in  its  bearings  upon  the  intel- 
lectual interests  of  mankind,  than  this  :  — 

How  to  identify  science  and  ;philosophy,  hy  making 
the  foundation,  method,  and  system  of  science  philo- 
sophic, and  the  foundation,  method,  and  system  of 
philosophy  scientific. 

The  theory  of  knowledge  which  is  predominant 
in  both  the  Transcendental  and  Associational  schools 
of  modern  philosophy  has  been  clearly  set  forth  in 
the  preceding  pages,  traced  to  its  source  in  the 
wrong  answer  given  by  mediseval  Nominalism  to  the 
questions  of  universals,  and  shown  to  impart  even 
to  so-called  modern  philosophy  a  thoroughly  Scho- 
lastic character.  The  theory  of  knowledge  which 
underlies  the  practical  procedure  of  modern  science 
has  also  been  clearly  set  forth,  although  only  so 
far  as  its  fundamental  principle  is  concerned,  under 
the  name  of  Scientific  Realism  or  Eelationism,  —  the 
full  development  of  which  will  involve  the  creation 


56  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

of  a  new  and  comprehensive  philosophical  system. 
The  irreconcilable  antagonism  of  these  two  theories, 
the  disastrous  consequences  of  it  both  to  philoso- 
phy and  science,  and  the  necessity  of  a  profound 
revolution  in  the  method  of  philosophy  in  order  to 
bring  it  into  harmony  with  the  now  thoroughly  es- 
tablished scientific  method,  have  likewise  been  shown, 
together  with  the  precise  nature  of  the  problem  which 
philosophy  has  now  to  solve,  in  order  to  modernize 
itself  in  a  true  sense. 

All  that  is  here  possible  is  simply  to  state  the 
problem  and  the  general  principle  on  which  alone  it 
can  be  solved ;  a  full  solution  of  it  is  the  great  desid- 
eratum of  science  and  philosoi^hy  alike.  For  a  full 
solution  of  it  will  permanently  heal  the  breach  which 
now  disastrously  divides  them,  and  for  the  first  time 
render  possible  the  harmonious  co-operation  and  con- 
centration of  all  the  powers  of  the  human  mind  for 
the  discovery,  establishment,  and  application  of  cos- 
mical  truth.  What  has  been  here  done  is  to  show 
that  this  greatest  of  modern  problems  is  only,  under 
a  new  form,  that  ancient  and  never  satisfactorily 
answered  question  of  Universals  which,  for  hundreds 
of  years,  absorbed  the  brightest  intellects  of  Europe, 
—  to  submit  to  the  bright  intellects  of  our  own  time, 
together  with  the  old  half-answers  to  that  problem 
historically  known  as  the  theories  of  Nominalism  and 
Realism,  a  third,  new,  and  full  answer  in  the  theory 
of  Eelationism,  —  and  to  inquire  whether  this  theory 
will  not  suffice  to  bring  about  the  greatly  needed 
identification  of  Science  and  Philosophy. 


PART   I. 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE. 


PART   I. 

THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    SCIENCE. 


CHAPTEK  I. 

THE   PEESUPPOSITIONS   OF   THE   SCIENTIFIC   METHOD. 

§  1.  Modern  science  consists  of  a  mass  of  Pro- 
positions'^ respecting  the  facts,  laws,  order,  and 
general  constitution  of  the  universe.  It  is  a  pro- 
duct of  the  aggregate  intellectual  activity  of  the 
human  race,  and  could  no  more  have  been  produced 
by  an  individual  than  could  the  language  in  which 
its  propositions  are  expressed.  These  propositions 
incorporate  the  results  of  universal  human  expe- 
rience and  reason,  from  which  all  elements  of  per- 
sonal  eccentricity,   ignorance,   or   error    have    been 

1  "The  answer  to  every  question  which  it  is  possible  to  frame 
must  be  contained  in  a  Proposition,  or  Assertion.  Whatever  can 
be  an  object  of  belief,  or  even  of  disbelief,  must,  when  put  into 
words,  assume  the  form  of  a  proposition.  All  truth  and  all  error 
lie  in  propositions.  What,  by  a  convenient  misapplication  of  an 
abstract  term,  we  call  a  Truth,  means  simply  a  True  Proposition ; 
and  errors  are  false  propositions.  .  .  .  The  objects  of  all  Belief  and 
all  Inquiry  express  themselves  in  propositions."  (John  Stuart 
Mill,  System  of  Logic y  I.  18-19,  London,  1872.) 


60  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

gradually  eliminated  in  the  course  of  ages ;  they  are 
the  winnowed  grain  of  knowledge,  from  which  the 
chaff  of  individual  mistake  has  been  blown  away  by 
the  wind  of  universal  criticism,  and  comprise  the 
total  harvest  of  truth  thus  far  garnered  by  man  in 
the  study  of  Nature.  All  propositions  respecting 
the  universe,  whether  in  its  physical  or  psychical 
aspect,  which  at  last  command  the  unanimous  assent 
of  all  experts  in  the  subjects  to  which  they  relate, 
take  rank  as  EstaUished  Scientific  Truths  —  not  neces- 
sarily as  infallible  truths,  but  as  truths  which  stand 
unchallenged  until  the  progress  of  discovery  com- 
pels a  revision,  correction,  and  re-establishment  of 
them  as  still  larger  truths.  Infallible  truths  are 
not  for  fallible  man,  and  modern  science  is  no  more 
infallible  than  ancient  science;  yet  science  is  man's 
nearest  approximation  to  the  absolute  truth  itself, 
since  it  rests  on  no  individual  or  dubious  authority, 
but  on  the  highest  possible  authority  which  the 
nature  of  the  case  permits :  namely,  the  universal 
experience  and  reason  of  mankind,  voiced  in  the 
unanimous  consensus  of  the  competent. 

§  2.  Now  all  the  established  truths  which  are 
formulated  in  the  multifarious  propositions  of  sci- 
ence have  been  won  by  use  of  the  Scientific  Metliod. 
This  method  consists  essentially  in  three  distinct 
steps  :  (1)  observation  and  experiment,  (2)  hypothesis, 
(3)  verification  by  fresh  observation  and  experiment. 
Observation  and  experiment  consist  in  the  dis- 
covery, by  actual  perception,  of  things  and  relations 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  61 

objectively  existent  in  the  universe,  and  constitute 
that  original  experience  of  the  universe  in  which 
all  human  knowledge  begins.  Hypothesis,  or  the 
rational  interpretation  of  the  results  of  observation 
and  experiment,  is  the  ideal  or  subjective  anticipa- 
tion of  further  possible  experience  of  the  universe ; 
in  its  legitimate  scientific  use,  it  is  the  work  of 
reason  and  imagination  combined,  elaborating  the 
data  of  experience  both  inductively  and  deductively, 
and  inferring  from  already  known  relations  other 
relations  which  may  objectively  exist  in  the  uni- 
verse, and  which,  therefore,  may  be  experientially 
discovered  there.  Verification  is  the  conversion  of 
sagacious  hypothesis  into  theory  and  scientific  law, 
by  means  of  fresh  and  corroborative  experience ; 
what  is  verified  is  hypothesis,  proved  to  have  been 
well-founded  as  inference,  whenever  the  set  of  rela- 
tions inferred  is  discovered  by  actual  experience  to 
be  identical  with  the  corresponding  set  of  relations 
in  the  objective  universe;^  and  the  perception  or 
discovery  of  this  identity,  which  is  the  essence  of 
all  verification,  proves  that  the  constitution  of  the 
universe  and  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind 
are  fundamentally  one.  Experience,  therefore,  is  the 
beginning  and  the  end  of  the  scientific  method, 
mediated  by  reason  and  imagination;  and  experi- 
ence itself  is  the  actual  meeting,  the  dynamic  cor- 
relation, the  incessant   action   and  reaction,  of   the 

1  This  is  substantially  Spinoza's  test  of  truth :  "  Idea  vera  debet 
cum  suo  ideato  convenire."     {Ethica,  I.  Ax.  6.) 


62  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

human  mind  and  its  cosmical  environment.  The 
scientific  method,  therefore,  is  a  living  organic  pro- 
cess, the  true  and  only  organon  for  the  discovery 
of  truth ;  and  the  proof  of  its  validity  is  the  rapid 
progress  of  actual  discovery  in  the  experiential  study 
of  the  universe. 

§  3.  Now  the  scientific  method  logically  implies  a 
very  definite  Philosophy,  which  it  does  not  stop  to 
prove,  but  takes  for  granted  and  presupposes  at 
every  step.  In  the  course  of  many  generations  of 
individual  investigators,  it  has  produced,  as  I  have 
said,  a  vast  mass  of  propositions  or  established  scien- 
tific truths,  dealing  directly  with  the  facts  and  laws 
of  the  universe  itself,  —  not  at  all  with  men's  ideas 
of  the  universe,  as  ideas.  For  instance,  astronomy 
and  physics  make  known  various  real  relations 
among  real  masses  moving  in  real  space,  in  absolute 
independence  of  man,  his  existence,  and  his  con- 
sciousness ;  physics  and  chemistry  make  known 
various  real  relations  among  real  molecules  and 
atoms,  likewise  moving  in  real  space ;  biology 
makes  known  various  real  relations  among  real 
living  organisms;  physiological  psychology  (which 
sometimes  mistakes  itself  for  philosophy,  but  is  in 
fact  one  of  many  special  sciences)  makes  known 
various  real  relations  between  the  physical  system 
and  psychical  activities  of  the  individual  organism ; 
sociology,  political  economy,  jurisprudence,  ethics, 
make  known  various  real  relations  among  human 
individuals   co-existing   in   a   state   of    society.     In 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  63 

other  words,  the  same  scientific  method,  variously 
applied  in  the  various  sciences,  makes  known  (if 
the  word  knowledge  denotes  anything  but  an  im- 
possible dream)  a  vast  mass  of  objectively  real  rela- 
tions among  ohjectivehj  real  things  —  things  and 
relations  which,  although  undeniably  known  by 
consciousness  alone,  do  not,  for  all  that,  depend 
upon  it  in  the  least  for  their  existence,  inasmuch 
as  many  of  them  are  known  to  have  existed  mill- 
ions of  ages  before  human  consciousness  began. 

An  "objective,"  or  **  objectively  real,"  or  ''objec- 
tively existent "  relation  must  be  understood  simply 
as  a  relation  which  subsists  in  the  real  universe 
itself,  and  is  not  a  mere  conception  of  the  human 
mind.  A  relation  may  be  known  to  exist  objec- 
tively, whenever  the  proposition  asserting  it  is 
proved  by  experience  to  be  true.  For  instance, 
"  the  earth  and  the  moon  revolve  about  their  com- 
mon centre  of  gravity  "  expresses  an  objectively  real 
relation,  because  the  scientific  method  has  discovered 
that  such  is  the  fact,  independently  of  man,  —  that 
the  proposition  is  true.  But  the  relation  must  not 
be  misconceived  as  a  "  thing,"  nor  the  affirmation  of 
the  objectivity  of  the  relation  as  an  affirmation  that 
the  relation  is  an  entity  apart  from  the  things  it 
relates.  Tlie  known  ohjectivity  of  a  relation  is  simply 
the  known  objective  truth  of  the  proposition  which  states 
it.  But  the  relation  itself  was  objectively  real  before 
the  proposition  which  states  it  was  conceived  ;  it  de- 
termined the  proposition,  not  the  proposition  it. 


64  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

§  4.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  validity  of 
the  scientific  method,  and  the  objective  truth  of  the 
results  won  by  its  use,  depend  unconditionally  on 
the  truth  of  the  following  philosophical  presupposi- 
tions, which  are  never  formally  mentioned  in  any 
particular  scientific  investigation,  or  formally  stated 
as  part  of  any  particular  science,  simply  and  solely 
because  they  are  the  common  ground  on  which  all 
science  must  stand,  if  it  is  to  stand  at  all,  and  be- 
cause they  constitute  the  universal  condition  of  the 
possibility  of  experience  itself  :  — 

Presupposition  I.  An  external  universe  exists 
per  se,  —  that  is,  in  complete  independence  of  human 
consciousness  so  far  as  its  existence  is  concerned; 
and  man  is  merely  a  part  of  it,  and  a  very  subordi- 
nate part  at  that. 

Presupposition  II.  The  universe  i^er  se  is  not 
only  knowable,  but  known  —  known  in  part,  though 
not  in  whole. 

Presupposition  III.  The  "what  is  known"  of 
the  universe  per  se  is  the  innumerable  relations  of 
things  formulated  in  the  propositions  of  which 
science  consists ;  consequently,  these  relations  objec- 
tively exist  in  the  universe  per  se,  as  that  in  it 
which  is  knowable  and  known. 

I  repeat :  the  validity  of  the  scientific  method,  the 
validity  of  the  results  won  by  its  use,  and  the  valid- 
ity of  these  philosophical  presuppositions,  aU  stand 
or  fall  together  ;  for  the  presuppositions  are  nothing 
but  a  general  explicit  statement  of  what  lies  logi- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  65 

cally  implicit  in  each  of  the  numberless  particular 
truths  which  constitute  the  body  of  science  itself. 
It  is  not  at  any  one's  option  to  accept  these  particu- 
lar truths,  and  at  the  same  time  reject  the  general 
statement  which  merely  sums  them  up  in  brief. 
The  actual  existence  of  a  universe  independent  of 
human  consciousness,  its  actual  intelHgibility,  and 
the  actual  existence  in  it  of  relations  in  which  its 
intelligibility  consists,  —  these,  I  maintain,  consti- 
tute fundamental  principles  of  a  Scientific  Ontology, 
presupposed  at  every  step  by  the  scientific  method. 
Taken  together  and  systematically  developed,  these 
principles  will  found  a  philosophy  of  science,  em- 
bracing not  only  a  radically  new  theory  of  knowl- 
edge, but  also  a  radically  new  theory  of  being.  The 
rapid  disintegration  of  old  philosophies,  the  wide- 
spread and  growing  confusion  of  religious  ideas,  and 
the  universal  mental  restlessness  which  character- 
izes our  age,  are  but  the  birth-throes  of  this  new 
philosophy  of  science. 

§  5.  It  would  be  a  very  shallow  criticism  which 
should  charge  me  here  with  returning  to  the  old 
and  unsatisfactory  realism  of  the  Scotch  school, 
known  as  the  "  philosophy  of  common  sense." 
Prof.  Huxley,  it  is  true,  has  described  science  as 
merely  the  extension  and  enlargement  of  *'  common 
sense,"  and  he  is  not  wrong  in  conceivmg  them  as 
both  realistic ;  but,  if  he  had  the  Scotch  school  in 
mind,  he  disregarded  the  profound  difference  of  the 
two  with  respect  to   the  sources  of  their  realism. 

5 


ee  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

The  Scotch  school  derived  the  conviction  of  the 
existence  of  an  external  world,  not  from  scientific 
experience,  but  from  a  fundamental  principle  or 
"  natural  belief  "  originally  implanted  by  God  in  the 
constitution  of  the  human  mind,  and  thus  assigned 
to  it  a  strictly  a  priori  or  subjective  origin.^  But 
the  philosophy  of  science  will  derive  it,  not  from 
any  a  priori  constitution  of  the  human  mind,  but 
from  experience  alone,  corrected  by  reason,  recast 
and  elaborated  by  the  scientific  imagination,  and 
verified  by  fresh  experience,  and  will  thus  assign  to 
it  a  strictly  a  posteriori  or  objective  origin.  Further- 
more, the  Scotch  school  held,  not  only  that  the 
things  which  we  perceive  exist,  but  also  that  they 
exist  as  we  perceive  them  ;  ^  whereas  the  philosophy 
of  science  will  hold  that  the  crudities  of  sense-per- 
ception and  the  confused  inferences  of  uninstructed 

1  "  All  the  arguments  urged  by  Berkeley  aud  Hume  against  the 
existence  of  a  material  world  are  grounded  upon  tliis  principle, 
that  we  do  not  perceive  external  objects  themselves,  but  certain 
images  or  ideas  in  our  own  minds.  But  this  is  no  dictate  of  com- 
mon sense,  but  directly  contrary  to  the  sense  of  all  who  have  not 
been  taught  it  by  philosophy."  (Reid,  Intellectual  Pincers  of  Man, 
Essay  VI.  chap.  V.)  "  In  the  order  of  nature,  belief  always  pre- 
cedes knowledge.  .  .  .  Even  the  primary  facts  of  intelligence,  — 
the  facts  which  precede,  as  they  afford  the  conditions  of,  all  knowl- 
edge, —  would  not  bfe  original,  were  they  revealed  to  us  under  any 
other  form  than  that  of  natural  or  necessary  beliefs."  (Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  p.  32,  Amer.  Ed.)  "  The 
doctrine  which  has  been  called  The  Philosophi/  of  Common  Sense 
is  the  doctrine  which  founds  all  our  knowledge  on  belief."  (Id. 
Lectures  on  Logic,  p.  383.) 

2  "  Another  first  principle  is,  That  those  things  do  really  exist 
which  we  distinctly  perceive  by  our  senses,  aud  are  what  we  per- 
ceive them  to  be."     (Reid,  I.  c.) 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  67 

"common  sense"  are  to  be  corrected  by  scientific 
discovery,  and  will  therefore  present,  as  the  veritable 
outward  fact,  the  subtile  and  often  recondite  rela- 
tions which  her  formulated  laws  express.  Lastly, 
the  Scotch  school  taught  the  mediaeval  doctrine  of 
Conceptualism  or  Nominalism,^  which  logically  im- 
plies that  of  the  merely  subjective  reality  of  rela- 
tions ;  whereas  the  philosophy  of  science  will  teach 
the  great  principle  of  Eelationism,  which  posits  the 
objective  reality  of  relations  as  the  cosmical  corre- 
late of  universal  concepts  in  the  human  mind  —  an 
innovation  sufficient  of  itself  to  revolutionize  and 
modernize  the  falsely  so  called  "  modern  philosophy." 
These,  not  to  mention  other  important  differences, 
are  quite  enough  to  signalize  the  vast  divergence  be- 
tween the  philosophies  of  science  and  of  "  common 
sense,"  and  to  show  that  scientific  realism  is  of  a 
type  wholly  distinct  from  that  of  the  Scotch  school. 

§  6.  Still  more  shallow,  however,  would  be  the 
criticism  that  scientific  realism  is  a  mere  groundless 
assumption,  an  unreflective  and  untutored  begging 
of  the  question,  a  naive  taking  for  granted  by  "  com- 
mon thinking  "  of  the  whole  point  at  issue  :  namely, 
whether  or  not  an  external  universe  can  be  known 
as  independent  for  its  existence  upon  human  con- 

1  "The  Doctrine  of  Nominalism  has,  among  others,  been  em- 
braced by  Hobbes,  Berkeley,  Hume,  Principal  Campbell,  and  Mr. 
Stewart ;  while  Conceptualism  has  found  favor  with  Locke,  Reid, 
and  Brown.  .  .  .  This  opinion  [Nominalism]  .  .  .  appears  to  me 
not  only  true,  but  self-evident."  (Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Led.  on  Met., 
p.  477.) 


eS  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

sciousness.  On  the  contrary,  scientific  realism  has 
an  inexpugnable  rational  foundation  in  the  trium- 
phantly successful  use  of  the  scientific  method  by 
the  separate  sciences,  and  points  out  that  this  incon- 
trovertible success  has  settled  the  question  experi- 
mentally, decisively,  and  forever;  it  grounds  itself 
avowedly  on  the  truth  of  the  discoveries  which  the 
scientific  method  has  made ;  it  declares  that  the 
truth  of  these  discoveries,  once  admitted,  demon- 
strates that  experience  cannot  be  the  product  of 
consciousness  alone,  but  must  be  the  product  of  con- 
sciousness and  an  external  universe  endlessly  acting 
and  reacting  upon  each  other  —  cannot  be  the  sole 
activity  of  the  subject,  but  must  be  the  co-activity 
of  the  subject  and  the  object  in  dynamic  correlation ; 
and  it  declares  that  this  interpretation  of  experience 
must  be  unreservedly  conceded,  or  else  the  validity 
of  the  scientific  method  itself  must  be  unreservedly, 
boldly,  and  frankly  denied. 

The  sharp  issue  is  this  :  either  an  external  world 
independent  of  human  consciousness  is  known  to 
exist,  or  else  all  human  science  is  false.  By  no 
logical  subterfuge  can  this  issue  be  escaped.  If  the 
discoveries  made  by  science  are  real  or  true  discov- 
eries, if  the  relations  they  reveal  in  the  non-human 
universe  are  real  or  true  relations,  then  scientific 
realism  is  no  assumption,  no  begging  of  the  question, 
no  taking  for  granted  of  the  point  at  issue,  but  the 
most  absolutely  j)roved  truth  which  the  intellect  of 
man  has  ever  wrested  from  the  mystery  in  which 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  69 

he  dwells.  The  claim  of  science  to  be  real  knowl- 
edge of  a  real  and  intelligible  universe  is  the  voice 
of  the  collective  experience  and  reason  of  mankind ; 
it  is  a  claim  so  solidly  grounded  that  the  hardiest 
sceptic  durst  not  call  in  question  the  particular 
truths  of  which  that  knowledge  is  the  sum. 

It  is  only  when  these  particular  truths  are  gen- 
eralized as  I  have  generalized  them,  —  only  when 
the  generalization  is  put  into  the  form  of  a  definite 
philosophical  principle  of  Scientific  Ontology,  —  that 
the  sceptic's  voice  is  heard.  But,  if  he  would  success- 
fully challenge  scientific  realism  as  a  philosophical 
first  principle,  he  must  first  overthrow  all  the  par- 
ticular truths  of  which  scientific  realism  is  a  mere  re. 
statement  in  general  terms.  Scientific  realism  is  no 
more  an  assumption  than  is  science  itself ;  the  two 
are  one  and  the  same.  The  ground  here  taken  is  that 
the  Successful  Use  of  the  Scientific  Method  is  the  Veri- 
fication and  Demonstration  of  Scientific  Realism ; 
that  scientific  realism  can  be  overthrown  only  by 
overthrowing  the  scientific  method  itself;  and  that 
it  is  time  for  speculative  philosophy  to  recognize 
this  position,  to  appreciate  its  tremendous  strength, 
and  to  adopt  it  as  its  own  foundation  and  point  of 
departure.  Until  it  shall  do  so,  speculative  philoso- 
phy will  never  become  the  creator  of  any  deep  or 
world-wide  human  conviction,  never  mould  the  faith 
of  mankind,  never  command  the  religious  allegiance 
of  the  many,  but  must  remain  what  it  is  to-day  — 
the  closet-amusement  and  intellectual  luxury  of  the 


70  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

few.  So  long  as  it  persists  in  denying  that  expe- 
rience is  actual  knowledge  of  a  universe  independent 
of  human  consciousness,  —  so  long  as  it  persists  in 
seeking  a  knowledge  of  Being  which  shall  be  deeper 
or  higher  than  experience  can  give,  —  just  so  long 
will  mankind  at  large  consider  philosophy  itself  as 
an  ingenious  boy  in  the  backwoods  inventing  a 
machine  for  perpetual  motion,  when  all  the  civilized 
world  knows  that  a  machine  for  perpetual  motion 
is  impossible. 

§  7.  "  But,"  it  will  be  asked,  "  do  you  seriously 
mean  to  defend  the  exploded  doctrine  that  the  uni- 
verse is  known  as  a  Thing-in-itself,  a  Ding-an-sich,  a 
Noumenon  ? " 

That  is  exactly  what  I  mean.  But  I  deny  that 
the  doctrine  is  exploded,  and  I  also  deny  that  it  has 
ever  yet  been  set  forth  in  its  true  light.  The  realism 
of  science  is  assuredly  no  invention  of  mine;  and 
it  can  no  more  be  exploded  without  exploding  the 
whole  fabric  of  science,  than  the  foundation  could 
be  blown  from  beneath  the  Washington  Monument 
without  bringing  the  whole  majestic  column  in  ruins 
to  the  ground.  For  the  last  two  or  three  centuries, 
the  most  fashionable  philosophy  has  played  the  part 
of  a  Japanese  juggler  or  acrobat,  and  performed  logi- 
cal feats  requiring  no  small  agility  and  dexterity, 
yet  not  conducing  in  any  marked  degree  to  the 
advancement  of  civilization.  Beginning  with  Des- 
cartes's  famous  "  I  think,  therefore  I  am,"  —  that  is, 
with  the  certainty  of  individual  human  conscious- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  71 

ness  as  the  one  first  fact  and  starting-point  in  all 
speculation,  —  and  assuming,  as  regulative  principle 
of  procedure,  that  nothmg  can  be  certainly  known 
except  the  contents  of  individual  human  conscious- 
ness, modern  philosophy  would,  if  it  reasoned  well, 
arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  nothing  can  be  either 
knowrij  or  inferred,  or  conceived,  as  existent  outside  of 
individual  human  consciousness.  With  such  a  point 
of  departure  and  such  a  rule  of  procedure,  the  only 
logical  conclusion  is  absolute  solipsism,  or  the  sole 
existence  of  the  individual  thinker ;  every  form  of 
inferential  realism  relies  on  a  logically  worthless 
inference  (§  67).  But  modern  idealism  tries  in  a 
thousand  ways,  ingenious  as  they  are  futile,  to  es- 
cape from  the  unavoidably  solipsistic  outcome  of  its 
own  principles,  to  withdraw  all  attention  from  this 
its  great  intellectual  sin  against  the  first  laws  of 
logic,  and  to  arrive  at  some  mode  of  living  amicably 
with  the  external  world  which  it  can  neither  suppress 
nor  master:  all  of  which  is  commendably  amiable, 
but  not  quite  satisfactory  as  a  substitute  for  clear 
thinking. 

§  8.  Now  the  root  of  modern  idealism,  whether 
in  its  transcendental  or  experiential  form,  is  the 
theory  of  Phenomenism  —  the  theory  that  nothing 
can  be  known  except  "phenomena,"  and  that  all 
phenomena  depend  for  their  existence  on  individual 
human  consciousness  alone.  It  is  this  theory  of 
phenomenism,  the  life-principle  of  modern  philoso- 
phy,   which    most    formidably    opposes   the   theory 


72  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

of  Noumenism  (scientific  realism  or  scientific  ontol- 
ogy), the  life-principle  of  modern  science.  This  pro- 
found and  fundamental  issue  between  Phenomenism 
AND  NouMENiSM  lies  at  the  bottom  of  all  other  issues 
of  modern  thought ;  it  is  the  "  previous  question  "  in 
all  philosophical  controversies ;  it  is  the  imperfectly 
seen,  yet  uneasily  and  vaguely  felt  turning-point, 
or  strategical  centre,  in  the  movement  and  self- 
marshalling  of  all  warring  tendencies  in  the  dis- 
tinctively modern  mind ;  it  is  the  pitched  battle-field 
in  a  struggle  which  must  end  in  a  vast  intellectual 
revolution,  wrought  by  the  influence  of  modern  science 
upon  so-called  modern  philosophy,  by  which  philoso- 
phy will  become  truly  modernized  —  taught,  that  is, 
to  exchange  its  old,  worn-out,  and  merely  traditional 
Scholastic  Method  of  sterile  subjectivism  for  the  new 
Scientific  Method  so  prolific  of  objective  discoveries. 
For  Phenomenism  is  the  historical  product  of  the 
Kantian  "  Apriorismus  ;  "  the  Kantian  "  Aprioris- 
mus"  is  the  historical  product  of  mediaeval  Nomi- 
nalism ;  and  mediseval  Nominalism  is  the  historical 
product,  by  a  violent  and  extravagant  reaction  ex- 
plicable as  historical  polarization,  of  the  earlier 
mediaeval  Eeahsm,  which  the  Catholic  Church  had 
borrowed  from  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  had  rendered 
intolerable  in  the  Renaissance  by  abusing  it  to  the 
service  of  oppressive  and  unintelligible  dogmas.^ 
This  indisputable  genealogy  of  phenomenism  shows 
that   the   issue   between    it   and   noumenism  is,  in 

1  See  the  Introduction. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  73 

truth,  the  everlasting  issue  between  the  past  and 
the  present,  and  that  all  the  interests  of  modern  in- 
tellectual progress  are  involved  in  its  right  decision. 
Consequently,  it  is  necessary  to  devote  considerable 
attention  to  it,  although  it  will  be  impossible  here 
to  do  more  than  touch  on  a  few  salient  points  of  so 
vast  a  subject. 


74  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 


CHAPTEE    11. 

THE   THEORY   OF   PHENOMENISM. 

§  9.  Stripped  of  unessential  particulars,  the  most 
advanced  and  fully  developed  form  of  phenomenism 
may  be  tersely  stated  in  these  five  main  positions :  — 

1.  The  universe  is  only  a  phenomenon,  and  not  a 
noumenon  or  thing-in-itself. 

2.  This  phenomenon-universe,  like  every  minor 
phenomenon,  is  only  a  mental  conception  or  repre- 
sentation, deriving  its  whole  existence  from  the 
representing  consciousness  alone,  and  determined  by 
and  depending  upon  absolutely  nothing  which  is 
external  to  that  consciousness. 

3.  For  philosophy,  the  sphere  of  Being  is  strictly 
identical  with  the  sphere  of  the  phenomenon-universe, 
and  therefore  with  the  sphere  of  human  representa- 
tion; no  inference  either  to  a  noumenal  subject  or 
to  a  noumenal  object  is  philosophically  permissible. 
All  the  categories,  even  those  of  Eeality,  Existence, 
and  Being  itself,  are  mere  forms  of  relation  wdthin 
the  actual  content  of  human  representation,  and 
have  neither  validity  nor  application  beyond  it.  The 
sole  legitimate  aim  of  philosophy,  limiting  its  scope 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  75 

both  as  Theory  of  Knowledge  and  Theory  of  Being, 
is  to  investigate  these  immanent  relations  of  repre- 
sentations as  such,  and  rigorously  to  exclude  all 
hypotheses  as  to  possible  realities  not  actually  con- 
tained within  them. 

4.  Since  all  the  categories  by  which  representa- 
tions are  internally  determined,  including  the  cate- 
gory of  Eelation,  are  themselves  determined  a  priori 
by  (and  hence  deducible  from)  the  nature  of  the 
human  understanding,^  all  possible  relations  are 
merely  immanent  determinations  of  human  repre- 
sentations, schematized  by  the  pure  understanding 
and  the  transcendental  imagination  acting  in  concert. 
In  other  words,  no  relations  are  possible  in  any 
noumenal  world  which  may  be  external  to  the  rep- 
resentations. Hence,  even  if  a  noumenal  world 
exists,  it  must  possess  in  itself  a  non-relational  or 
chaotic  constitution,  and  therefore  remam  forever 
unintelligible  locr  se. 

5.  The  existence  of  a  noumenon-universe,  how- 
ever, even  if  an  abstract  possibility,  is  an  utterly 
inconceivable,  groundless,  and  useless  assumption. 
The  noumenon  is  a  mere  hypostasis  of  the  abstract 
unity  of  the  "  thing,"  which  abstract  unity  is  nothing 

1  "weil  der  Verstand  des  Menschen  ronNatur  so  organisirt  wlrd, 

dass"  u.  s.  ID.  (Krug,  EncyHopadlsch-j.hilosophisches  Lexilon,  I.  730.) 
This  "natural  organization  of  the  human  understanding"  is  to 
phenomenism  an  ultimate  and  inexplicable  fact.  In  this  funda- 
mental point,  phenomenism  imitates  the  ''naive  realism"  which 
it  professes  to  despise  ;  for  it  rests  at  last,  no  less  tlian  the  Scotch 
school,  on  the  assumption  of  an  ultimately  inscrutable  constitution 
of  the  knowing  faculty. 


76  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

but  the  d  priori  form  of  representation  in  general  ? 
by  hypostasis,  this  mere  a  priori  form  of  thought 
is  illegitimately  converted  into  a  self-subsistent  entity 
or  "thing-in-itself."  Consequently,  there  is  and  can 
be  no  perceptive  understanding  or  intellectual  in- 
tuition (intelleduelle  Anscliaimng)  by  which  tliis  non- 
entity may  be  cognized. 

§  10.  In  short,  phenomenism  is  the  theory  which 
teaches  that  the  universe  is  a  phenomenon  without 
a  noumenon,  existing  in  the  act  of  the  individual 
consciousness  which  represents  it,  and  while  it  repre- 
sents it,  but  otherwise  having  no  existence  which 
can  be  either  known,  inferred,  or  conceived ;  and, 
consequently,  that  science  is  valid  only  in  the  realm 
of  actual  experience  —  valid,  that  is,  only  as  explain- 
ing the  order  and  connection  of  actually  existent 
representations,  whose  true  explanation  must  be 
sought  only  in  themselves,  and  not  in  a  self-existent 
universe.  In  other  w^ords,  all  the  relations  formu- 
lated in  the  propositions  of  science  are  absolutely 
created  by  the  mind  which  formulates  them,  and 
exist  only  in  that  mind ;  they  do  not  exist  in  any 
universe  independent  of  it,  but  have  their  whole  ex- 
istence in  the  human  representations  of  w^hich  they 
themselves  are  merely  immanent  determinations.^ 

The  rational  foundation  of  this  whole  theory,  then, 
lies  in  the  principle  that  relations  have  no  objective 

1  "Materialism  .  .  .  builds  its  theories  upon  the  axiom  of  the 
intelligibility  of  the  world,  and  overlooks  that  this  axiom  is  at 
bottom  only  the  principle  of  order  in  phenomena."  (Lange,  His- 
tory of  Materialism,  II.  166,  Boston,  1880.) 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  11 

realitij  whatever,  hut  exist  solely  and  exclusively  as  the 
creative  ivork  of  the  human  tmder standing.  This  ex- 
clusive Subjectivity  of  Relations  is  the  genetic  and 
essential  principle  of  phenomenism,  although  not 
distinctly  laid  down  as  such  by  phenomenists,  and 
evidently  not  discerned  by  them  to  be  the  funda- 
mental logical  ground  of  phenomenism  itself,  for 
the  reason  that  it  has  been  inherited  by  all  schools 
of  modern  philosophy  from  mediaeval  Nominalism, 
and  hence  has  never  been  subjected  hitherto  to  a 
closely  critical  examination.^  It  constitutes,  for  all 
that,  the  whole  pith  and  substance  of  phenomenism 
and  its  chief  future  significance  in  the  history  of 
philosophy;  for  it  is  the  germinal  presupposition 
from  which  all  the  other  principles  of  phenomenism 
have  been  logically  derived,  and  without  which  they 
would  have  no  inner  coherence  or  even  intelligible 
meaning. 

§  11.  Taken  in  the  advanced  form  which  has  been 
presented  above,  the  theory  of  phenomenism  is  based 
substantially,  though  with  various  modifications  and 
improvements,  on  the  Kantian  philosophy;   and  it 

1  Even  M.  Fr.  Paulhan,  who  writes  an  article  on  "  La  Eealite 
des  Rapports"  in  La  Critique  Philosophique  for  April  30,  1885,  has 
to  destroy  his  own  argument  by  taking  his  stand  on  phenomenism  : 
"  Nous  nous  pla^ons  ici  sur  le  terrain  du  phe'nome'nisrae  qui  voit 
dans  les  faits,  quels  qu'ils  puissent  etre,  non  pas  I'ombre  changeante 
et  fuyante  d'une  substance  inconnaissable,  mais  une  realite  vraie, 
la  seule  re'alite'  dont  on  puisse,  en  somme,  s'occuper."  It  is  mani- 
fest enough  that  M.  Paulhan  is  defending  only  the  phenomenal 
reality  of  relations  in  the  representation,  not  their  noumenal  reality 
in  the  thing-in-itself. 


78  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

meets  us  everywhere  in  the  philosophical  literature 
of  the  day.  Prof.  Windelband  says  of  it:  ''This 
thought,  that  outside  of  representation  there  is 
nothing  with  which  science  has  to  deal,  is  Kant's 
gift  of  the  gods  to  man ;  although  to  common  think- 
ing, to  wdiich  nothing  is  more  familiar  than  the  dis- 
tinction of  representation  and  thing-in-itself,  it  must 
appear  to  be  what  Jacobi,  the  champion  of  common 
thinking,  called  it  —  Mhilism."  And  again:  "This 
Immanent  Metliocl  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  is 
now  justly  considered  to  be  Kant's  supreme  achieve- 
ment." Eiehl  goes  so  far  as  to  declare  that  the 
Kantian  philosophy  essentially  consists  in  this  "  im- 
manent method"  of  discarding  both  noumenal  sub- 
ject and  noumenal  object  as  mere  metaphysical 
dreams,  and  refusing  to  consider  aught  beyond  the 
bare  representation  itself.  Fortlage,  on  the  other 
hand,  formulates  this  method  as  an  attempt  "  to 
resolve  all  cognitions  into  the  process  of  cognizing," 
and  characterizes  it  as  "completed  scepticism."  ^  Just 
as  the  Scientific  Method  rests  on  the  presupposition 
of  the  Objectivity  of  Eelations,  so  the  Immanent 
Method  rests  on  the  presupposition  of  the  Subjec- 
tivity of  Eelations ;  both  presuppositions  are  assumed 
without  proof,  and  constitute  the  rational  ground 
of  their  respective  methods,  the  pivotal  principles  of 
Noumenism  and  Phenomenism  as.  rival  theories  of 

1  See  the  valuable  article  by  Prof.  W.  Windelband,  of  Zurich, 
"  Ueher  die  veischiedenen  Phasen  der  Kantischen  Lehre  vom  Diiuj- 
an-sich,"  in  the  ViertAjahrsschrift  filr  wissenschaftUche  Philosophie, 
I.  224-266,  Leipzig,  1877. 


TEE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  79 

knowledge.  What,  then,  shall  be  said  of  the  theory 
of  Phenomenism  ?     Is  it  true  ? 

§  12.  I  consider  the  theory  of  phenomenism  false, 
root  and  branch,  —  false  in  relation  to  the  opposite 
theory  of  noumenism,  which  is  proved  true  by  the 
existence  of  science  as  actual  and  indisputable  knowl- 
edge of  a  noumenal  universe,  and  false  in  itself,  be- 
cause it  contradicts  itself  in  a  most  astounding  way. 
Omitting  here  all  other  criticisms,  and  reserving 
these  for  another  occasion,  I  rest  my  case  for  the 
present  on  these  two  objections,  either  of  which,  if 
substantiated,  is  overwhelmingly  decisive. 

§  13.  The  first  objection  to  phenomenism  is  that 
science  is  actual  knowledge  of  a  noumenal  universe, 
and  therefore  refutes  by  its  bare  existence  the  phe- 
nomenism which  denies  the  possibility  of  such  knowl- 
edge,—  on  the  sound  principle  of  the  old  logical 
maxim:  "Ah  esse  ad  posse  valet,  a  2^osse  ad  esse  non 
valet,  eonsequentia." 

§  14.  To  break  the  force  of  this  argument,  phe- 
nomenism, of  course,  maintains  that  science  is,  and 
claims  to  be,  nothing  but  knowledge  of  phenomena 
alone,  —  that  it  neither  has,  nor  professes  to  have, 
any  knowledge  of  noumena.  It  denies  that  "the 
discovery  of  new  relations  between  phenomena  with- 
in the  sphere  of  consciousness  "  can  "  either  prove  or 
disprove  the  existence  of  that  noumenal  something 
which  was  the  object  of  the  keen  Irish  Bishop's 
brilliant  polemic."'  It  strenuously  contends  that 
Nature  is  nothing  more  than  a  "system  of  sense- 


80  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

ideas : "  that  is,  a  merely  suhjedive  synthesis  of  real 
sensations  mutually  related  and  reduced  to  order  in 
representation  by  means  of  the  schematism  of  the 
pure  understanding,  and  not  at  all  an  objective  syn- 
thesis of  real  relations  in  a  universe  independent  for 
its  existence  on  human  consciousness.  It  asserts 
that  "investigation  of  the  laws  of  Nature  proceeds 
upon  a  basis  of  observation  and  experiment,  and 
observation  and  experiment  have  to  do  with  the 
immediate  object  of  knowledge"  (^.e.,  as  evidently 
here  intended,  not  the  objectively  existent  thing, 
but  the  purely  subjective  mental  representation  of 
the  thing,  the  Vorstcllung),  "  and  in  no  case  with  the 
'substratum'  or  ' thing-in-itself.'"  It  affirms  that 
"the  only  difference  in  the  views  of  Nature  taken 
by  the  ordinary  scientific  realist  and  the  consistent 
idealist  is,  that  the  one  regards  objects  as  actually 
existing  between  the  intervals  of  his  perception, 
while  the  other  attributes  to  them  a  merely  poten- 
tial existence"  {i.e.,  regards  them  as  actually  non- 
existent, the  perception  absolutely  creating  them  and 
the  cessation  of  perception  absolutely  annihilating 
them  as  actual  existences,  —  which  is,  of  course,  the 
only  possible  meaning  of  the  Berkeleian  principle 
that  the  esse  of  objects  is  j^^^^^ipi)-^ 

§  15.    Now  the  conception  of   science  here   pre- 
sented, if  it  were  not  so  common  in  phenomenistic 

1  The  quotations  in  this  paragraph  are  all  taken  from  an  in- 
genious article  by  Prof.  G.  S.  Tullerton,  entitled  "The  Argu- 
ment from  Experience  against  Idealism,"  in  the  Journal  of  Speculative 
Philosophy,  October.  1884. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  81 

literature,  and  if  it  were  not  unfolded  with  such 
evident  gravity,  seriousness,  and  naivete,  would  be 
aptly  characterized  as  mere  caricature,  travesty,  or 
broad  burlesque.  Every  one  of  the  propositions 
which  formulate  the  results  of  the  scientific  method, 
and  constitute  in  their  totality  the  body  of  science, 
is,  if  valid  at  all,  valid  of  "  things-in-themselves,"  — 
that  is,  states  relations  among  objective  realities 
which  have  indeed  been  discovered  by  human 
perception,  yet  no  more  depend  upon  human 
perception  for  their  existence  than  the  coach  in 
the  fable  depended  on  the  fly  for  its  motion. 
That,  and  that  only,  is  what  every  scientific  man 
means  by  his  statements,  and  he  would  be  indig- 
nant, if  told  to  his  face  he  did  not  mean  it.^  By 
means  of  consciousness,  science  discovers  permanent 
relations  among  permanent  things  which  depend  on 
consciousness  for  nothing  whatever,  except  for  the 
discovery  itself.  Phenomenism  may  deny  the  dis- 
covery, if  it  will,  but  not  distort  it ;  it  has  no  right 
to  pervert  facts  and  misrepresent  science  by  pre- 

1  The  "  order  of  Nature  "  is  never  understood  b}^  strictly  scien- 
tific men  in  the  sense  of  the  "  mere  order  of  my  representations," 
which  is  the  interpretation  put  upon  it  by  phenomenism.  Prof. 
Virchow,  in  Schliemann's  New  Tlios,  refers  to  his  own  '*  Gcwohnlieit 
der  kdltesten  Objrcflvitat."  Prof.  W.  B.  Taylor,  in  his  masterly 
essay  on  "  Kinetic  Theories  of  Gravitation,"  published  in  the  Sviith- 
sonian  Report  for  1876,  says:  "Our  beliefs  should  always  be  based 
upon,  and  conform  to,  the  observed  order  of  Nature."  Prof.  L.  E. 
Hicks,  who  fills  the  chair  of  geology  in  Denison  University,  says  in 
his  Critique  of  Design  Arrjiimeiits,  p.  17:  "The  external  order  ex- 
isted before  the  science  which  is  based  upon  it."  Volumes  could 
be  filled  with  precisely  similar  statements. 

6 


82  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

tending  that  the  discovery  relates  merely  to  subjec- 
tive human  representations,  when  it  relates  in  truth 
to  an  objectively  real  and  self-existent  universe. 

§  16.  It  is  solemn  trifling  or  elegant  pleasantry 
of  this  sort  which  has  degraded  philosophy  from 
its  once  proud  rank  of  scientia  scieiitiaritm,  and 
threatens  to  degrade  it  still  further  to  that  of 
ignorantia  scientiarum.  The  friendship  which  phe- 
nomenism professes  for  science  is  a  false  and  treach- 
erous friendship;  for  phenomenism  is  the  modernized 
form  of  the  ancient  Greek  scepticism,  and  has  merely 
given  to  the  crude  Pyrrhonic  formula  of  the  "un- 
intelligibility  of  all  things  "  (afcaraXriyjrLa,  rravra 
iarlv  aKaraXTjirrd,  nihil  sciri  potest,  ne  illiid  ipsum 
quidem)  a  more  subtile  and  refined  form  in 
the  modern  doctrine  of  the  "  unintelligibility  of 
things-in-themselves "  {Uncrkennharkeit  dcr  iJingc- 
an-sich).  To  both  the  ancient  and  modern  scep- 
ticisms science  makes  one  silent  reply:  she  points 
to  her  undeniable  discoveries  and  the  method  by 
which  they  have  been  won,  as  the  unanswerable 
proof  that  knowledge  of  the  noumenal  universe  is 
attainable  by  experience.  Certain  it  is  that  phe- 
nomenism, the  thoroughly  systematized  form  which 
scepticism  has  assumed  in  modern  times,  lays  the 
axe  at  the  very  root  of  all  scientific  knowledge  of 
the  universe,  by  astutely  and  covertly  seeking  to 
transmute  it  into  a  purely  ideal  product  of  the 
human  mind,  devoid  of  all  truth  or  applicability 
beyond  the  human  mind  itself.     But  its  blows  will 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  83 

continue  to  fall  without  effect,  until  it  shall  first 
have  attacked  and  destroyed  the  scientific  method. 
Unwilling  to  attempt  openly,  however,  so  formidable 
a  task,  phenomenism  prefers  to  assume  the  guise  of 
friendship,  to  concede  ostensibly  the  validity  of  tlie 
scientific  method  and  its  results,  and  then  to  under- 
mine it   secretly   by   interpreting   these   results   as 
"  the  discovery  of  new  relations  between  phenomena 
loithin  the  sphere  of  consciousiiess."     In  other  words, 
since  such  relations  must  depend  absolutely  for  their 
existence  upon  the  continuance  of  the  consciousness 
in  which  they  are  discovered,  and  must  therefore 
cease  to  exist  the  moment  they  cease  to  be  perceived, 
phenomenism  covertly  denies,   notwithstanding  her 
professions  of  friendship,  that  the  scientific  method 
can  effect  any  discovery  of  any  fact  that  does  not 
begin   and    end   with    human   consciousness    itself. 
Consequently,  when  science  (as  she  does)  formulates 
countless  relations  as  objectivehj  real  in  the  universe 
per  se,  phenomenism,  not  venturing   to  contradict, 
misinterprets  and  misrepresents  them  as   only  sitb- 
jectively  real  in  the  hu7nan   mind.     Despite  all  dis- 
guises, phenomenism   thus   shows  itself   to   be  the 
secret  and  irreconcilable  foe  of  science,  and  appears 
as  what   Fortlage  calls  it,  "  completed  scepticism." 
In   short,  if  phenomenism  is  true,  science  is  false; 
if  science  is  true,  phenomenism  is  false ;  and  every 
attempt   to   show   the   contrary  misrepresents    one, 
or  the  other,  or  both.     The  first  objection,  therefore, 
that  phenomenism  is  refuted  by  the  bare  existence 


84  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

of  science,  is  substantiated  for  all  wlio  are  convinced 
that  science  is  true-;  but  its  full  strength  will  hardly 
be  felt  before  the  theory  of  noumenism  is  positively 
developed. 

§  17.  The  second  objection  to  the  theory  of  phe- 
nomenism is  that  it  suicidally  contradicts  itself, 
inasmuch  as  it  claims  to  get  rid  of  noumena  alto- 
gether, and  ends  by  giving  us  nothing  else. 

§  18.  In  the  first  place,  it  maintains  that  "  the 
phenomenon-universe  is  only  a  mental  representa- 
tion, deriving  its  whole  existence  from  the  represent- 
ing consciousness."  Now  a  "  mental  representation  " 
is  nothing  but  the  act  of  representing,  just  as  a  thought 
is  nothing  but  the  act  of  thinking,  or  as  a  men- 
tal image  is  nothing  but  the  act  of  imagining;  its 
existence  consists  in  the  actual  continuity  of  the 
act,  and  ceases  when  the  act  ceases.  Moreover,  the 
"  representing  consciousness,"  likewise,  according 
to  phenomenism,  which  rejects  the  supposition  of 
a  noumenal  subject  behind  the  consciousness,  is 
nothing  but  the  act  of  representing ;  for  nothing  else 
remains  when  the  noumenal  subject  is  suppressed. 
Consequently,  the  statement  with  which  we  began, 
if  we  now  substitute  in  it  these  strictly  equivalent 
expressions,  will  read  as  follows  :  "  The  phenomenon- 
universe  is  only  an  act  of  representing,  deriving  its 
whole  existence  from  the  act  of  representing."  Con- 
sequently, the  phenomenon-universe,  thus  reduced 
to  a  mere  act  of  representing,  derives  its  whole 
existence  from  itself  —  is  therefore  absolutely  self- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  85 

subsistent  and  depends  on  nothing  beyond  itself  — 
is  therefore  a  self-existent  or  self-caused  reality,  or 
causa  sui.  Thus  phenomenism,  pretending  to  give 
us  a  phenomenon-universe,  has  given  us  in  fact  a 
universe  which  is  pure  noumenon,  and  nothing  else  ; 
for,  if  a  causa  sui  is  not  a  pure  noumenon,  nay,  a 
very  noumenon  noumenoncm,  what  is  it  ?  Phenome- 
nism, therefore,  strange  to  say,  ends  by  giving  us  a 
noumenon-universe  after  all ! 

§  19.  In  the  second  place,  the  Greek  sceptic  Kar- 
neades,  founder  of  the  third  Academy,  knew  how  to 
analyze  the  representation  (^  (fyavTaa-ia)  without  deny- 
ing the  reality  either  of  the  representing  consciousness 
(o  cj>avTa(Tiov/jL6vo<=:)  or  of  the  represented  thing  (to 
(fiavracTTov)}  Phenomenism,  however,  conceding  real 
existence  to  the  representation,  denies  it  both  to  the 
representing  consciousness  and  to  the  represented 
thing.2  Hence  the  pure  representation,  since  it 
really  exists,  yet  can  exist  neither  in  a  noumenal 
subject  nor  in  a  noumenal  object,  must  exist  really 
in  itself  —  in  other  words,  must  be,  and  be  known 
to  be,  a  self-existent  entity  dependent  on  nothing 

1  *'  Um  die  Unmoglichkeit  eines  Kriteriums  und  der  darauf  sich 
stiitzenden  Ueberzeugung  darzuthun,  analysirt  er  die  Vorstellung 
und  findet,  dass  dieselbe  ein  Verhaltniss  liabe,  sowol  zu  dem  Gegen- 
stande,  durch  den,als  zu  dem  Subjecte,  in  dem  sie  entsteht."  (Erd- 
mann,  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  I.  164.) 

2  "Die  Beziehung  unserer  Vorstellungen  auf  ein  vorstellendes 
Subject  und  auf  ein  vorzustellendes  Object  sind  in  dem  reinen 
Thatbestand  des  Vorstellungsin hakes  nicht  enthalten,  sonderu 
bereits  Deutungsversuche  zur  Erklarung  der  Vorstellungen,  die 
sine  durch  die  Categoric  der  Causalitat,  die  andere  durch  diejenige 
der  Substantialitat  vermittelt."     (W.  Wiudelbaud,  1.  c,  p.  259.) 


8Q  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

outside  of  itself.  But  that  is  a  noumenon,  iu  the 
very  sense  in  which  phenomenism  most  vigorously 
denies  its  reality.  Once  more,  therefore,  phenome- 
nism, promising  us  a  representation  which  shall  he 
pure  phenomenon,  ends  by  giving  us  a  noumenon- 
representation  after  all ! 

§  20.  In  the  third  place,  phenomenism  is  severe  on 
all  attempts  to  convert  abstractions  into  entities  by 
that  delusive  process  of  thought  called  hypostasis. 
"The  tenets  of  the  old  metaphysic,"  says  Windel- 
band,  "consisted  in  the  hypostasis  of  the  A  priori 
forms  of  thought  {Hypostasirung  cler  Denkformen) ; 
the  assumption  of  things-in-themselves  in  general  is 
the  hypostasis  of  the  ground-form  of  all  representa- 
tions." And  he  declares :  "  The  hypostasis  of  the 
thought-forms  is  the  essence  of  all  dogmatism." 
The  warning  is  salutary ;  but  phenomenism  imme- 
diately proceeds  to  despise  and  disregard  it.  For 
the  retort  is  cogent  and  unanswerable  that,  if  tlie 
hypostasis  of  the  thought-forms  is  inadmissible  in 
the  old  metaphysic,  the  self-evident  hypostasis  of  the 
thought-ads,  or  thovght-funcMons,  is  no  less  inadmis- 
sible in  phenomenism  itself.  The  representation 
cannot  possibly  be  conceived  as  anything  else  than 
a  mere  act  or  functioning  of  the  mind,  a  mere  act 
of  representing ;  and,  by  abstraction,  to  elevate  this 
mere  act  or  function  into  a  self  subsistent  phenome- 
non-in-itself  is  to  hypostatize  it,  beyond  the  possi- 
bility of  cavil  or  reply.  The  '■  Hypostasirnng  der 
Denkformen"  is  at  least  no  worse  than  the  Hyposta- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  87 

sirung  der  Denkacten ;  the  phenomenon-iu-itself  is 
at  least  as  bad  as  the  thing-in-itself,  —  in  fact,  it 
becomes  a  thing-in-itself,  since  there  is  no  distinc- 
tion between  phenomenon  and  noumenon,  if  the 
possibility  of  separating  them  is  once  conceded. 
Self-existent  representations,  or  phenomena-in-them- 
selves,  are  strictly  indistinguishable  from  noumena, 
or  things-in-themselves.  Not  only,  therefore,  does 
phenomenism,  having  promised  to  give  us  phenomena 
alone,  end  by  giving  us  noumena  alone,  but  also  it 
caps  the  climax  of  self-contradiction  by  creating  its 
noumena  through  the  selfsame  process  which,  in  the 
old  metaphysic,  it  gravely  reprehends  and  repro- 
bates —  the  process  of  hypostasis  ! 

§  21.  Thus,  turn  which  way  it  may,  phenomenism 
proves  itself  utterly  unable  to  escape  from  the  nou- 
mena it  abhors,  and  powerless  to  hold  fast  by 
"phenomena  alone;"  /or  " i^hcnomeyia  alone'''  in- 
stantly become  noumena.  In  vain  it  struggles  to 
evade  the  necessity  of  confessing  that  man  knows 
the  self-existent :  the  bare  fact  that  anything  exists 
at  all  is  demonstration  of  the  fact  that  something 
exists  of  itself,  and  the  one  fact  is  no  less  neces- 
sarily known  than  the  other.  The  essential  and 
avow^ed  purpose  of  phenomenism,  namely,  to  con- 
ceive the  universe  as  only  a  phenomenon,  is,  there- 
fore, quixotic,  impossible,  and  self-contradictory  to 
the  very  verge  of  absurdity.  It  cannot  be  character- 
ized with  a  more  thoroughly  scientific  accuracy  than 
by  a  passage  in  that  charming  story-book,  Alice  in 


88  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

Wonderland,  —  designed,  it  is  true,  for  children,  yet 
not  without  occasional  instiuction  for  philosophers. 
Alice  has  repeatedly  encountered  the  famous  and  ever- 
grmning  *•'  Cheshire  Cat,"  and  at  last  exclaims :  — 

" '  I  wish  you  would  n't  keep  appearing  and  vanish- 
ing so  suddenly ;  you  make  me  quite  giddy.' 

"'AH  right,' said  the  Cat;  and  this  time  it  van- 
ished quite  slowly,  beginning  with  the  end  of  the 
tail,  and  ending  with  the  grin,  which  remained  some 
time  after  the  rest  of  it  had  gone. 

"'Well!  I've  often  seen  a  cat  without  a  grin,' 
thought  Alice ;  '  but  a  grin  without  a  cat  I  It 's  the 
most  curious  thing  I  ever  saw  in  all  my  life.'" 

When  philosophy  becomes  fairyland,  in  which 
neither  the  laws  of  nature  nor  the  laws  of  reason 
hold  good,  the  attempt  of  phenomenism  to  conceive 
the  universe  as  a  jjlienomcnon  icithout  a  noumcnon 
may  succeed,  but  not  before ;  for  it  is  an  attempt 
to  conceive  "  a  grin  without  a  cat."  Being  satisfied, 
therefore,  that  phenomenism  is  the  most  inconsistent 
and  unphilosophical  theory  to  be  met  in  the  whole 
history  of  philosophy,  I  turn  now  to  the  opposite 
theory  of  noumenism,  or  scientific  realism. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE,  89 


CHAPTER    III. 

THE   THEORY    OF   NOUMENISM. 

§  22.  Kant  occasionally  opposes  the  phenomenon 
{die  Erschcinung)  to  the  non-phenomenal  (das  Nicht- 
Erscheinendc),  but  far  more  frequently  to  the  noume- 
non  or  thing-m-itself  {das  Ding-an-sich).  Now  the 
first  is  a  true,  the  second  a  false  opposition  ;  and  the 
reason  why  he  failed  to  see  that  these  two  opposi- 
tions were  not  one  and  the  same  lies  deep  in  the 
ground-plan  of  his  system,  —  nay,  in  the  far  older 
nominalistic  theory  of  universals,  of  which  his  sys- 
tem is  simply  the  historical  and  logical  culmination. 
This  point  must  be  at  least  briefly  explained,  for  it 
concerns  our  subject  vitally. 

§  23.  The  general  purpose  of  the  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason  is  to  investigate  the  origin  and  laws 
of  pure  a  priori  knowledge,  the  possibility  and 
reality  of  which  Kant  far  too  hastily  assumed,  inas- 
much as  all  the  instances  he  gives  of  it,  if  keenly 
scrutinized,  betray  at  once  the  presence  of  strictly 
empirical  elements.  Under  the  influence  of  the 
traditional  and  still  prevalent  Nominalism,  which 
reduces  all  general  terms  to  mere  subjective  con- 
cepts and  by  implication  denies  the  possibility  of 
objective  relations  as  their  cosmical  correlates,  —  and 


90  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

more  particularly  under  the  influence  of  the  nomi- 
nalistic  Hume,  whose  incomplete  subjectifying  of 
the  causal  relation  stimulated  Kant's  profounder 
genius  to  develop  this  partial  subjectivism  into  a 
universal  and  systematic  "  Apriorismus"  —  Kant 
found  himself  logically  compelled  to  consider  the 
category  of  relation  itself  as  of  purely  subjective 
validity,  and  to  see  in  it  merely  one  of  the  four 
a  priori  forms  of  the  logical  judgment  (Quantity, 
Quality,  Eelation,  Modality)  which  determine  the 
twelve  "  categories  "  or  "  pure  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing." Into  these  categories  or  a  priori  forms 
of  thought,  as  if  into  moulds,  the  formless  matter  of 
sensuous  intuition  is  run,  and  thereby  enabled  to 
take  the  form  of  definite  representations.  All  rela- 
tions, as  such,  were  thus  conceived  by  Kant  to  be 
exclusively  subjective  in  origin  and  nature,  and  to 
be  impressed,  so  to  speak,  on  the  data  of  sensation 
as  an  exclusively  subjective  element  in  all  cognition 
of  objects  of  experience.  In  this  manner  the  far- 
reaching  principle  of  the  Subjectivity  of  Belations,  de- 
rived from  the  old  nominalistic  theory  of  universals 
and  simply  reduced  by  Kant  to  a  scientific  form, 
became  incorporated  as  a  vitally  essential  part  in 
the  Kantian  system ;  and  then,  for  the  first  time, 
was  the  foundation  laid  for  a  thoroughly  systematic 
theory  of  phenomenism. 

§  24.  Now  relations  as  such  are  the  specific  and 
only  direct  objects  of  the  intellect  or  understanding. 
Nothing  else  can  be  properly  said  to  be  understood ; 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  91 

nothing  else  can  even  be  affirmed,  because  every 
proposition  without  exception  is  simply  the  state- 
ment of  some  determinate  relation  between  its  sub- 
ject and  its  predicate.  Consequently,  all  relations 
having  been  resolved  by  Kant  into  a  purely  subjec- 
tive addendum  to  the  objects  of  experience  presented 
to  the  senses,  the  external  world  became  straight- 
way absolutely  stripped  of  everything  which  is 
intelligible ;  things  in  themselves,  being  left  utterly 
unrelated  either  to  each  other  or  to  the  human 
understanding,  lapsed  into  the  condition  of  virtual 
non-existence ;  nothing  remained  possible  but  to 
view  the  universe  in  itself  as  an  utterly  inscruta- 
ble and  unintelligible  blank,  if  indeed  it  existed  at 
all  —  which  unintelligible  existence  Kant,  indeed, 
affirmed,  but  which  his  successors  have  either  gravely 
doubted  or  boldly  denied. 

Now  these  facts  perfectly  explain  how  the  word 
noumenon,^  which  originally,  in  Greek  philosophy, 
signified  "  that  which  is  intelligible,"  came  to  mean 
in  Kantian  and  post-Kantian  use  the  exact  opposite : 
namely,  "  that  which  is  unintelligible."  This  total  in- 
version in  the  meaning  of  one  of  the  most  important 
words  in  the  philosophical  vocabulary  is  certainly  a 
most  extraordinary,  significant,  and  instructive  fact ; 
and  I  venture  to  assert  that  no  satisfactory  expla- 

1  The  Greek  vo4ui,  even  in  Homer,  signified  to  perceive  with  the 
mind,  as  well  as  with  the  eyes.  In  Plato,  ra  voovfxcua  were  the 
objects  of  intellectual  perception,  and  hence,  in  general,  "  the  intelligi- 
ble ;  "  although  the  derivative  vot]t6s  more  literally  corresponded 
to  the  Latin  intelliyibilis. 


92  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

nation  of  it  can  be  given  except  the  revolution  of 
thought  by  which,  through  the  rise  of  nominalism, 
the  principle  of  the  objectivity  of  relations  was  sup- 
planted by  that  of  the  subjectivity  of  relations.  To 
Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  the  schools  derived 
from  them,  relations  were  objective  realities,  either 
separable  or  inseparable  from  objective  individual 
things ;  they  were  in  no  sense  impressed  on  objects 
a  priori  by  the  understanding  in  the  act  of  cognition  ; 
they  belonged  to  the  things  in  themselves,  and  made 
the  things  intelligible.  This  is  the  essential  purport 
both  of  the  Platonic  Theory  of  Ideas  and  of  the 
Aristotelian  Theory  of  Essential  Forms,  whence 
arose  the  distinction  of  the  koct/jlo^  votjto^  and  the 
koo-jjlo^  aLo-6r]T6<;,  the  mundits  intelligihilis  and  the 
mimdus  sensibilis  —  one  and  the  same  world  in  itself, 
as  differently  related  to  the  understanding  and  the 
sensibility,  yet  equally  within  the  compass  of  both. 
It  is  no  less  the  essential  purport  even  of  the  Greek 
"  Skepsis ;  "  for  the  fundamental  difference  between 
the  ancient  and  the  modern  scepticisms,  unnoticed 
even  in  the  best  histories  of  philosophy,  yet  easily 
detected  behind  their  statements,  lies  in  the  fact 
that  ancient  scepticism  rested  on  the  assumption  of 
the  objectivity  of  relations,  while  modern  scepticism, 
or  phenomenism,  rests  on  that  of  the  subjectivity  of 
relations.  To  show  this  in  detail  would  require 
more  space  than  can  here  be  spared  for  the  purpose  ; 
yet  a  few  facts  may  be  cited  which  sufficiently  and 
unmistakably  indicate  it. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  93 

§  25.  Pyrrhon,  the  founder  of  the  (improperly 
so  called)  sceptical  "  school,"  developed  the  general 
philosophical  doubt  occasioned  by  the  mutual  con- 
flict of  the  various  dogmatic  systems  of  his  time  into 
what  may  be  termed  a  negative  dogmatism,  whose 
chief  tenet  was  the  total  incomprehensibility  or  un- 
intelligibility  of  things  (a/caraXTz-v/r/a).  This  tenet 
was  avowedly  based  on  the  observed  conflict  of 
human  opinions  {^la  rrjv  avrtkoylav^  ck  rrj^;  Bia- 
(jxovia^)  ;  and  this  observed  conflict  of  human  opin- 
ions can  evidently  be  construed  in  only  one  way,  — 
namely,  as  an  actually  existent  relation  of  antagonism, 
objective  to  and  independent  of  the  observer,  yet 
actually  perceived  and  known  by  him  as  a  ground 
of  inference.  Pyrrhon,  therefore,  as  is  self-evident, 
denied  neither  the  objective  reality  of  things,  nor  the 
objective  reality  of  their  relations,  nor  the  subjective 
reality  of  some  mode  of  discovering  at  least  the  par- 
ticular objective  relations  on  which  he  based  his 
general  conclusion :  on  the  contrary,  he  manifestly 
assumed  all  this,  without  noticing  that  it  upset  the 
conclusion  itself.  What  he  denied  was  the  possi- 
bility of  discovering  what  the  real  relations  of  things 
are,  on  account  of  the  absence  of  any  trustworthy 
criterion  of  truth ;  and  what  he  affirmed  was  that 
nothing  can  be  known  with  certainty,  because  to 
every  affirmation  respecting  things  as  they  are  in 
themselves  its  negation  can  be  opposed  with  equal 
plausibility  or  strength  (iravrl  Xoyro  X070?  tcro<i  avrt- 
KeiTai).     This   last   proposition   Sextos   Empeirikos, 


94  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

with  the  addition  of  "  as  it  appears  to  me "  (w?  iixol 
<f>aiveTaC)  in  order  to  avoid  even  negative  dogmatism, 
declared  to  be  the  ground-principle  of  scepticism 
{^PX^  T^?  cr/c67rTifcr]<;),  It  was,  therefore,  only  on  the 
naively  conceded  reality  of  actual  and  perceptible  rela- 
tions in  the  intelligible  world,  as  objectively  existent 
aiKi  really  discoverable,  although  curiously  enough 
claimed  to  be  undiscoverable,  that  the  Pyrrhonists 
inculcated  abstinence  from  all  assertion  (d(f)aoria) 
and  suspense  of  judgment  (iiroxv)  respecting  the 
constitution  of  things  as  they  are. 

The  Academics  Arkesilaos  and  Karneades  sub- 
stantially agreed  with  Pyrrhon,  but,  in  order  to 
escape  an  absolute  deadlock  in  the  world  of  action, 
allowed  probabihty  (Trt^ai/or?;?)  as  a  practical  guide 
in  common  life.  Ainesidemos  brought  the  "  Skepsis  " 
to  its  highest  pitch  of  perfection  by  conceiving  it  not 
as  denial,  or  even  as  mere  doubt,  but  rather  as  inves- 
tigation. The  true  sceptic  does  not  permit  himself 
to  maintain,  like  the  Academics,  that  there  is  no 
certainty,  but  only  probability ;  that  would  be  a 
dogma ;  he  affirms  not,  denies  not,  doubts  not,  but 
investigates  ;  the  essential  thing  is  to  maintain  noth- 
ing at  all,  and  to  permit  to  oneself  the  use  of  no 
expressions  more  dogmatic  than  "  perhaps,"  "  I  do 
not  decide,"  "it  is  possible,"  "it  may  be  or  may 
not  be,"  and  so  forth.  This  settled  hostility  to  that 
fixedness  of  conviction  which  is  the  inevitable  result 
of  all  positive  experience  and  scientific  verification 
is,  perhaps,  the  chief  point  of  union  between  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  95 

ancient  "  Skepsis "  and  modern  phenomenism:  it  is 
the  most  marked  characteristic  of  both,  and  reveals 
itself  in  phenomenism  as  that  diseased  habit  of 
mind  which  abhors  nothing  so  heartily  as  fixed  con- 
clusions, stigmatizes  them  under  all  circumstances 
as  ''  dogmatic,"  and  insists  on  treating  even  verified 
scientific  truth  itself  as  a  "  mere  hypothesis."  In 
order  to  give  philosophic  form  to  this  tendency, 
Ainesidemos  drew  up  the  famous  ten  "Tropes" 
{rpoTTOL  tt}?  (7/ce>e«?),  or  universal  grounds  for  the 
sceptical  suspense  of  judgment,  which  were  after- 
wards reduced  to  five  by  Agrippa.  The  most  no- 
ticeable and  paradoxical  fact  about  them  is  that 
every  one  of  them  involves  a  distinct  and  unequivo- 
cal recognition  of  the  objectivity  of  relations  :  every 
one  of  them  is  based  on  the  observed  differences  of 
things  —  disagreements  in  the  constitutions  of  dif- 
ferent animals  or  men,  in  the  testimony  of  the  senses 
in  general,  in  human  institutions,  customs,  laws, 
superstitions,  or  opinions,  in  the  various  conditions 
and  circumstances  of  human  life  itself,  and  so  forth. 
Nay,  the  eighth  (o  diro  rov  Trpo?  ri),  which  in  fact 
covers  the  ground  of  the  entire  ten,  explicitly  alleges 
the  constant  changes  in  the  relations  of  things  to 
each  other  and  to  us  (relations,  therefore,  which 
must  be  both  real  and  perceived)  as  a  reason  why 
the  permanent  constitution  of  the  things  themselves 
cannot  be  certainly  known.  And  Sextos  declares  in 
terms  that  not  only  phenomena  {(^aivofieva),  hut  also 
noumena  (voov/neva),  are  legitimate  objects  of  seep- 


96  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

tical  investigation :  the  result  of  which  investigation 
being  to  find  equal  strength  {laoadeveLa)  in  opposite 
conclusions  as  to  both,  the  "  Skepsis  "  conducts  to 
the  desired  suspense  of  judgment  and  consequent 
peace  of  mind  {drapa^ta). 

Nothing  can  be  plainer,  therefore,  than  the  fact 
that  the  Greek  scepticism  itself,  —  much  more,  then, 
the  other  schools  of  Greek  philosophy,  —  were  all 
founded  upon  the  principle,  assumed  rather  than 
criticised  and  proved,  of  the  objectivity  of  relations 
and  the  intelligibility  of  noumena  no  less  than  of 
phenomena ;  and  that  this  principle  of  objectivism 
or  noumenism  is  the  profoundest  distinction  between 
Greek  and  modern  philosophy,  inasmuch  as  the 
latter  is  almost  universally  based  on  the  principle 
of  subjectivism  or  phenomenism.  Alike  to  tran- 
scendental idealism,  experiential  idealism,  and  all 
other  forms  of  nominalistic  philosophy  in  general, 
relations  have  become  mere  subjective  realities,  in- 
herent in  the  representations  and  absolutely  dis- 
severed from  the  world  in  itself,  —  which,  like  a 
decapitated  trunk,  is  now  so  far  gone  in  decay  as 
to  be  indistinguishable  from  absolute  nonentity. 
While,  however,  modern  philosophy  has  well-nigh 
unanimously  followed  in  Kant's  footsteps,  aban- 
doned the  old  Greek  foundation  of  the  objectivity  of 
relations,  and  adopted  the  mediaeval  foundation  of 
scholastic  nominalism  or  the  subjectivity  of  relations, 
modern  science  still  stubbornly  occupies  the  old 
Greek  ground  of  realism,  and  by  her  amazing,  ever- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE,  97 

multiplying  discoveries  has  already  rendered  it  an 
absolutely  impregnable  fortress  for  the  philosophy 
of  the  future. 

§  26.  We  are  at  last,  therefore,  in  a  position  to 
understand  how  it  happened  that  Kant,  confessedly 
the  greatest  genius  in  philosophy  since  Aristotle, 
came  to  confound  the  true  opposition  between  the 
phenomenon  and  the  non-phenomenal,  on  the  one 
hand,  "with  the  totally  false  opposition  between  the 
phenomenon  and  the  noumenon,  on  the  other  hand. 
In  both  the  Greek  and  the  German  philosophies,  the 
phenomenon  is  the  Apparent,  to  which  the  ISTon- 
apparent  is  a  true  opposite ;  in  the  Greek  philosophy, 
however,  the  noumenon  is  the  Objectively  Eelated 
and  Intelligible,  while  in  the  German  philosophy 
it  has  become,  as  I  have  just  explained,  the  Objec- 
tively Unrelated  and  Unintelligible. 

Consequently,  in  the  Greek  philosophy,  there  is 
no  fundamental  opposition  between  the  phenomenon 
and  the  noumenon,  since  the  Apparent  and  the 
Intelligible  are  quite  compatible  predicates  of  Being- 
in-itself ;  in  fact,  they  are  indispensable  and  insepa- 
rable predicates  of  it,  inasmuch  as  only  the  Apparent 
can  be  intelligible  and  only  the  Intelligible  can  be 
apparent,  —  inasmuch,  furthermore,  as  there  is  no 
contradiction,  but  perfect  compatibility,  between  Be- 
ing and  Appearance  or  between  Being  and  Thought. 
But,  in  the  German  philosophy,  the  noumenon  hav- 
ing become  identified  with  the  Objectively  Unrelated 
and  Unintelligible,  or  ''thing-in-itself,"  the  phenome- 


98  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

non  became  naturally  and  inevitably  identified  with 
the  merely  Subjectively  Eelated  and  Intelligible,  or 
"representation;"  in  other  words,  phenomena  be- 
came wholly  detached  from  the  world  of  Intelligible 
BeincT  and  wholly  transferred  to  the  world  of  Ideal 
Thought.  Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth, 
as  modern  science  interprets  it;  but  that,  never- 
theless, is  the  history  of  German  idealism  in  a 
nutshell. 

In  this  manner  an  unavoidable  opposition,  —  false 
in  itself,  but  logically  drawn  from  the  premises 
latent  in  Nominalism,  the  mediaeval  and  scholastic 
philosophy  grounded  on  the  assumption  of  the  sub- 
jectivity of  relations,  —  has  grown  up  and  become 
established  in  Germany  between  Being  and  Appear- 
ance, thing-in-itself  and  representation,  noumenon 
and  phenomenon.  Kant's  second  opposition  between 
the  phenomenon  {Erscheinung)  and  the  noumenon 
(Ding-an-sich)  was,  therefore,  logical  enough  in  his 
own  system  and  quite  legitimate  in  his  own  use  of 
words  —  interchangeable,  therefore,  with  his  first 
opposition  between  the  phenomenon  {Erscheiming) 
and  the  non-phenomenal  {NicM-Erscheinende).  None 
the  less  unfortunate,  hojvever,  have  been  the  con- 
sequences of  the  grave  error  originated  by  his  crea- 
tion of  this  false  opposition  between  the  noumenon 
and  the  phenomenon ;  for  it  has  deepened  the  chasm 
between  modern  philosophy  and  modern  science,  and 
prevented  the  incalculable  good  which  would  have 
resulted  from   their   cordial   co-operation.      For,  in 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  99 

both  the  Greek  and  the  scientific  conceptions  of 
the  universe,  there  is  no  opposition  whatever  be- 
tween the  noumenon  and  the  phenomenon;  on  the 
contrary,  they  are  absolutely  inseparable  predicates 
of  Being-in-itself,  or  the  universe  as  both  self-existent 
and  intelligible.  And  philosophy  itself  can  never 
recover  its  ancient  influence  and  position  as  the 
supreme  intellectual  power  in  civilization  and  cul- 
ture, until  it  has  thoroughly  revolutionized  and 
modernized  itself  by  adopting  unreservedly  the  nou- 
menism  of  modern  science. 

§  27.  While  phenomenism,  therefore,  cleaves  to 
the  German  conception,  and  views  the  universe  as 
phenomenal  only,  —  that  is,  as  a  purely  subjective 
representation  without  any  noumenal  object,  —  nou- 
menism  cleaves  to  the  old  Greek  conception,  and 
views  the  universe  as  both  phenomenal  and  noume- 
nal. Here  is  brought  out  with  perfect  distinctness 
and  clearness  the  fundamental  difference  between 
phenomenism,  or  German  subjectivism,  and  nou- 
menism,  or  ancient  Greek  and  modern  scientific 
objectivism.  The  former  assumes,  utterly  without 
warrant  in  reason  or  experience,  the  actual  separa- 
hility  of  the  phenomenon  and  noumenon,  resolves 
the  phenomenal  universe  into  the  merely  subjective 
representation  (  Vorstellung),  and  denies  all  objective 
reality  to  the  noumenal  universe  {Din(j-an-sich)\ 
while  the  latter  assumes,  as  a  datum  guaranteed  by 
both  reason  and  experience  in  the  scientific  method, 
the  actual  inseparability  of  the  phenomenon  and  the 


100  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

noumenon,  and  finds  them  to  be  not  only  compatible, 
but  co-existent  and  necessary,  predicates  of  the  uni- 
verse per  se.  And  the  ultimate  origin  of  this  funda- 
mental difference  lies  in  the  difference  between  the 
subjectivity  and  the  objectivity  of  relations,  as  the  only 
two  possible  forms  of  the  Theory  of  Universals,  upon 
which  must  rest  at  last  the  Theory  of  Knowledge. 

According  to  noumenism,  therefore,  the  noumenon 
is  Intelligible  Being,  the  mundus  intelligibilis ;   the 
phenomenon   is  Apparent   Being,  the   mundus  sen- 
sihilis;  and  these  two  are  different  yet  entirely  com- 
patible conceptions  of  the  one  universe  jper  se  which 
is  actually  known  by  science.     Phenomenism,  being 
essentially  an  affirmation  of  the  incompatibility  of 
Eeal  Being  and  Ideal  Appearance,  is  the  victim  of 
the   false   opposition   between   the   two  which   the 
Kantian   philosophy  derived  from   mediaeval   Scho- 
lasticism;  and  philosophy  can  never  become  truly 
modernized  until  it  discards  phenomenism  altogether, 
thereby  ridding  itself  of  the  numberless  contradic- 
tions latent  in  this  mistaken  theory.     Kestore  the 
true   opposition  between  the  phenomenon  and  the 
non-phenomenal;   restore  the  Aristotelian  principle 
of  the  necessary  inseparabihty  of  the  phenomenon 
and  the  noumenon;  restore  the  universal  Greek  prin- 
ciple, unconsciously  assumed  rather  than  consciously 
comprehended  and  critically  justified,  of  the  objec- 
tivity of  relations ;  add  to  these  the  incontrovertible 
discoveries  achieved  by  the  scientific  method  in  con- 
seq^uence  of  its  adoption  of  these  very  principles, — 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  101 

and  the  whole  of  modern  phenomenism  collapses 
with  its  cause,  philosophy  revives,  and  man  is  once 
more  at  home  in  a  universe  which  he  can  increas- 
ingly know. 

§  28.  For  whatever  exists  is  intelligible,  because 
it  is  or  may  be  apparent;  only  Non-Being  is  unintel- 
ligible, because  it  must  forever  remain  non-apparent. 
There  are,  and  can  be,  no  "unintelligible  things-in- 
themselves : "  so  far  phenomenism  is  unquestionably 
right.  But  things-in-themselves  are  necessarily  in- 
telligible :  and  so  far  phenomenism  is  as  unquestion- 
ably wrong.  So  understood,  the  dictum  of  Hegel 
would  be  true:  "Whatever  is  real  is  rational." ^ 
There  exists  no  "  Unknowable,"  Spencer  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding;  the  only  "Unknowable"  is 
the  non-existent.  Human  intelligence  is  a  light  in 
the  midst  of  a  boundless  darkness;  its  rays  shoot 
indefinitely  far  in  all  directions,  and  its  brightness 
grows,  fed  by  a  marvellous  internal  source  of  illu- 
mination whose  limits  have  never  yet  been  ascer- 
tained. Whoever  presumes  to  set  impassable  bounds, 
whether  deduced  from  the  nature  of  the  darkness 
per  se  or  from  the  nature  of  the  glin.-mering  light 
per  se,  to  the  area  over  which  it  may  shine,  is  guilty 
of  that  worst  vice  in  philosophy  —  dogmatism,  or 
the  conceit  of  knowledge  without  the  reality.  In- 
crease the  light  infinitely,  and  it  would  expel  the 

1  "  Was  vernunftig  ist,  das  ist  wirklich ;  und  was  wirklich  ist,  das 
ist  vernunftig."  (Hegel,  Werke,  VIII.  17.  In  his  Werke,  VI.  10, 
Plegel  himself  makes  a  mistaken  reference  to  this  passage,  quoted 
from  himself  as  "  S.  XIX."  instead  of  p.  17.) 


102  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

infinite  darkness :  the  only  reason  why  the  infinite 
darkness  is  not  absolutely  expelled  by  the  light  of 
human  intelligence  is  that  the  light  is  so  small. 
The  existence  of  the  Unknown  is  a  legitimate  in- 
ference from  the  fact  of  the  constant  increase  of 
human  knowledge;  but  to  affirm  the  existence  of 
that  which  is  ^er  se  the  "  Unknowable  "  is  to  affirm 
and  deny  knowledge  of  it  in  one  and  the  same  breath ; 
and,  of  all  dreary  inventions  of  human  pedantry, 
Agnosticism  is  the  dreariest,  when  it  elevates  this 
self -destructive  concept  of  a  Known  Unknowable  into 
a  mock  deity,  and  founds  upon  it  a  mock  religion.  Is 
it  not  time  to  lay  this  *' Cock-lane  Ghost"  of  the 
Unknowable,  and  return  to  the  grand  seriousness 
and  simplicity  of  Greek  objectivism? 

§  29.  From  all  this  it  follows  that  phenomenism, 
on  the  one  hand,  is  founded  upon  the  Suhjcctivity 
of  Relations  and  the  Separahility  of  Noumenon  and 
Phenomenon ;  while  noumenism,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  founded  on  the  Ohjectivity  of  Belations  and  the 
Inseparability  of  Noumenon  and  Phenomenon. 

§  30.  This  last  principle  is  involved  in  the  bare 
definitions  of  the  words  phenomenon  and  noumenon, 
as  respectively  "  that  which  is  apparent "  and  "  that 
which  is  knowable  or  known."  That  which  is  appar- 
ent must  be  so  far  known  ;  that  which  is  known 
must  be  so  far  apparent.  Consequently,  noumenon 
and  phenomenon  reciprocally  contain  each  other ; 
they  are  merely  different  determinations  of  that 
which  is;  and   these  determinations  are  as   insepa- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  103 

rable  as  color  and  form  in  an  object  of  vision.  What- 
ever appears  must  exist;  the  phenomenon  without 
the  noumenon  is  at  once  an  impossibility  and  an 
absurdity .1  The  case  of  dreams,  hallucinations,  in- 
sane delusions,  and  so  forth,  occasions  no  difficulty 
whatever,  for  nothing  is  ever  the  object  of  an  illusion 
which  has  not,  at  least  in  its  separate  elements,  been 
noumenally  as  well  as  phenomenally  experienced. 
The  dream  or  delusion,  therefore,  in  no  wise  differs 
from  the  picture  created  by  the  sane  waking  imagina- 
tion, except  that  the  dream-synthesis  is  not,  as  is  the 
case  with  the  picture-synthesis,  regulated  by  the  in- 
tellect. A  false  appearance  is  no  real  appearance  ; 
by  the  very  terms  of  the  hypothesis,  it  is  false,  unreal, 
ideal  only,  —  not  Erscheinung ,  but  ScJiein.  What  dis- 
tinguishes appearance  from  apparition  or  delusion, 
Erscheinung  from  Schein,  is  congruity  with  the  en- 
tirety of  experience ;  there  is  no  positive  test  of 
knowledge  or  criterion  of  truth  save  universal  hu- 
man experience,  which  constitutes  the  final  appeal 
of  science  itself. 

But  appearance  may  be  either  real  or  ideal.  Eeal 
appearance  is  the  appearance  of  the  noumenon-object 
in  experience ;  ideal  appearance  is  the  appearance  of 
the  noumenon-subject  in  consciousness;  in  either 
case,  noumenon  and  phenomenon  are  inseparable, 
and  the  phenomenon  depends  upon  the  noumenon, 
since  every  appearance  must  be  of  that   which   is 

1  "  Was  erscheinen  soil,  muss  als  seiend  vorausgesetzt  werden." 
(Krug,  Lexikon,  I.  835.) 


104  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

both  existent  and  intelligible.     If,  as   happens  in 
delusions,  ideal  appearance  in  consciousness  is  mis- 
taken for  real  appearance  in  experience  (and  this  is 
the   whole  fact   covered   by   the   expression   "false 
appearance "),  what  truly  appears  is  the  noumenon- 
subject,  disordered   in   its   functions   and   disguised 
from  itself ;  the  mistake  is  a  mistake  of  inference  as 
to  causation,  a  wrong  interpretation  of  facts,  and,  if 
curable  at  all,  is  to  be  cured  by  the  appeal  to  uni- 
versal human  experience.     Consciousness  is  always 
a  part  of  experience,  but  only  a  part  of   it,  which 
phenomenism  confounds  with  the  whole.^     Experi- 
ence itself,  as  conceived  by  noumenism,  and  as  con- 
firmed by  science,  is  the  joint  product  of  two  equally 
important  factors,  noumenon-subject  and  noumenon- 
object,— the  actual  co-existence,  union,   and   inter- 
penetration  of  real  appearance  and  ideal  appearance, 
as  above  defined.     Phenomenism  misconceives  it  as 
ideal   appearance   alone  (Vorstelhmg),  and   even  in 
this  abolishes  the  noumenon-subject ;  it  thereby  irre- 
trievably mangles  the  fact  of  experience,  first,  by 
denying  in  it  the  real  appearance  of  the  noumenon- 
object,  and,  secondly,  by  denying  even  in  the  ideal 
appearance  the   existence  of  the  noumenon-subject. 

1  "Die  aus  dem  genannten  Bediirfnisse  hervorgehende  Ent- 
stehung  der  Fhilosophie  hat  die  Erfahrung,  das  unmittelbare 
und  raisonnirende  Bewusstsein,  zum  Ausgangspunkte."  (Hegel, 
Werke,  VI.  18.  Mr.  William  Wallace,  in  his  Logic  of  Hegel, 
p.  15,  translates  this  passage  as  follows:  "The  first  beginnings  of 
philosophy  date  from  these  cravings  of  thought.  It  takes  its 
departure  from  Experience;  including  under  that  name  our  im- 
mediate consciousness  and  the  processes  of  inference  from  it.") 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  105 

Science,  as  actual  knowledge  of  the  universe  per  se, 
is  demonstration  of  the  fact  that  real  appearance  of 
the  noumenon-object  and  ideal  appearance  of  the 
noumenon-subject  are  actually  welded  or  fused  to- 
gether in  experience.  Experience  is  the  chemical 
union,  so  to  speak,  of  the  noumenon-object  and  the 
noumenon-subject,  the  former  appearing  really  and 
the  latter  appearing  ideally,  in  a  positive  third  which 
is  neither  one  nor  the  other  of  the  two  elements 
alone,  but  a  positive  coalescence  of  both  essentially 
different  from  either;  objective  existence  and  sub- 
jective consciousness  meet  in  an  actual  relation  of 
action  and  reaction,  or  mutual  co-activity,  which 
constitutes  the  relation  of  human  knowledge  —  the 
actual  empirical  unity  of  knower  and  known,  sub- 
ject and  object,  Thought  and  Being.  Hence  all 
human  knowledge  arises  in  experience ;  in  all  ex- 
perience the  activity  of  Being  is  the  logical  jprius, 
and  that  of  Thought  the  logical  posterius ;  and  the 
Kantian  assumption  of  "  pure  a  priori  knowledge  " 
falls  to  the  ground.  In  other  words,  consciousness 
itself  originates  only  in  experience,  and  experience 
originates  in  the  influence  of  that  which  can  be 
known  upon  that  which  can  know ;  but  that  which 
can  know  must  exist  before  it  can  be  influenced,  and 
is  so  far  truly  d  priori. 

§  31.  Noumenism  thus  repudiates  the  fundamental 
dualism  which  compels  phenomenism  to  set  nou- 
menon  and  phenomenon,  being  and  appearance,  sub- 
stance and  quality,  over  against   each  other  as  not 


106  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM, 

only  distinguishable  in  thought  (which  they  are), 
but  also  as  separable  in  fact  (which  they  are  not), 
and  grounds  itself  on  the  fundamental  monism  which 
posits  the  objective  identity  and  merely  subjective 
difference  of  the  two.  Phenomenism  grossly  carica- 
tures noumenism,  when  it  makes  the  latter  conceive 
the  noumenon  as  a  mysterious  and  incomprehensible 
"  substratum  "  from  which  phenomenal  qualities  can 
be  peeled  off  one  by  one,  like  the  coats  of  an  onion  ; 
and  it  wins  a  cheap  enough  victory  over  a  man-of- 
straw  antagonist,  when  it  triumphantly  inquires  what 
is  left  of  the  onion  when  the  coats  are  all  gone.  The 
ground  of  this  absurdity  lies  in  phenomenism  itself, 
not  in  noumenism ;  for  it  is  the  former,  not  the  latter, 
which  assumes  the  separability  of  noumenon  and  phe- 
nomenon, —  it  is  the  former,  not  the  latter,  which 
detaches  phenomena  from  the  world  of  Being,  trans- 
fers them  to  the  world  of  Thought,  and  thereby 
reduces  the  noumenon  to  nonentity  as  an  impossible 
"  substratum."  Noumenism,  on  the  contrary,  vetoes 
the  first  step  in  this  royal  progress  towards  nonsense, 
and  maintains  the  absolute  inseparability  of  nou- 
menon and  phenomenon,  —  characterizes  it  as  the 
quintessence  of  unreason  even  to  suggest  that,  sub- 
stantial Being  can  possibly  or  imaginably  be  stripped 
of  all  or  any  one  of  its  qualities,  or  that  its  qualities 
can  possibly  or  imaginably  be  transferred  to  Thought. 
The  inherent  changeableness  of  phenomena  is  a  fact 
which  militates  against  noumenism  no  more  than 
against   phenomenism ;   for,  on   either   theory,  phe- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  107 

nomena  constantly  change.  All  phenomena,  how- 
ever, must  either  inhere  in  noumenal  Being  as  their 
ultimate  origin  and  ground,  or  else  must  originate 
de  nihilo  and  return  in  nihilum}  To  phenomenism, 
therefore,  their  constant  changes  are  utterly  inex- 
plicable, because  conceived  by  it  as  utterly  without 
origin  —  that  is,  as  absolutely  ultimate  facts ;  while 
to  noumenism  they  are  at  least  partially  explicable, 
because  conceived  by  it  as  effects  or  self-manifesta- 
tions of  causative  or  self-manifesting  Being,  perma- 
nent and  one.  So  far  as  recognition  of  the  Many  is 
concerned,  therefore,  phenomenism  and  noumenism 
stand  on  precisely  the  same  level;  but,  so  far  as 
recognition  of  the  One  is  concerned,  noumenism 
possesses  an  immeasurable  philosophical  superiority, 
if  philosophy  is  indeed  a  search  for  the  One  in  the 
Many. 

§  32.  Noumenism,  then,  conceives  the  universe 
as,  at  the  same  time,  noumenal  and  phenomenal 
both.  It  revives,  though  in  a  far  higher  form,  the 
ancient  Greek  principles  of  the  objectivity  of  rela- 
tions and  the  inseparability  of  noumenon  and  phe- 
nomenon, and  finds  the  noumenal  or  intelligible 
character  of  the  universe  per  se  to  consist  in  its 
Immatunt  Relational  Co7istitution.  It  beholds  in  the 
modern  scientific  method  the  perfection  or  culmina- 
tion of  actual  human  experience,  the  source  of  all 

1  " gigni 

De  nihilo  nihilum,  in  nihilum  nil  posse  reverti." 

(Persius,  Sat.  III.  83,  84.) 


108  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

actual  discoveries  of  truth,  and  the  "  promise  and 
potency  "  of  illimitable  discovery  in  the  future.  It 
concedes  the  claim  of  science  to  have  already  dis- 
covered an  "  objective  synthesis  "  of  relations  in  the 
universe  per  se,  existent  not  merely  when  they  are 
perceived  by  man,  but  just  as  much  in  the  intervals 
of  his  perception ;  and  it  not  only  repudiates,  but 
reprehends,  the  essentially  strategical  policy  of  phe- 
nomenism in  misrepresenting  and  belittUng  this 
'*  objective  synthesis "  of  cosmical  relations  as  a 
mere  "  subjective  synthesis  "  of  human  representa- 
tions —  a  policy  which  proves  that  phenomenism 
stands  in  need  of  either  a  little  scientific  illumina- 
tion or  a  Httle  ethical  instruction. 

§  33.  Further,  noumenism  argues  that,  if  science 
has  succeeded  in  discovering  objective  relations  in 
the  universe  per  se,  totally  independent  for  their 
existence  on  man,  his  representations,  or  his  con- 
sciousness in  any  sense  of  the  word  (and  it  is  an 
inexcusable  belying  of  science  to  say  of  it  anything 
less  than  that),  then  there  must  be  in  the  human 
mind  some  adequate  and  appropriate  intellectual 
faculty,  or  function,  by  which  they  have  been  discov- 
ered. It  argues  that,  since  the  noumenal  universe 
is  actually  known  by  man  (the  results  of  science 
being  the  self-evident  proof  of  that  fact),  there  must 
be  in  man  a  Perceptive  Understanding  capable  of  ap- 
prehending these  indisputably  discovered  objective 
relations.  It  is  not  practicable  in  this  connection 
to  do  more  than  barely  touch  on  this  highly  impor- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  109 

tant  subject,  which  is  developed  further  in  §  50. 
Enough  to  say  here  that  what  philosophy  and  psy- 
chology have  to  do,  as  the  most  urgently  needed 
service  they  can  render  in  the  present  condition  of 
thought,  is,  not  to  deny  the  undeniable  as  phenome- 
nism does,  but  patiently  to  exert  their  utmost  in- 
genuity to  investigate  and  discover  what  this  now 
unrecognized  mode  of  knowing  is. 

§  34.  The  main  positions  of  the  theory  of  nou- 
menism  may  now  be  presented  synoptically  in  the 
following  summary :  — 

1.  The  universe  is  both  a  noumenon  and  a  phe- 
nomenon, indissolubly  one. 

2.  It  is  a  noumenon  because  it  exists  and  is 
intelligible  in  itself  {per  sCy  an  sich),  independent  of, 
yet  knowable  by,  the  human  mind;  and  its  know- 
ableness  or  intelligible  character  consists  in  its 
immanent  relational  constitution. 

3.  It  is  a  phenomenon  because  it  is  apparent 
and  actually  known,  in  part,  not  in  whole ;  and 
science  is  the  knowledge  of  it. 

4.  Every  phenomenon  is  necessarily  a  noumenon, 
and  every  noumenon  is  an  actual  or  possible  phe- 
nomenon. The  actual  phenomena  of  the  universe 
constitute  the  Known  ;  the  universe  per  se  is  known 
so  far  as  it  is  actually  related  to  man's  consciousness. 
The  merely  possible  phenomena  of  the  universe  con- 
stitute the  Unknown ;  the  universe  per  se  is  unknown 
so  far  as  it  is  potentially  —  that  is,  not  yet  actually 
—  related  to  man's  consciousness.     But,  inasmuch  as 


110  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

no  reason  is  discoverable,  either  in  human  conscious- 
ness or  in  the  universe  per  se,  why  the  sphere  of  this 
actual  relationship  may  not  be  indefinitely  extended, 
and  inasmuch  as  all  noumena  are  necessarily  per  se 
intelligible,  the  Unknowable  per  se  is  a  figment  of 
imagination  which  is  intrinsically  self-contradictory, 
and  therefore  an  offence  to  reason,  unless  it  is  con- 
ceived as  the  Non-Existent  or  the  Nonsensical 

5.  The  human  mind  includes  a  perceptive  un- 
derstanding, by  which  the  relational  constitution  of 
the  universe  per  se  has  been  already,  to  some  extent, 
discovered  and  formulated  in  the  propositions  of 
science.  Its  function  is  to  apprehend  the  particular 
objective  relations  immanent  in  the  universe  per  se, 
so  far  as  they  are  presented  to  human  consciousness. 
Consequently,  the  concept  of  experience  must  be  so 
far  enlarged  as  to  include,  not  only  the  activity  of 
the  senses,  but  also  the  activity  of  the  perceptive 
understanding  (intellection,  intellectual  perception 
or  apprehension  or  intuition).  Science  has  thus  had 
a  strictly  experiential  origin,  and  been  built  up  by 
means  of  that  a  posteriori  knowledge  of  noumena  of 
which  Kant  merely  assumed,  without  proving,  the 
actual  impossibility. 

This  theory  of  noumenism  is  nothing  but  the 
logical  development  of  the  philosophical  presupposi- 
tions which  were  presented  at  the  outset  as  scientific 
realism.  It  has  been  worked  out,  both  in  general 
scope  and  special  detail,  far  more  than  can  here  be 
even  hinted.     But  enough  has  been  said  to  show 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  Ill 

that  modern  science  contains,  lying  latent  in  its 
hitherto  empirical  "  scientific  method,"  a  whole  phi- 
losophy ;  and  that  the  stability  of  all  its  results, 
as  the  "  objective  synthesis  "  of  a  universe  which  is 
not  the  product  of  man,  but  the  producer  of  man, 
must  depend  in  the  last  analysis  upon  the  sound- 
ness of  that  philosophy.  Whatever  influence  mod- 
ern science  may  be  to-day  exerting  on  the  religious 
thought  of  mankind,  and  whatever  influence  it  may 
hereafter  exert,  must  proceed,  not  from  the  single 
sciences  as  such,  but  solely  from  the  possible  phi- 
losophies which  men  may  imagine  to  underlie  them 
as  a  whole ;  and  the  philosophical  students  of  this 
nineteenth  century  must  be  blind  indeed,  if  they  fail 
to  see  the  incalculable  importance  of  developing  this 
necessary  scientific  philosophy  according  to  true  and 
just  principles.  The  single  sciences  as  such  conduct 
to  no  universal  philosophical  conclusion ;  and  for 
this  reason  scientific  specialists  are  confident  in  pro- 
testation that  "  science  has  nothing  to  do  with  re- 
ligion." But  the  sciences  as  a  whole,  above  all  the 
universal  scientific  method  which  has  produced  them, 
constitute  the  only  foundation  on  which  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  future  can  be  reared ;  and  if,  as  I 
profoundly  believe,  human  thought  is  the  architect 
of  all  things  human,  then  what  the  philosophy  of 
the  future  shall  prove  to  be,  that  also  will  be  its 
rehgion. 

§  35.  The  appended  tables,  epitomizing  the  results 
of  the  first  three  chapters  of  this  little  book,  will 


112  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

conveniently  exhibit  the  relations  of  the  theory  of 
noumenism  to  the  theory  of  phenomenism  and  to 
the  history  of  philosophy  in  general 

The  first  table,  in  particular,  will  render  clearer 
the  general  argument  of  §§  22-26,  and  explain  the 
proximate  historical  origin  in  Kantism  of  the  phe- 
nomenist  principle  of  the  separability  of  noumenon 
and  phenomenon ;  while  the  second  and  third  tables 
will  facilitate  comprehension  of  the  profound  and 
irreconcilable  differences  between  modern  science 
and  (so-called)  modern  philosophy.  If  a  sharp 
issue  is  the  necessary  condition  of  every  important 
advance  in  knowledge,  these  tables  will  well  repay 
careful  study. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  113 

THREE     TABLES 

ILLUSTEATING 

TEE    ANTITHESIS    OF    PHENOMENISM 
AND     NOmiENISM. 


I.    KANT'S   TWO    OPPOSITIONS. 

1.  True  Opposition. 

Phenomenon  versus  Non-Phenomenon. 

The  Apparent  versus  the  Non- Apparent. 

("Die  Ersclieinung  versus  das  Nicht-Erscheinende.^^) 

2.  False  Opposition. 

Phenomenon  versus  Noumenon. 

Ideal  Appearance  versus  Real  Being. 

{^^  Die  Erscheinung  versus  das  Bing-an-sich.^') 

3.  Hence,  in  the  Kantian  system, — 

Non-Phenomenon  =  Noumenon. 

C^  Das  Nicht-Erscheinende  =  Das  Ding-an-sich.") 

8 


114  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

II.    PHENOMENISM. 

MEDIAEVAL    NOMINALISM:    GERMAN    SUBJECTIVISM 
MODERN    PHILOSOPHICAL    IDEALISM. 

^^Apriorismus!' 


1.  Ground-principle  of  the  Theory  of  Universals: 

Subjectivity  of  Relations. 
Hence  — 

2.  Ground-principle  of  the  Theory  of  Knowledge: 

Separability  of  Noumenon  and  Phenomenon. 


Immanent  Method  =  Analysis  of  Subjective  Eepresentation. 


RESULTS. 

Noumenon  =  Objectively  Unrelated  and  Unintelligible 

Real  Being  =:  Non-Being. 

("  Das  Nicht-ErscheUende  =  Das  Ding-an-sich.'') 

Phenomenon = Ideal  Appearance  of  Subjectively  Related 

and  Intelligible  Representation. 

("Z)ie  Erscheinung  =  Die    Vorstellung") 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCIENCE.  115 

III    NOUMENISM. 

GREEK    OBJECTIVISM:    MODERN    RELATIONISM: 
MODERN    SCIENTIFIC    REALISM. 

^^  Almost  eriorismus." 


1.  Ground-principle  of  the  Theory  of  Universals: 

Objectivity  of  Relations. 
Hence  — 

2.  Ground-principle  of  the  Theory  of  Knowledge; 
Inseparability  of  Noumenon  and  Phenomenon. 


Scientific  Method  =  Analysis  of  Objective  Experience. 


RESULTS. 

Noumenon = Objectively  Related  and  Intelligible  Real 
Being  =  Immanent  Relational  Constitution  of  the 
Thing-in-itself. 

Phenomenon  =  Real  and  Ideal  Appearance  of  Objectively 
and  Subjectively  Related  and  Intelligible  Real 
Being  =  Real  and  Ideal  Appearance  of  the  Noumenal 
Thing-in-itself. 


PART   II. 

THE   RELIGION  OF   SCIENCE. 


PART  11. 

THE    RELIGION    OF    SCIENCE. 


CHAPTEE  IV. 

THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

§  36.  What,  tlien,  must  be  the  religious  outcome 
of  the  philosophy  logically  presupposed  by,  or  latent 
in,  the  universal  Scientific  Method  ? 

For  more  than  twenty  years  I  have  tried  to  peer 
into  the  obscurity  of  the  future  and  discern  the  large 
outlines  of  this  religious  philosophy  fated  to  come.^ 
I  have  sought  to  discover  them,  not  by  the  compara- 
tively superficial  process  of  forming  merely  a  "  wid- 
est generalization,"  which  is  simply  detecting  more 
comprehensive  relations  in  already  won  scientific  re- 
sults, but  by  going  back  and  down  to  that  underlying 
scientific  method  which  is  the  creator  of  all  these 
results,  pondering  its  deeply  hidden  and  fundamental 
presuppositions,  drawing  out  its  subtile  implications, 
and  penetrating  into  the  interior  recesses  of  its  all- 
pervading  spirit.     For  the  scientific  method  itself  is 

^  See  article  on   "  Positivism  in  Theology,"   published  in   The 
Christian  Examiner,  Boston,  March,  1866. 


120  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

the  grandest  discovery  yet  made  by  man,  towering 
immeasurably  above  all  his  other  achievements;  it 
is  the  mother  of  all  achievements,  all  investigations, 
all  discoveries,  —  nay,  exists  immanently  in  them  all 
as  their  innermost  process  and  law,  and  gives  them 
all  their  meaning;  it  is  man's  nearest  approach  to 
that  secret  laboratory  of  Nature  whither  her  marvel- 
lous constructiveness  must  be  tracked  back  to  its 
birthplace  in  the  eternally  creative  unity  of  Being 
and  Thought.  The  issue  of  this  long  meditation  has 
been  the  "  philosophy  of  science "  of  which  only 
a  few  of  the  most  prominent  features  have  been 
sketched  in  Part  First,  yet  enough,  I  trust,  to  give 
some  conception  of  the  groundwork  of  that  mode  of 
viewing  the  universe,  that  Weltanschauimg,  w^hich 
remains  to  be  unfolded  as  my  anticipation  of  the 
"religion  of  science." 

§  37.  Grasp  that  conception  clearly.  All  Being 
is  essentially  intelligible,  and  either  is,  or  may  be, 
apparent.  The  Known  is  actually  apparent  Being ; 
the  Unknown  is  potentially  apparent  Being;  the 
unity  of  the  Known  and  the  Unknown  is  Infi- 
nite Being,  which  comprehends  them  both.  The 
"  Unknowable  "  is  nothing  but  ISTon-Being  —  the 
Non-Existent  and  the  Nonsensical.^  The  pretended 
"  consciousness  of  the  Unknowable "  is  nothing  but 
the  consciousness  of  our  own  finitude,  —  of  our  own 
depressing  failure,  our  weariness,  sadness,  and  pain, 

1  "  But  nonsense  never  can  be  understood."     (Dryden,  Hind  and 
Panther,  Part  I.) 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  121 

when  we  strive  to  comprehend  Infinite  Being  in  its 
totality  with  our  intrinsically  finite  powers,  —  of  our 
own  bewildered  and  half-terrified  shrinking  back 
into  ourselves,  when  we  consciously  confront  the 
awful  and  overwhelming  mystery  of  the  Unknown. 
Sound  dies  beyond  the  boundary  of  our  little  atmos- 
phere; sight  fails  beyond  the  horizon  of  our  little 
field  of  vision ;  thought  itself  expires  in  the  bound- 
less vacuity  of  the  Unrevealed.  But  nowhere  in 
Being  is  there  any  positive  barrier  to  stop  the  slow 
and  gradual  extension  of  human  Knowledge.  Of  all 
forms  of  dogmatism,  the  most  abhorrent  to  a  sound, 
sane,  and  vigorous  intellect  is  the  presumptuous 
audacity  which  dares  to  set  up  flimsy  a  priori 
"limits  of  knowledge,"  or  Eomulus-walls,  to  be  at 
once  overleaped  with  a  laugh  by  the  Eemus  of 
Science,  and  which,  if  it  only  could,  would  slay 
him  for  the  deed. 

§  38.  However  narrow  may  seem  the  territory 
which  science  has  already  won  from  the  "  void  and 
formless  infinite,"  it  is  immeasurably  vast,  com- 
pared with  the  actual  or  possible  acquisition  of  any 
individual ;  and  it  is  real  in  the  highest  conception 
of  reality.  The  ground  on  which  we  stand  is  honest 
and  stable  ground,  no  treacherous  quicksand  threat- 
ening to  engulf  us  if  we  stir  hand  or  foot,  —  a  tiny 
floating  island  in  the  ocean  of  the  infinite,  if  you 
please,  but  an  island  every  whit  as  real  as  the  ocean 
itself.  Science  maintains  that  the  universe  it  knows 
is   actual   existence,  perish   who   or   what  may, — 


122  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

affirms  the  uttermost  reality  of  its  own  conquests,  — 
claims  to  have  solved  by  victorious  wit  not  a  few  of 
the  Sphinx-riddles  propounded  to  mankind  by  the 
Weltgeist,  —  and  testifies  that  it  finds  the  universe 
intelligible  wherever  it  can  bring  to  bear  its  unfail- 
ing method  of  research  and  discovery.  It  indig- 
nantly spurns  the  sophistry  which  would  explain 
away  its  hard-won  cosmical  truths  as  the  phenome- 
nist's  merely  subjective  "  representations  "  —  real 
while  he  wakes,  potential  only  while  he  sleeps.  It 
refuses  this  proffered  kingdom  of  man's  dreams,  and 
vindicates  for  itself  a  higher  office  than  merely  to 
introduce  into  his  little  phantasmagoric  world  the 
coherency,  connection,  and  order  which  it  is  labo- 
riously discovering  in  the  universal  world  of  Nature. 
Nature  herself  is  what  science  explores  and  studies, 
not  the  mere  domain  of  human  "representation;" 
consciousness  is  the  means  it  uses,  but  knowledge  of 
consciousness  is  not  the  end  it  seeks  and  attains. 
The  phenomenist,  who,  reversing  the  precedent  of 
the  Hebrew  legend,  imagines  himself  to  have  swal- 
lowed the  universe,  or  who  escapes  the  somewhat 
awkward  immodesty  of  this  assumption  by  sharing 
the  glory  of  the  feat  with  a  host  of  fellow-phenome- 
nists,  is  shut  down,  however  reluctantly,  to  this  di- 
lemma: either  science  is  all  one  huge  illusion,  or  else 
consciousness  is  able  to  apply  itself  to  that  which 
exists  beyond  its  own  limits,  and  to  discover  in  the 
noumenal  world  relations  which  there  exist  in  total 
independence  of  that  which  merely  discovers  them. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  123 

The  inconsequent  phenomenism  which  shrinks  from 
this  dilemma  is  entitled  to  no  serious  consideration : 
consequent  phenomenism  is  the  pure  negation  of 
science. 

§  39.  It  is  no  a  priori  assumption,  resting  on 
contempt  for  experience  or  the  rashness  of  over- 
confident speculation,  to  hold  that  the  universe  is 
intelligible  through  and  through,  whether  within  or 
without  the  confines  of  actual  human  knowledge. 
On  the  contrary,  this  conclusion  is  a  pure  induction 
from  experience  itself,  and  the  absolutely  strongest 
induction  which  experience  can  yield.  For  every 
discovery,  nay,  every  perception,  ever  made  by  man 
from  the  very  birth  of  human  intellect,  has  been  a 
conversion  of  the  unknown  into  the  known,  —  a  demon- 
stration, therefore,  that  the  unknown  is  intrinsically 
knowable.  All  knowledge  is  acquired  gradually,  or 
learned ;  and  "  to  learn "  is  itself  to  convert  the 
unknown  into  the  known.  The  totality  of  human 
experience  itself,  therefore,  the  entire  experience  of 
all  men  in  all  ages  and  all  climes,  is  the  foundation 
of  this  overwhelmingly  convincing  induction  that 
the  unknown  is  knowable  per  se.  What  other  truth 
won  by  man  can  boast  a  warrant  more  absolute? 
This  undeniable  KnoivaUeness  of  the  Unknown,  this 
experientially  proved  Intelligibility  of  Infinite  Being, 
is  a  fact  in  which  there  is  unspeakable  courage  and 
hope  for  the  truth-hungry  thinker,  who,  when  the 
grin-without-a-cat  theory  assures  hun  that  his  con- 
sciousness can  never  know  anything  that  depends 


124  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

not  for  existence  on  itself,  has  all  human  experience 
on  his  side,  when  he  replies :  "  The  universe  depends 
not  for  existence  on  my  consciousness,  but  my  con- 
sciousness on  it ;  science  has  taught  me  much  of  it 
already ;  and  philosophy  is  an  impostor,  if  she  can- 
not tell  me  how,  and  help  me  to  learn  more." 

Dream  as  phenomenism  may,  the  fact  stands  firm, 
if  there  is  any  firmness  in  modern  science  and  the 
modern  scientific  method,  that  the  universe  per  se 
is  independent  of  man,  yet  thoroughly  knowable  by 
man  as  far  as  man  has  wit  to  know  it.  Make  his 
wit  infinite,  and  he  would  know  it  all.  The  universe 
in  itself  —  all  there  is  of  it,  and  it  is  the  All  —  is 
intelligible  through  and  through.  There  is  bound- 
lessly much  that  man  does  not  yet  know,  but 
absolutely  nothing  that  cannot  in  itself  be  known. 
In  every  phenomenal  experience,  both  he  and  the 
universe  noumenally  appear,  —  he  as  the  noumenon 
knowing,  and  it  as  the  noumenon  known;  for  (as 
has  been  shown  in  Part  First)  the  noumenon  neces- 
sarily exists  in  the  phenomenon.  Phenomenism, 
therefore,  reduces  itself  to  mere  gibberish,  mere 
"  sound  and  fury  signifying  nothing,"  when  it  takes 
the  Appearance  wholly  away  from  the  universe  and 
puts  it  wholly  in  consciousness,  thereby  annihilating 
the  very  experience  which  it  assumes  to  explain. 
Hence  the  doctrine  of  the  "Unknowable,"  which 
has  no  foundation  whatever  except  the  theory  of 
phenomenism,  is  the  concentrated  essence  of  un- 
reason, if  made  itself  the  foundation  of  a  philosophy ; 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  125 

and,  if  this  philosophy  founded  on  nothing  is  then 
made  the  foundation  of  a  religion,  it  becomes  thereby 
the  concentrated  essence  of  superstition  —  the  wor- 
ship of  the  Non-Existent  and  the  Nonsensical.  The 
KnowaUe  Unknoivn  is  one  thing ;  the  Known  Un- 
hnoivable  is  a  very  different  thing.  The  former  is 
the  doctrine  that  what  is  now  unknown  may  yet 
become  known,  and  is  therefore  knowable  in  itself ; 
it  is  the  strongest  possible  induction  from  experience. 
But  the  latter  is  the  doctrine  that  what  is  unknow- 
able in  itself  is  now  known ;  it  is  the  strongest  pos- 
sible contradiction  in  terms.  In  short,  the  Known 
Unknowable  is  an  absolute  myth,  and  the  Agnosti- 
cism founded  upon  it  is  a  parvenu  mythology. 

§  40.  Noumenism,  therefore,  or  the  philosophy 
latent  in  the  modern  scientific  method,  establishes 
the  fundamental  principle  that  self -existent  Being, 
whether  known  or  unknown,  is  absolutely  and  infi- 
nitely knowable,  —  that  the  universe  jper  se  is  intel- 
ligible through  and  through,  and  transparent  to 
finite  thought  just  as  far  as  finite  thought  can  go. 
This  great  principle  of  the  Infinite  Intelligibility  of 
the  Universe  is  the  corner-stone  of  Scientific  Theism  ; 
and  its  warrant  is  universal  human  experience,  puri- 
fied, consolidated,  and  organized  in  the  scientific 
method. 

§  41.  Few  scientific  specialists,  I  admit,  show  any 
philosophical  comprehension  of  their  own  method; 
but  this  is  the  fault,  not  of  their  method,  but  of  their 
specialism,  and  it  will  cure  itself  in  time.     Those 


126  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

scientific  men  who  possess  a  native  largeness  of 
thought  too  marked  to  be  belittled  and  defeated  by 
the  cramping  tendency  of  exclusively  particular  in- 
vestigations will  be  the  first  to  welcome  a  philosophy 
which  shall  frankly  and  consistently  ground  itself  on 
the  scientific  method,  and  prove  itself  to  be  a  truly 
faithful  interpreter  of  the  scientific  spirit.  To  such 
as  these,  the  doctrine  of  the  infinite  intelligibility 
of  the  universe  in  all  its  boundless  extent  will  be 
neither  more  nor  less  than  that  of  the  objectivity 
and  discoverability  of  all  natural  truth ;  and  it  will 
be  seen  to  be  what  it  is  —  the  philosophical  con- 
firmation and  justification  of  their  already  practical 
conviction  that  all  scientific  knowledge  is  genuinely 
objective  experience  of  a  universe  not  dependent  for 
its  existence  on  the  mere  continuance  of  perception. 
Their  not  undeserved  contempt  for  "  metaphysics  " 
will  then  be  restricted  to  the  baffling  and  sterile 
philosophy  which  identifies  all  scientific  knowledge 
with  mere  subjective  representation,  and  thereby 
extinguishes  the  possibility  of  knowing  a  real  ex- 
ternal world.1  Noumenism  maintains  the  infinite 
intelligibility,  phenomenism  the  infinite  unintelligi- 
hility,  of  the  universe  ^er  se.     Between  these  two 

1  "  Die  Art  der  Beweise  ist  es,  welche  dem  naturwissenschaft- 
lichen  Denker  jenen  iustinctiven  Widerwillen  gegen  die  Philosopliie 
einflcisst,  jenen  Widerwillen,  der  sich  zu  unserer  Zeit,  wo  auf  alien 
Gebieten  des  Lebens  der  Realismus  iiber  den  Idealismns  trium- 
phirt,  bis  zur  souverainen  Verachtung  gesteigert  hat."  (Von 
Hartmann,  Philosophie  des  Unbewiissten,  I.  9,  ed.  1882.)  Yon  Hart- 
mann  himself  takes  for  his  motto :  "  Speculative  Resultate  nach 
inductivnaturwissenschaftlicher  Methode." 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  127 

principles  there  is  no  logical  or  rational  middle 
ground.  AVhicli  of  the  two  is  the  more  faithful 
interpreter  of  the  scientific  method  and  spirit? 
Large-minded  men  of  science,  especially  those  of 
the  rising  generation  who  have  escaped  the  subtile, 
contagious,  and  widespread  influence  which  phe- 
nomenism exerts  even  in  scientific  circles,  will  have 
no  difi&culty  in  answering  that  question,  and  detect- 
ing the  sophistry  in  the  phenomenistic  use  of  the 
word  "phenomena."  For  by  "phenomena"  the 
theory  of  phenomenism  means  only  the  ideal  ap- 
pearance  of  subjective  representation,  while  by  the 
same  word  science  means  the  real  appearance  of 
ohjective  being ;  and  scientific  men  who  once  under- 
stand the  profound  difference  between  these  two 
things  will  never  concede  that  the  laws  of  Nature 
are  valid  only  in  the  former  sense  of  this  much 
abused  word.  Hence  it  is  hardly  presumptuous  to 
believe  that  scientific  men  themselves,  whether  pre- 
pared to  go  with  me  further  or  not,  will  at  least  go 
with  me  thus  far  without  the  slightest  hesitation, 
admit  that  noumenism  is  the  only  just  and  philo- 
sophical interpretation  of  the  scientific  method,  and 
concede  the  truth  of  the  principle  that  the  universe 
p}er  se,  as  discovered  by  the  use  of  that  method,  is 
infinitely  intelligible. 

Clearly  conceiving  the  universe  as  noumenism 
conceives  it,  then,  and  following  as  guide  the  fun- 
damental principle  of  the  infinite  intelligibility  of 
Nature,  the   unprejudiced   and   thoughtful   mind  is 


128  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

led,  I  think  irresistibly,  to  momentous  conclusions. 
But,  before  proceeding  to  apply  this  principle,  it 
is  necessary  to  determine  precisely  what  we  are 
to  understand  by  "intelligibility,"  and  also  by  "in- 
telligence." 

§  42.  What,  then,  is  "  intelligibility  "  ? 

§  43.  Strictly  speaking,  nothing  is  intelligible  but 
relations,  which  I  have  already  called  the  specific  and 
only  direct  objects  of  the  understanding  or  intellect 
(§  24).  Kow  there  is  no  relation  but  in  and  with 
its  terms  —  no  relation  but  in  and  with  the  things 
of  which  it  is  the  relation.  Things  and  their  rela- 
tions, though  necessarily  distinguishable,  are  abso- 
lutely inseparable  in  Being  and  in  Thought.  It 
was  the  great  defect  of  the  old  Scholastic  Kealism 
to  treat  relations  as  if  they  were  things,  and  con- 
ceive them  as  separate  entities ;  it  is  the  great  merit 
of  the  new  Scientific  Realism  to  treat  things  and 
relations  as  two  totally  distinct  orders  of  objective 
reality,  indissolubly  united  and  mutually  dependent, 
yet  for  all  that  utterly  unlike  in  themselves. 

§  44.  The  thing  {joZe  tl,  hoc  aliquid  uniim  numero, 
das  Ding,  das  Etivas)  is  a  unitary  system  of  closely 
correlated  internal  forces,  and  manifests  itself  by 
specific  qualities,  actions,  or  motions ;  the  qualities, 
actions,  or  motions  constitute  it  a  phenomenon ;  the 
system  of  relations  constitutes  it  a  noumenon,  —  con- 
stitutes, that  is,  both  the  real  unity  of  the  thing  and 
its  intelligible  character.  This  immanent  relational 
constitution  of  the  single  thing  is,  according  to  the 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  129 

theory  of  noumenism,  the  true  "principle  of  indi- 
viduation "  {i^rincipium  individualitatis  —  quodvis  in- 
dividwwm  est  omnimode  determination) ;  perception 
never  exhausts  or  discovers  all  the  single  relations 
or  determinations  which  it  includes,  although  pro- 
longed attention  always  discovers  more  and  more 
of  them ;  it  is  never  known  wholly,  which,  however, 
is  no  reason  for  denying  that  it  is  known  in  part  by 
science.  Scientific  discovery  has  thus  far  stopped 
with  the  ato77i  and  the  person,  as  the  practical  limits 
of  its  analysis  of  the  universe  into  single  things 
(jjLovdhe^,  Einzelivesen,  Einzeldinge) ;  the  universe  it- 
self is  the  All-Thing  (Allding);  between  these  ex- 
tremes is  a  countless  multitude  of  intermediate 
composite  things  (molecules,  masses,  compounds, 
species,  genera,  families,  societies,  states,  etc.).  The 
systems  of  internal  relations  in  all  these  various 
things  vary  immensely  in  complexity  and  compre- 
hensiveness, —  in  fact,  the  complexity  and  com- 
prehensiveness of  the  system  determines  the  grade 
of  the  thing  in  the  scale  of  being;  but  in  every 
case  the  immanent  relational  constitution  oi  the  thing 
constitutes  its  real  unity,  quiddity,  noumenal  es- 
sence, substantial  form,  formal  cause,  or  ohjcctively 
intelligible  character.  Notw^ithstanding  the  confus- 
ing influence  of  the  theory  of  phenomenism,  a  more 
or  less  incomplete  perception  of  this  profound  truth 
asserts  itself  in  philosophers  of  widely  divergent 
tendencies;  as,  for  instance,  Kant  and  Fichte,  on 
the   one  hand,  and   George  Henry   Lewes,  on   the 

9 


180  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

other  hand,^  who  all  agree  in  the  acknowledgment 
that,  so  far  as  it  is  knowable,  the  thing  essentially 
consists  in  its  own  system  of  internal  relations. 
Consequently,  it  may  be  taken  as  a  generally  con- 
ceded truth  that  nothing  is  intelligible  except  rela- 
tions. And  intelligibility  itself  as  an  attribute  or 
predicate  of  things,  may  now  be  defined,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  the  schools,  as  the  possession  of  a  determi- 
nate essential  or  substantial  form  —  in  the  language 
of  noumenism,  as  the  possession  of  an  immanent  rela- 
tional constitution,  or  system  of  internal  relations. 

§  45.  From  the  fact,  however,  that  nothing  is 
intelligible  except  relations,  it  is  not  to  be  inferred, 
and  does  not  follow,  that  all  relations  are  intelligible 
in  themselves  alone.  There  are  relations  of  dis- 
order, discord,  or  chaos,  no  less  than  of  order,  har- 
mony, or  cosmos.  Order  is  life,  disorder  is  death ; 
and  disorderly  relations  constitute  the  possibility  of 
death.     Taken  by  themselves  alone,  disorderly  rela- 

1  "  Dagegen  sincl  die  innern  Bestimmungen  einer  substantia  phrr- 
nomenon  im  Raume  nichts,  als  Verlialtnisse,  und  sie  selbst  ganz  und 
gar  ein  Inbegriff  von  lauter  Relatiouen."  (Kant,  Werke,  III.  228^ 
ed.  Hart.)  — "In  der  Form  besteht  das  Weseu  der  Sache  [forma  dut 
esse  rei,  hiess  er  bei  den  Scholastikern),  sofern  dieses  durch  Ver- 
nunft  erkannt  werden  soil."  (Ibid.  VI.  480.)  — "  Alle  diese  Ver- 
haltnisse  mit  einander  sind  das  Ding."  (Fichte,  Werke,  I.  443.)  — 
"  To  know  a  tbing  is  to  know  its  relations :  it  is  its  relations." 
(Lewes,  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  1st  Series,  p.  59,  Amer.  ed.)  — 
"The  thing  is  its  relations."  (Ibid.  p.  89.)  All  these  statements, 
of  course,  must  be  taken,  if  fairly  interpreted,  in  a  phenomenistic, 
not  noumenistic  sense, — that  is,  as  referring  only  to  the  things 
of  purely  phenomenal  experience.  But  noumenism  extends  them 
to  things  as  at  once  both  phenomena  and  noumena. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  131 

tions  are  absolutely  unintelligible ;  they  are  relations 
that  do  not  relate,  mere  undoing  of  intelligible  rela- 
tionship, mere  dissolution  of  system,  mere  nonsense ; 
they  are  the  absolute  defeat  of  intelligence,  and  its 
only  possible  defeat;  they  could  not  in  any  wise 
exist,  if  they  had  to  exist  by  themselves  alone,  for 
independent  existence  is  necessarily  intelligible.  But 
they  do  not  exist  by  themselves  alone,  and  herein 
lies  the  only  possibility  of  their  existing  at  all; 
they  can  only  exist  in  dependence  upon,  and  as 
parts  of,  a  larger  inclusive  system  which  is  itself 
intelligible,  and  in  which  they  themselves  become 
intelligible  by  ceasing  to  be  relations  of  disorder. 
In  other  words,  disorder,  discord,  or  chaos  is  not 
possible  as  such  except  relatively  to  the  particular 
system  in  which  it  arises ;  it  is  not  itself  relatively 
to  the  larger  inclusive  system  in  which  this  par- 
ticular system  is  merely  a  part ;  it  is  an  incident  of 
the  finite  alone,  and  cannot  reach  to  the  infinite. 
For  instance,  the  decay  of  an  organic  cell  is  disorder 
and  consequent  death  to  the  system  of  that  cell, 
yet  order  and  life  to  the  system  of  the  whole  organ- 
ism, since  without  the  incessant  disintegration  and 
excretion  of  its  exhausted  cells  the  whole  organism 
could  not  live  and  renew  itself ;  and,  again,  the 
decay  of  the  whole  organism  is  disorder  and  con- 
sequent death  to  the  system  of  that  organism,  yet 
order  and  life  to  the  system  of  animate  Nature, 
since  without  the  disintegration  and  excretion  of  its 
exhausted  organisms  the  system  of  animate  Nature 


132  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

could  not  live  and  renew  itself.  So  the  ravings  of 
a  maniac  are  nothing  but  unintelligible  disorder  to 
the  unscientific  listener,  yet  intelligible  and  orderly- 
enough  to  the  sagacious  physician,  who  sees  that 
they  are  to  be  rightly  related,  not  to  the  system  of 
common  human  experience,  but  to  the  vaster  system 
of  physiologico-psychological  laws,  which  is  the  con- 
dition of  the  existence  of  common  human  experience, 
and  of  which  even  pathological  relations  are  only 
normal  illustrations.  Thus  relations  of  disorder, 
disease,  or  death,  when  viewed  from  a  higher  stand- 
point, become  relations  of  order,  health,  or  life,  and 
therefore  intelligible.  Chaos  per  se  is  a  stark  im- 
possibility; cosmos  per  se  is  alone  possible.  For 
chaos  per  se  is  an  absolute  unreality,  or  pure  Non- 
Being;  chaos  as  a  relative  reality  is  simply  un- 
comprehended  cosmos,  or  Being  as  the  Knowable 
Unknown,  and  is  possible  only  in  relation  to  the 
finite  intelligence  which  fails  to  comprehend  it.  An 
actual  universe  can  exist  only  on  condition  that  it 
be  cosmos,  and  not  chaos;  for  an  actual  universe 
must  be  self-existent,  and  self-existent  chaos  would 
be  nothing  but  self -existent  universal  disorder  — 
that  is,  a  self-existent  system  of  non-system,  which  is 
a  flat  contradiction  in  terms. 

§  46.  Hence  our  critical  examination  of  the  fact 
of  disorderly  relations  leads  once  more  to  results 
substantially  the  same  as  our  former  results:  (1) 
that  no  thing  could  be  intelligible,  if  it  did  not 
exist ;  (2)  that  no  thing  could  exist,  if  it  were  not 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  133 

intelligible ;  and  (3)  that  no  thing  could  either  exist 
or  be  intelligible,  if  it  did  not  possess  an  immanent 
relational   constitution.     To   state   these   results   in 
more  general  terms :  (1)  existence  is  the  condition 
of  intelligibility;  (2)  intelligibility  is  the  condition 
of   existence ;  (3)  an  immanent  relational  constitu- 
tion is  the  condition  both  of   intelligibility  and  of 
existence  —  their  aboriginal  common  ground  of  pos- 
sibility, and  therefore  the  absolute   ground  of   the 
identity   of    Being   and    Thought.      The   immanent 
relational   constitution   as   such,    therefore,   is   seen 
to  be  the  common  or  middle  term  between  Being 
and    Thought,  —  at   once    the    ground-form    of    all 
determinate    existence    and   the    grand    master-key 
of  all  philosophy  (§  84).     Finally,    to  apply  these 
results  to  the  problem  in  hand:  the  infinite  intelli- 
giUlity  of  the  universe,  as  the  infinite,  eternal,  and  self- 
existent  All-Thing,  lies  in  its  ^possession  of  an  infinite 
and   immanent   relational   constitution.     This  is  the 
System  of  Nature. 

§  47.  The  next  question  to  ask  is :  what  is  "  in- 
telligence" ? 

§  48.  Phenomenism,  the  philosophical  outcome  of 
the  Kantian  Kritikismus,  holds  that  the  nature  of 
inteUigence  must  be  determined  by  the  d  priori 
analysis  of  the  knowing  faculty  {Erhenntnissvermogen), 
and  that  the  nature  of  the  object  of  knowledge — 
the  "what  is  known"  —  must  be  determined  by 
the  results  of  this  a  priori  analysis.  Tennemann 
has  weU  pomted  out  that  the  essential  method  of 


134  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

Scholasticism  was  to  draw  all  knowledge  from  the 
a  priori  analysis  of  concepts;  and  Kantism  lumi- 
nously manifests  its  own  genetic  derivation  from 
Scholasticism  by  this  essential  method  of  drawing 
all  knowledge  from  the  a  priori  analysis  of  the 
conceiving  faculty.  Noumenism,  on  the  contrary, 
the  philosophical  outcome  of  the  scientific  method, 
holds  that  the  nature  of  intelligence  must  be  deter- 
mined by  the  a  posteriori  analysis  of  the  object  of 
knowledge;  that  the  constitution  of  "that  which 
knows  "  can  only  be  learned  from  the  constitution  of 
''that  which  is  known;"  that  actual  experience  is 
the  sole  revealer  of  either,  and  in  experience  the  sub- 
ject is  revealed  only  so  far  as  it  actually  experiences. 
Hence  it  argues  that  the  question,  *'  what  is  known  ? " 
comes  first  in  order,  and  the  question,  "  what  knows 
it  ?  "  or,  "  how  is  it  known  ? "  comes  afterwards.^ 

§  49.  The  fact,  therefore,  that  no  objective  reality 
(apart  from  Space,  Time,  and  Force,  the   universal 

1  "  An  act  of  knoAvledge  is  only  possible  in  relation  to  an  object, 
—  and  it  is  an  act  of  one  kind  or  another  only  by  special  relation 
to  a  particular  object.  Thus  the  object  at  once  determines  the 
existence,  and  specifies  the  character  of  the  existence,  of  the 
intellectual  energy."  (Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Lect.  on  Met.,  p.  158.) 
"  It  will  not  suffice  for  psychology  to  throw  the  07ius  prohandi,  e.  g. 
the  proof  that  we  have  a  'faculty*  of  Intellectual  Intuition,  on 
supporters  of  the  systems  of  speculation  contemplated.  The  ques- 
tion is  one  concerning  the  contents  of  experience,  not  concerning  its 
conditions.  It  will  not  do  to  say,  —  we  have  no 'organ 'for  pro- 
curing us  such  and  such  experiences ;  we  must  first  inquire  what 
experiences  we  actually  have,  and  then  will  follow  the  question, 
what  'organs'  are  those  by  which  they  are  procured."  (Dr.  Shad- 
worth  H.  Hodgson,  art.  on  "  Philosophy  and  Science,"  in  the 
London  Mind,  Vol.  I.  p.  233.) 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE,  135 

conditions  of  all  reality)  is  actually  known  except 
things  and  their  relations,  and  that  all  that  is  known 
of  the  things  themselves  is  their  unitary  systems  of 
internal  relations,  —  in  other  words,  that  nothing 
is  known  of  the  universe  per  se  except  its  immanent 
relational  constitution,  —  is  proof  of  the  fact  that 
the  knowing  faculty  itself,  the  understanding  or 
intellect,  is  nothing  but  the  Faculty  of  Relations. 
Knowing  is  by  no  means  the  whole  of  human  con- 
sciousness ;  neither  is  the  knowing  faculty  the  whole 
of  the  human  mind.  But  our  present  argument 
does  not  require  an  exhaustive  psychological  classi- 
fication of  the  contents  of  human  consciousness  or  of 
the  functions  of  the  human  mind;  it  limits  itself 
strictly  to  that  which  is  germane  to  the  matter  in 
hand,  and  this  demands  only  a  brief  account  of  the 
knowing  faculty  as  such. 

The  intellect  or  understanding,  then,  is  that  mode 
of  energizing  by  which  the  human  mind  deals  with 
relations.  It  deals  with  them  in  three  distinguish- 
able ways,  and  may  be  said,  therefore,  to  discharge 
three  distinct  functions :  (1)  perceptive,  intuitive,  or 
analytical ;  (2)  conceptive,  reproductive,  or  syntheti- 
cal ;  and  (3)  creative,  constructive,  or  teleological. 

§  50.  (1)  The  perceptive  use  of  the  understand- 
ing is  essentially  intellection  —  that  is,  intellectual 
apprehension,  intellectual  observation,  intellectual 
intuition ;  ^  and  its  object  is  always  one  or  more  of 

1  This  last   expression,   "  intellectual  intuition   {die   intpllectnelle 
Anschauung]"  is  used  here  in  a  sense  substantially  identical  with 


136  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

the  particular  relations  which  in  their  totality  com- 
pose the  immanent  relational  constitution  of  the 
thing  in  itself.  The  thing  acts  upon  the  mind ;  the 
mind,  as  sensibility  and  understanding,  reacts  upon 
itself  as  affected  by  the  thing,  and  subsequently,  as 
will,  upon  the  thing  itself;  and  the  result  of  this 
primary  action  and  reaction  is  the  percept,  or  per- 
ception of  the  thing.  The  perceptive  understand- 
ing is  always  indissolubly  associated  with  sensuous 
intuition  in  perception;  the  sensibility  apprehends 
particular  unrelated  qualities,  the  understanding  ap- 
prehends their  particular  relations ;  but  the  two  are 
necessarily  as  inseparable  in  the  act  of  perception 
as  the  two  blades  of  a  pair  of  scissors  in  the  act  of 
cutting.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  only  related  quah- 
ties  are  intelligible,  and  as  all  relations  of  qualities 
in  the  thing  belong  to  its  relational  constitution,  it  is 
evident  that  the  thing  can  be  understood,  not  by  the 
sensibility,  nor  even  by  the  sensibility  and  under- 

its  original  meaning  in  Kant,  who  denoted  by  it  the  a  posteriori  cog- 
nition of  the  noumenon  by  a  perceptive  or  intuitive  understanding. 
Kant  himself,  however,  in  consequence  of  his  assumption  of  the 
exclusive  subjectivity  of  relations,  logically  enough  denied  the 
actual  existence  of  such  a  faculty  in  man,  though  he  admitted  its 
purely  hypothetical  existence  in  possible  higher  intelligences. 
Fichte  used  the  expression  to  denote  the  "pure  immediate  self- 
intuition  of  the  I,"  Schelling  to  denote  the  "non-sensuous  intuition 
of  the  Absolute  as  at  once  a  Real-Ideal,"  and  New  England  Tran- 
scendentalists,  as  Theodore  Parker,  to  denote  the  "  immediate  intui- 
tion of  God."  But  these  mystical  meanings  of  the  expression  have 
no  more  to  do  with  the  precise,  strictly  limited  meaning  assigned 
to  it  in  the  text,  than  has  the  earlier  mystical  voctv  or  <pp6vr}(ris  of 
Plotinus,  or  the  experimentum,  intellectualis  visio,  or  intuitus  gnosticus 
of  Scotus  Erigena. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  137 

standing  together,  but  only  by  the  understanding 
alone.  For  instance,  the  object  of  vision  is  formed 
color :  color  (reflected  rays  of  light)  is  perceived  by 
the  sensibility ;  form  (which  is  nothing  but  a  system 
of  relations  of  outlines,  boundaries,  or  mere  limits 
of  extension)  is  perceived  by  the  understanding ;  the 
object  of  vision  is  perceived,  or  "  seen,"  far  more  by 
the  mind  than  by  the  eye,  —  in  fact,  is  not  "  seen  " 
by  the  eye  at  all.  Sight  is  the  most  intellectual  of 
the  senses ;  in  the  other  senses,  the  ratio  of  percep- 
tion to  mere  sensation  diminishes,  in  smell  almost 
to  zero.  In  other  words,  the  pure  sensibility  is 
not  an  intellectual  function  of  the  mind  —  no  part, 
therefore,  of  the  knowing  faculty.^ 

Now  the  actually  acquired  knowledge  of  the  thing 
in  itself  is  never  exhaustive  ;  the  quantity  and  qual- 
ity of  it  are  proportional  to  the  power  of  observation 
and  degree  of  attention  bestowed  upon  the  thing; 
more  always  remains  to  be  learned.  The  study  of 
the  thing  is  the  essential  work  of  the  perceptive 
understanding,  which  explores  the  thing's  immanent 
relational  constitution,  and  discovers  more  and  more 
of   it,  the  longer  the  exploration   continues.     This 

1  "  Ni  notre  imagination  ni  nos  sens  ne  nous  sauroient  jamais 
assurer  d'aucune  chose,  si  notre  entendement  n'y  intervient," 
(Descartes,  GEuvres,  I.  164,  ed.  Cousin.)  "We  may,  therefore, 
define  Intuition  as  Mental  Vision,  or  as  the  Perception  of  Rela- 
tions." (Lewes,  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  1st  Ser.,  p.  341,  Boston, 
1874.  In  a  footnote,  Lewes  quotes  Whewell  as  saying  in  1849: 
"If  we  were  allowed  to  restrict  the  use  of  this  term,  we  might 
conveniently  confine  it  to  those  cases  in  which  we  necessarily  appre- 
hend relations  of  things  truly,  as  soon  as  we  conceive  the  objects 
distinctly.") 


138  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

perceptive  exploration  of  the  immanent  relational 
constitution  of  the  thing  in  itself  is  Analysis ;  and 
all  perceptive  use  of  the  understanding  is  essentially 
analytical.  Analysis,  therefore,  succeeds  in  individu- 
alizing the  thing,  when  it  has  discovered  enough  of 
its  immanent  relations  to  render  the  system  of  these 
relations  intelligible  as  a  whole  —  in  a  word,  when 
it  has  discovered  the  real  unity  or  substantial  form 
of  the  thing.  And  Analysis  itself  may  now  be 
defined  as  the  experiential  discovery,  made  hy  the 
perceptive  understanding,  of  the  immanent  relational 
constitution,  or  unitary  system,  of  the  thing  in  itself 

§  51.  (2)  The  conceptive  use  of  the  understanding 
is  essentially  reproduction,  or  the  formation  of  con- 
cepts out  of  the  percepts  of  individual  things.  The 
conceptive  understanding  unites  perceived  relations, 
after  the  pattern  of  the  real  systematic  unity  dis- 
covered in  the  thing  by  the  perceptive  understand- 
ing, into  permanent  thought-systems,  which  persist 
in  the  mind  after  the  disappearance  of  the  percepts ; 
and  these  thought-systems,  or  concepts,  it  coins  into 
words,  for  use  in  the  intellectual  commerce  of  man- 
kind. Words  are  mere  symbols,  but  concepts  are 
not  symbols  at  all;  they  are  relational  systems 
identical,  as  far  as  they  go,  with  the  immanent 
relational  systems  of  the  things  analyzed  and  dis- 
covered by  the  perceptive  understanding.  Eelations 
are  the  common  essence  of  concepts  and  things ;  as 
already  pointed  out  (§  46),  "  an  immanent  relational 
constitution  is  the  condition  both  of  intelligibility 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE,  139 

and  of  existence,  their  aboriginal  common  ground 
of  possibility,  and  therefore  the  absolute  ground  of 
the  identity  of  Being  and  Thought."  Hence  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  "  symbolical  conceptions ; "  and 
the  doctrine  of  symbolical  conceptions,  of  which  so 
much  is  made  in  the  "Synthetic  Philosophy,"  is 
itself  a  "pseud-idea."  The  only  truth  in  it  lies  in 
the  fact  that  all  concepts  are  only  partial  repro- 
ductions of  the  relational  systems  of  things,  only 
silhouette  likenesses  or  outline  sketches  (so  to 
speak),  since,  as  has  just  been  explained,  the  work 
of  analysis  by  the  perceptive  understanding  is  never 
exhaustively  completed,  and  the  work  of  synthesis 
by  the  conceptive  understanding  is  therefore  incom- 
plete to  precisely  the  same  extent.  But  that  this 
work  is  genuinely  successful  as  far  as  it  goes,  and 
that  the  relational  constitution  of  the  concept  is 
identical  to  this  extent  with  that  of  the  thing  in 
itself,  is  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  scientific 
mind,  whenever  it  receives  the  corroboration  of  fresh 
experience  in  scientific  verification. 

Now  concepts  are  of  two  sorts :  the  concept  of 
the  individual  thing,  and  the  concept  of  the  kind  or 
class.  The  concept  of  the  individual  thing  is  the 
joint  work  of  the  sensuous  imagination  and  the  con- 
ceptive understanding,  just  as  the  percept  of  the 
individual  thing  was  the  joint  work  of  the  sensuous 
intuition  and  the  perceptive  understanding,  or  in- 
tellectual intuition :  the  sensuous  imagination  re- 
produces the  sensuous  intuition,  and  the  conceptive 


140  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM, 

understanding  reproduces  the  intellectual  intuition; 
and,  in  this  reproduction  of  the  percept  of  the  indi- 
vidual thing  as  a  concept,  the  sensuous  imagination 
and  the  conceptive  understanding  are  just  as  indis- 
solubly  associated  in  activity,  as  were  the  sensuous 
intuition  and  the  perceptive  understanding  in  its 
original  production.  The  concept  of  the  individual 
thing,  therefore,  may  be  called  the  impure  concept, 
the  image-concept,  or,  shortly,  the  image.  The  con- 
cept of  the  kind  or  class,  however,  is  the  sole  work 
of  the  conceptive  understanding,  and  may  be  called 
the  pure  concept,  the  concept  proper,  or  the  uni- 
versal notion.  For,  in  the  individual  thing,  the 
object  of  the  understanding  is  a  relational  constitu- 
tion immanent  in  an  actual  unity  of  sensuously 
perceptible  and  imaginatively  reproducible  qualities 
which  is  actually  presented  to  perception ;  whereas, 
in  the  kind  or  class,  the  object  of  the  understanding 
is  a  relational  constitution  immanent  in  an  actual 
unity  of  many  individuals  as  a  group  or  species, 
which,  however,  is  never  actually  presented  as  such 
to  perception.  This  relational  constitution,  there- 
fore, cannot  be  reproduced  in  an  image  at  all ;  it  is 
immanent  in  the  group  as  a  group,  in  the  species 
as  a  species,  but  not  in  the  group  or  species  as  a 
strictly  individual  thing.  While,  however,  the  species 
as  such  furnishes  no  percept  to  sensuous  intuition 
and  no  image  to  the  sensuous  imagination,  and  can- 
not, therefore,  be  a  strictly  individual  thing,  it  is, 
for  all  that,  an  individual  thing  of  a  higher  order, 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  141 

inasmuch  as  it  possesses  a  relational  constitution 
immanent  in  the  totality  of  its  individuals  as  a  self- 
related  whole,  although  this  totality  is  never  presented 
to  perception  in  its  real  unity.  Nay,  if  the  species 
as  a  whole,  that  is,  as  an  assemblage  of  all  the  in- 
dividuals composing  it,  were  ever  presented  to  per- 
ception, then  it  would  yield  both  a  percept  and  an 
image  ;  but,  just  as  the  percept  would  be  a  percept 
of  the  assemblage,  so  the  image  would  be  an  image 
of  the  assemblage,  and  not  of  any  "generic  indi- 
vidual"—  which  is  a  sheer  absurdity.  Hence  the 
pure  concept,  or  universal  notion,  is  no  image  at  all, 
and  the  puzzle  how  to  form  mental  pictures  corre- 
sponding to  "general  terms"  has  caused  a  deplorable 
waste  of  philosophical  ingenuity.  No  such  pictures 
are  possible,  not  even  with  the  help  of  that  curious 
nonentity,  the  "  generic  individual."  The  universal 
notion,  or  concept  proper,  is  a  pure  thought-system 
of  relations,  reproducing  only  the  objective  system 
of  relations  of  resemblance  among  many  individ- 
uals,—  never  the  image  or  mental  picture  of  one 
individual ;  it  reproduces  the  relational  constitution 
immanent  in  the  species  as  a  species,  which  includes, 
none  of  the  relations  or  qualities  peculiar  to  the 
individual  as  an  individual ;  and  it  is  the  synthetical 
work  of  the  conceptive  understanding.  Such,  also, 
is  the  concept  of  the  abstract  quality,  the  abstract 
action,  the  abstract  motion,  and  so  on :  all  these 
are  concepts  of  relations,  dropping  out  of  considera- 
tion the  things  related,  and  capable  of  still  higher 


142  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

abstraction  as  relations  of  relations,  of  innumerable 
grades  of  remoteness  from  individual  things.  In  all 
such  cases,  the  conceptive  understanding  simply  re- 
produces systems  of  relations  in  thought  which  the 
perceptive  understanding  has  previously  discovered 
in  being.  There  is  no  limit  to  the  generalizations, 
classifications,  abstractions,  and  so  forth,  which  the 
conceptive  imderstanding  may  thus  permanently  fix 
or  coin  in  concepts,  words,  and  definitions. ^  They 
are  all  syntheses  of  real  relations,  discovered  origi- 
nally by  the  analyses  of  the  perceptive  understand- 
ing, and  subject  to  the  necessity  of  verification  in 

1  The  analogy  between  the  word  and  the  coin  is  a  very  instruc- 
tive one.  Man  is  an  immanent  relational  constitution,  or  unitary 
system,  of  internal  forces ;  and  the  expenditure  of  these  forces 
takes  the  two  phenomenally  distinct  directions  of  labor  and  thought. 
From  the  fact  of  human  society  arises  the  necessity  of  the  exchange 
of  labor-products  and  thought-products,  and  hence  the  necessity  of 
symbolic  representatives  or  readily  exchangeable  measures  of  them. 
As  symbols,  the  coin  is  the  measure  of  labor,  and  the  word  is  the 
measure  of  thought.  Language  is  the  money  of  intellect :  unworded 
thought  is  its  bullion,  but  worded  thought  is  its  exchangeable  cur- 
rency. Thought  itself  is  the  original  mental  wealth ;  but,  if  un- 
worded, it  is  like  gold  undug  in  the  mine,  which  is  practically 
useless  even  to  the  possessor  until  mined  and  minted.  In  the  intel- 
lectual commerce  of  society,  words  alone  are  available  property. 
Consequently,  whoever  is  indifferent  to  accuracy  in  the  use  of  words 
is  an  unskilled  laborer  in  the  intellectual  world  —  a  trader  ignorant 
of,  or  indifferent  to,  the  value  of  the  coins  he  gives  and  takes;  and 
commercial  failure  would  be  the  instant  fate  of  him  who  in  business 
should  confound  the  eagle  with  the  dollar  and  the  dollar  with  the 
cent.  Hence  the  vulgar  reproach  against  philosophy  that  it  is  mere 
hair-splitting  in  words,  or  profitless  trickery  in  verbal  subtilties,  is 
simply  a  proof  of  vulgar  ignorance.  The  student  of  science  or 
philosophy  who  should  despise  or  neglect  the  subtile  but  real  dis- 
tinctions of  technical  terms  would  speedily  become  a  scientific  or 
philosophical  bankrupt. 


THE  RELIGIOl"^  OF  SCIENCE.  143 

fresh  experience;  they  not  only  perpetuate  these 
discoveries,  but  also  furnish  indispensable  instru- 
mentalities for  the  further  scientific  exploration  of 
objective  reality.  Hence  intellectual  reproductive 
synthesis,  or  the  combination  and  conversion  of  eva- 
nescent objective  percepts  into  permanent  subjective 
concepts,  is  the  special  function  of  the  conceptive 
understanding. 

§  52.  (3)  The  creative  use  of  the  understanding 
is  essentially  telcological :  that  is,  it  is  the  free  con- 
struction of  ends  and  means.  The  end  is  a  purely 
ideal  system  of  relations  in  the  present  which  is  to 
be  realized  in  the  future ;  the  means  is  a  purely 
ideal  system  of  relations  in  the  present  by  which 
the  future  end  is  to  be  realized ;  and  the  objective 
realization  of  these  purely  subjective  systems  of 
relations  is  effected  by  the  will,  which  is  the  blindly 
executive  faculty  or  function  of  the  mind  and  impli- 
citly obeys  the  directive  mandate  of  the  understand- 
ing. When  the  understanding  takes  the  suggestion 
of  its  end  from  feeling,  the  general  end  it  creates  is 
the  attainment  of  (egoistic  or  altruistic)  happiness, 
and  its  principle  of  action  is  utility  or  expediency  — 
that  is,  fidelity  to  the  immanent  relational  constitu- 
tion of  the  mind  itself ;  when  it  takes  the  suGf^es- 
tion  of  its  end  from  the  higher  reason  (which  is 
the  supreme  Faculty  of  tlie  Ideal),  the  general  end  it 
creates  is  the  attainment  of  truth,  beauty,  and  good- 
ness, and  its  principle  of  action  is  justice  —  that 
is,  fidelity  to  the  immanent  relational  constitution  of 


144  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

the  universe  per  se.  There  is  no  necessary  antago- 
nism between  these  two  ultimate  principles  of  action ; 
antagonism  arises  only  when  the  lower  or  partial 
principle  usurps  the  authority  of  the  higher  or  uni- 
versal principle  —  when  feeling  asserts  an  unnatural 
and  illegitimate  supremacy  over  the  higher  reason. 

The  understanding,  therefore,  and  not  the  will,  is 
the  true  Faculty  of  Freedom  —  intellectual  freedom 
when  the  immediate  end  is  the  knowledge  or  appli- 
cation of  truth  (science,  philosophy,  and  the  me- 
chanical arts),  sesthetical  freedom  when  the  immediate 
end  is  the  possession  of  beauty  (literature  and  the 
fine  arts),  practical  or  moral  freedom  when  the  im- 
mediate end  is  the  conduct  of  life  or  the  achievement 
of  virtue  (praxis,  morality,  religion).  For  example, 
it  creates  innumerable  objective  relational  systems 
in  tools,  machines,  and  other  inventions  of  the  in- 
dustrial arts;  pictures,  sculptures,  musical  instru- 
ments, buildings,  books,  all  works  of  the  higher 
imagination,  in  the  fine  arts  ;  institutions  of  all  sorts, 
civil,  political,  military,  philanthropic,  ecclesiastical, 
in  human  society;  plans  of  conduct,  schemes  of 
social  reform,  religious  organizations,  and  so  forth, 
in  the  sphere  of  moral  and  religious  activity,  —  in 
short,  all  the  instrumentalities  and  enginery  of 
human  civilization. 

§  53.  Now,  in  all  this  multiform  self-activity,  the 
creative  understanding  appears  as  the  ahsolutc  origi- 
nator of  systems  of  relations.  It  pervades  all  other 
uses  of  the  understanding,  whose  functions  are  dis- 


TEE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  145 

tinguishable  only,  not  separable.  The  percept,  it  is 
true,  is  a  system  of  relations  created  by  the  joint 
activity  of  the  thing  and  the  understanding,  object 
and  subject,  noumenon  known  and  noumenon  know- 
ing, co-existing  and  interacting  in  the  phenomenon, 
real  appearance,  or  'actual  experience.  But  the  con- 
cept is  the  perpetuation  —  that  is,  the  ideal  recfea" 
tion  —  of  the  percept ;  and  the  end  and  the  means 
are  combuiations  of  percepts  and  concepts  in  free, 
ahsolutely  iieWy  and  purely  ideal  creations^  subse- 
quently realizable  by  the  will.  Thus  the  perceptive 
understandiQg  discovers  objective  systems  of  rela- 
tions ;  the  conceptive  understanding  recreates  or 
reproduces  them  ;  the  creative  understanding,  in  its 
pure  activity,  recombines  them,  and  thereby  freely 
creates  new  subjective  systems  of  relations.  The 
supreme  construction  of  the  creative  understanding 
is  Mctliod,  which  is  also  the  highest  perfection  of 
teleology  ;  for  it  is  the  adaptation  of  means  to  ends, 
not  for  a  single  act  or  judgment,  but  for  the  uni- 
versal series  of  acts  or  judgments.  Hence,  method 
being  the  highest  potency  of  intellect  in  actu,  the 
essentially  teleological  nature  of  all  intellect  is  plainly 
apparent. 

In  all  its  functions,  the  essential  act  of  the  under- 
standing is  judgment ;  and  judgment  is  always  the 
affirmation  (including,  of  course,  negation)  of  the 
objective  existence,  or  fitness  to  exist  objectively,  of 
systems  of  relations.  Eeasoning,  or  the  continuous 
activity  of  the  understanding,  is  the  strictly  teleo- 

10 


146  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

logical  combination  of  judgments  of  objective  exist- 
ence to  produce  a  final  judgment  of  precisely  the 
same  character.  The  percept  is,  originally,  the  judg- 
ment or  affirmation  of  the  objective  existence  of  par- 
ticular relations  in  the  thing,  and,  finally,  of  their 
real  unity  in  its  relational  system  as  a  whole ;  the 
concept,  or  the  reproduction  of  the  final  percept,  is 
the  judgment  or  re-affirmation  of  the  objective  exist- 
ence of  the  relational  constitution  of  the  thing ;  the 
end  is  the  judgment  or  affirmation  of  the  fitness  of 
a  purely  ideal  relational  system  to  exist  objectively, 
and  the  means  is  the  judgment  or  aftirmation  of  the 
fitness  of  another  purely  ideal  relational  system  to 
exist  objectively,  in  order  to  produce  the  objective 
existence  of  the  end.  But  this  is  not  all.  The 
understanding  is  the  absolute  originator  of  systems 
of  relations,  not  only  in  thought,  but  also  in  being. 
Acting  in  conjunction  with  the  will  as  its  executive 
subordinate,  it  masters  forces  which  exist  in  the 
outward  world,  and  constrains  them  to  reproduce 
relational  systems  which  have  absolutely  no  origin 
but  the  understanding  itself.  This  is  the  manner  in 
which  the  mind,  originally  acted  upon  by  the  thing 
in  perceptive  experience,  reacts  ultimately  upon  the 
thing  itself  in  teleological  construction.  For  instance, 
the  ship,  as  a  ship,  is  the  teleological  creature  of  the 
understanding  alone ;  its  materials  and  forces  are 
derived  solely  from  external  nature,  but  its  idea,  its 
real  unity  as  a  ship,  its  immanent  relational  consti- 
tution, without  which  it  would  be  a  mere  mass  of 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  147 

timbers  and  cordage  or  material  still  less  formed,  is 
derived  solely  from  the  understanding,  wliicli  has 
absolutely  created  it  as  a  means  to  its  own  ends. 
The  ship,  as  such,  is  nothing  but  this  immanent 
relational  constitution,  this  real  unity  of  relational 
system,  this  substantial  form ;  and,  in  virtue  of  this 
internal  system  alone,  the  ship  is  truly  a  thing  in 
itself.  Hence  the  ship,  as  a  thing  in  itself,  is  a  sys- 
tem of  objectively  real  relations  created  absolutely 
in  the  world  of  actual  existence  by  the  understand- 
ing and  the  will.  And  the  general  result  of  our  in 
vestigation  of  the  nature  of  intelligence  may  now 
be  condensed  into  this  brief  definition,  to  be  inter- 
preted  in  the  light  of  what  precedes :  Intelligence  is 
that  luhich  either  discovers  or  creates  relational  systems 
or  coristittttions. 

§  54.  It  only  remains  to  show,  under  this  head, 
that  the  nature  of  intelligence,  as  such,  is  identical 
in  all  possible  forms  and  degrees. 

Any  organism,  however  low  in  the  scale  of  being, 
which  has  sufficient  intelligence  to  select  its  food, 
choosing  the  nutritious  and  rejecting  the  innutri- 
tions, —  or  to  fly  from  its  enemies,  or  to  seek  shelter 
from  the  weather,  or  to  seek  its  mate,  —  proves 
thereby  its  possession  of  a  perceptive  understanding, 
or  the  capability  of  discovering  systems  of  relations 
objectively  real  to  itself.  Any  organism  which 
manifests  the  ability  to  act  for  a  purpose  or  end, 
however  simple,  proves  thereby  its  possession,  not 
only  of  a  perceptive,  but  also  of  a  conceptive  and 


148  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

creative,  understanding.  Many  of  the  lower  animals 
manifest  rudiments  even  of  the  higher  reason,  the 
faculty  of  the  ideal,  so  far  as  they  show  themselves 
capable  of  self-sacrifice  for  the  sake  of  others.  So 
far  as  modern  investigations  go,  they  tend  to  prove 
that  mind  is  everywhere  mind,  essentially  identical 
in  kind,  however  various  in  degree.  If  man's  under- 
standing were  infinite,  it  could  not  cease  to  be  what 
it  is,  no  matter  what  new  faculties  might  be  added 
to  it ;  it  would  still  be  essentially  that  w^hich  cog- 
nizes and  deals  with  relations,  or  it  would  cease  to 
be  mind  altogether.  The  network  of  relations,  the 
inosculating  and  interpenetrating  systems  of  rela- 
tions which  in  their  totality  compose  the  immanent 
relational  constitution  of  the  universe,  would  still 
remain  to  be  known ;  and  the  infinite  mind  which 
should  not  know  them  would  be  simply  infinite 
stupidity  and  ignorance.  Knowledge  itself  can  be 
nothing  but  knowledge  of  these  relations ;  finite 
knowledge  is  knowledge  of  a  part  of  them,  infinite 
knowledge  could  only  be  knowledge  of  them  all. 
There  is  thus  no  essential  difference  in  knowledge 
itself,  or  in  the  knowing  faculty,  whether  it  be 
finite  or  infinite ;  the  difference  is  in  the  nature  of 
the  object  of  knowledge,  as  finite  or  infinite.  Hence 
man's  present  intelligence,  if  only  infinitely  expanded 
without  the  slightest  change  in  its  essential  nature, 
would  be  thereby  rendered  adequate  to  the  absolute 
comprehension  of  the  absolute  All ;  and,  if  there 
exists  anywhere  or  anyhow  an  absolute  and  infinite 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  149 

mind,  its  essential  nature  must  be  identical  with 
that  of  the  human  mind,  differing  in  degree  alone 
and  not  in  kind,  if,  as  has  just  been  shown,  mind  or 
intelligence  is  that  which  either  discovers  or  creates 
relational  systems.     In  only  two  unessential  respects 
could  an   infinite   intelligence   differ   from   a   finite 
intelligence:    an   infinite    understanding  would  be 
perceptive  and  creative,  but  not  conceptive  ;  and  while, 
to  the  finite  intelligence,  the  material  of  its  percep- 
tion and  creation  must  be  given  from  without,  this 
material,  to  the  infinite  intelligence,  must  be  given 
from  within.     For,  on  the  one  hand,  it  is  only  the 
non-continuance  or  evanescence  of  the  percept  which 
renders  the  concept  a  necessity  of  finite  intelligence ; 
the  conceptive  understanding  is  merely  a  remedy  for 
the  defect  or  finitude  of  the  perceptive  understand- 
ing;   and    an    infinitely   perceptive    understanding 
would  itself  discharge  the  essential  function  of  the 
conceptive  understanding,  since  a  permanent  percept 
would   be  indistinguishable   from  the  concept   and 
render  the  latter  superfluous.     On  the  other  hand, 
the  fact  that  the  finite  intelligence  originally  deals 
with  relational  systems  only  in  that  which  is  given 
to  it  from  without  results  likewise  from  its  finitude 
as  such;  an  infinite  mind  would  necessarily  origi- 
nate from  within  both  matter  and  form  of  the  rela- 
tional   systems    which,    as   an    infinite    perceptive 
understanding,    it  would    intuitively    comprehend. 
Hence  there  must  be  unessential  differences  between 
the   finite   and   the   infinite    intelligence;    but   the 


150  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

definition  of  intelligence  itself  as  "  that  which  either 
discovers  or  creates  relational  systems "  remains 
equally  applicable  to  both,  and  hence  the  principle 
stands  unshaken  that  the  nature  of  intelligence,  as 
such,  is  identical  in  all  possible  forms  and  degrees. 
If  this  is  "  anthropomorphism,"  it  matters  not ;  hard 
names  never  yet  changed  a  false  principle  into  a 
true,  or  a  true  principle  into  a  false ;  and  the  ques- 
tion remains  as  before  —  is  the  principle  itself  false 
or  true  ?  And  this  principle  of  the  essential  identity 
of  the  nature  of  intelligence  in  all  possible  forms 
and  degrees,  following  so  clearly  and  necessarily 
from  the  scientific  or  noumenal  conception  of  the 
universe,  seems  to  be  undeniably  true. 

§  55.  Having  at  last  arrived  at  answers  to  the 
vitally  important  subsidiary  questions,  "  What  is  in- 
telligibility ? "  and  "  What  is  intelligence  ? "  it  is  time 
to  resume  the  thread  of  our  main  argument.  It  has 
been  shown  (§  46)  that  intelligibility,  as  an  attribute 
of  the  thing,  consists  in  the  possession  of  an  im- 
manent relational  constitution,  and  that  the  infinite 
intelligibility  of  the  universe,  as  the  infinite,  eternal, 
and  self-existent  All-Thing,  consists  in  its  possession 
of  an  immanent  and  infinite  relational  constitution. 
It  has  likewise  been  shown  (§  53)  that  intelligence 
itself  is  that  which  either  discovers  or  creates  rela- 
tional systems  or  constitutions,  and  that  the  nature  of 
intelligence,  as  such,  is  identical  in  all  possible  forms 
and  degrees.  What  is  the  unavoidable  inference  or 
conclusion  from  these  principles,  as  premises  ? 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  351 

This  —  that  the  infinitely  intelligible  universe  must 
he  likeiuise  infinitely  intelligent. 

The  infinitely  intelligible  universe  is  the  self- 
existent  totality  of  all  Being,  since  there  is  no 
"  other  "  to  which  it  could  possibly  owe  its  exist- 
ence. But  that  which  is  self-existent  must  be  self- 
determined  in  all  its  attributes;  and  it  could  not 
possibly  determine  itself  to  be  intelligible,  unless  it 
were  likewise  intelligent.  Self-existent  intelligibility 
is  self-intelligibility,  and  self -intelligibility  is  self- 
intelligence  :  or,  that  w^hich  intelligibly  exists  through 
itself  must  be  intelligible  to  itself,  and  therefore 
intelligent  in  itself. 

To  express  this  thought  in  less  abstract  terms : 
the  universe,  being  the  sole  cause  of  its  own  exist- 
ence, must  be  likewise  the  sole  cause  of  all  the 
determinations  of  that  existence,  and  therefore  of  its 
own  intelligibility ;  that  is,  it  must  be  the  absolute 
author  or  eternal  originator  of  its  own  immanent 
relational  constitution.  Intelligence,  as  the  creative 
understanding,  has  just  been  shown  to  be  the  "  ab- 
solute originator  of  systems  of  relations;"  and  no 
other  origin  of  relational  systems  is  either  known  in 
experience  or  conceivable  in  hypothesis.  So  far  as 
experience  and  reason  can  go,  therefore,  the  intelligi- 
bility or  relational  system  of  the  universe.,  considered 
as  an  effect,  must  originate  in  the  intelligence  or 
creative  understanding  of  the  universe,  considered 
as  a  cause.  This  is  substantially  the  meaning  of 
Spinoza's  famous  distinction  of  natura  naturans  and 


152  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

7iatura  naturata,  and  of  Prof.  Caporali's  distinction, 
identical  with  Spinoza's,  of  natura  fatta  and  natura 
che  si  fa.  It  does  not  mean  causation  or  creation  at 
any  particular  time,  but  the  eternal  self-causation 
or  self-creation  which  is  involved  in  the  reality  of 
Infinite  Being  as  Eternal  Self -activity,  actus  imnis, 
or  causa  sui ;  and  this  is  a  conception  which,  as  we 
saw  in  Part  First,  phenomenism  itself  is  powerless 
to  escape.  And  it  is  no  less  the  conception  towards 
which,  as  pure  cosmical  dynamism,  modern  science 
is  steadily  tending  more  and  more. 

Hence  the  existence  of  an  intelligible,  infinite,  and 
immanent  relational  constitution  or  system  in  Na- 
ture is  the  highest  possible  or  conceivable  proof  that 
Nature  is  intelligent ;  and  the  stronger  the  proof  of 
the  system,  just  so  much  stronger  is  the  proof  of  the 
intelligence.  The  absolute  invariability  of  natural 
law,  which  is  the  logical  corollary  of  natural  system, 
is  thus  essential  to  the  conception  of  an  immanent 
relational  constitution  as  the  real  unity  of  the  uni- 
verse ;  the  possibility  of  miracle,  as  a  suspension  of 
natural  law,  would  be  the  disproof  of  an  infinite  in- 
telligence. Now,  as  was  shown  at  the  outset  (§4), 
the  scientific  conception  underlying,  or  lying  latent 
in,  all  empirical  use  of  the  scientific  method  is  that 
the  universe,  as  a  whole,  has  an  immanent  relational 
constitution,  and  that  all  the  countless  particular 
relations  of  which  it  is  the  real  unity  are  actually  or 
potentially  discoverable  by  observation,  experiment, 
hypothesis,  and  verification.      No  scientific  investi- 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  153 

gation  could  possibly  ever  have  been  instituted,  ex- 
cept on  the  conscious  or  unconscious  assumption  of 
the  scientific  discoverability  of  these  relations  ;per  se : 
that  is,  of  the  scientific  knowableness  of  the  un- 
known, —  that  is,  of  tlie  existence  in  Nature  of 
a  relational  system  which  includes,  not  only  the 
known,  but  no  less  the  unknown  in  all  its  bound- 
lessness. The  whole  progress  of  science,  discovering 
more  and  more  of  that  intimate  relational  system 
which  finds  place  for  every  new  fact  as  soon  as  it  is 
brought  to  light,  is  a  cumulative  proof,  mounting 
almost  to  mathematical  demonstration,  that  the  "  ob- 
jective synthesis "  or  system  of  Nature  is  the  most 
real  of  all  realities.  Yet  this  system,  as  has  just 
been  shown,  is  the  strongest  possible  proof  of  infinite 
intelligence  in  the  universe.  System  —  all-inclusive 
self-relatedness  in  whole  and  in  part  —  has,  even 
conjecturally,  no  possible  origin  except  intelligence ; 
and  an  infinite  system,  inclusive  alike  of  the  known 
and  the  unknown,  can  have  no  origin  but  in  infinite 
intelligence.  Chance,  or  fate,  is  no  hypothesis  at 
all ;  ^  it  is  the  mere  absence,  the  mere  negation,  of 
all  hypothesis ;  intelligence  is  the  only  hypothesis  in 
the  field,  for  intelligence,  as  the  creative  understand- 
ing, is  the  only  experientially  known  or  hypotheti- 

1  "It  would  be  with  it  as  witli  that  man  of  whom  Gassendi 
speaks,  who,  half  asleep,  and  hearing  four  o'clock  struck,  said : 
*  This  clock  is  mad ;  lo,  four  times  it  has  struck  one  o'clock ! '  The 
man  had  not  force  of  mind  enough  to  reflect  that  four  times  one 
o'clock  makes  four  o'clock.  Those  who  explain  tlie  world  by  a 
fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms  give  evidence  of  a  power  of  synthesis 
about  equal  to  this."     (Janet,  Firial  Causes,  1883,  p.  28.) 


154  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

cally  conceivable  origin  of  system.  Yet  the  system 
of  Nature  is  the  surest  fact  of  science ;  it  has,  and 
must  have,  an  adequate  cause ;  and  the  only  cause 
known  to  man  which  is  ever  the  originator  of  sys- 
tem is  the  creative  understanding.  All  experienced 
systems  which  cannot  be  referred  to  the  creative 
understanding  in  man  and  the  lower  animals  belong 
together,  as  mere  parts  of  the  one  total  system 
known  to  exist  as  the  immanent  relational  constitu- 
tion of  the  universe. 

It  will  not  do  to  say  that  man  discovers  a  multi- 
plicity of  relational  systems  in  Nature  which  have 
evidently  no  origin  in  an  originating  understanding, 
and  that  system  as  such,  therefore,  is  no  proof  of 
originating  understanding ;  for  not  one  of  these  sys- 
tems is  independent  —  they  are  all  dependent  yarts, 
not  indejjendent  wholes,  and  only  constitute  elements 
in  the  one  vast  system  of  Nature  itself,  which  in  its 
absolute  unity  alone  explains  them  or  renders  them 
intelligible.  There  is  one,  and  only  one.  System  of 
Nature;  there  are  many  system-products  of  man, 
because  man  is  many,  but  only  one  system-product 
of  Nature,  because  Nature  is  one. 

The  simple  question  is  —  shall  this  one  system,  as 
a  known  fact,  be  referred  to  anything  but  intelli- 
gence, the  known  cause  of  innumerable  other  known 
systems?  To  this  question  but  one  reasonable  an- 
swer can  be  given,  if  experience  is  the  true  guide 
of  reason.  Consequently,  the  immanent  and  infinite 
relational  constitution  of  the  universe  'per  se,  verified 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  155 

by  experience  as  far  as  experience  has  gone,  and 
confirmed  by  reason  as  far  as  reason  can  go,  is  the 
one  grand  and  decisive  proof  that  the  infinite  intel- 
ligibility  of  the  universe  can  have  no  possible  origin  hut 
the  infinite  intelligence  of  the  universe  itself 

§  56.  Now  let  us  put  two  and  two  together,  and 
see  if  they  make  four.  Our  results  thus  far  are  (1) 
that  the  universe  per  se  is  infinitely  intelligible,  and 
(2)  that  the  universe  per  se  is  infinitely  intelligent. 
Unite  these  two  truths,  and  the  third  truth  follows 
with  irresistible  certainty  that  the  universe  per  se  is 
an  infi7iite  self -consciousness.  For  that  which  is  in- 
telligible is  an  actual  or  possible  object  of  knowl- 
edge ;  that  which  is  intelligent  is  an  actual  subject 
of  knowledge ;  and  that  which  in  itself  is  at  once 
intelligible  and  intelligent  is  an  actual  subject-object 
—  a  living  self -consciousness.  This  actual  identity 
of  subject  and  object,  or  "  transcendental  [experi- 
ential] synthesis  of  Being  and  Knowing  in  the  I," 
is  precisely  what  constitutes  the  mystery,  and  yet 
the  undeniable  fact,  of  all  consciousness  ( Urthatsache 
des  Bewnsstseins).  The  universe,  then,  is  infinitely 
intelligible  and  infinitely  intelligent  at  the  same 
time;  since  it  includes  all  that  exists,  and  there- 
fore excludes  the  possibility  of  any  other  object  of 
knowledge  than  itself,  it  must  be  its  own  object ;  con- 
sequently, it  must  be  an  actual  and  infinite  subject- 
object,  that  is,  an  infinite  self-consciousness. 

Thus  far,  then,  we  seem  to  have  been  led  by  a 
very  straight  path,  assuming  only  the  validity  of  the 


156  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

scientific  method  and  of  the  philosophical  presup- 
positions logically  involved  in  it,  to  the  momentous 
result  that  the  universe  per  se  is  an  Infinite  Self- 
conscious  Intellect,  which,  though  infinitely  removed 
in  degree,  is  yet  essentially  identical  in  kind  with 
the  human  intellect.  This  result,  then,  is  the  con- 
stitutive principle  of  Scientific  Theism ;  and  I  see  no 
way  to  escape  it,  except  by  repudiating  the  scientific 
method  itself.  But  this  result  is  by  no  means  an 
ultimate  one.  Let  us,  then,  conclude  this  long  chap- 
ter, and  in  the  next  go  on  and  see  whither  the  road 
we  are  travelling  will  conduct  us. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  157 


CHAPTEE  V. 

THE  UNIVEESE  :   MACHINE   OE   ORGANISM  ? 

§  57.  The  immanent  relational  constitution  of  the 
universe  per  se,  then,  is  the  mode  in  which  the 
universe-suhject,  or  Infinite  Self-conscious  Intellect, 
thinks  and  creates  and  reveals  itself  as  the  universe- 
object,  or  infinitely  intelligible  System  of  Nature ; 
and,  so  far  as  it  is  yet  known,  modern  physical  and 
psychical  science  is  the  knowledge  of  it.  From  the 
side  of  the  finite,  science  is  human  discovery ;  from 
the  side  of  the  infinite,  science  is  divine  revelation ; 
there  could  neither  be  discovery  without  revelation 
nor  revelation  without  discovery;  and  science  thus 
appears  as  the  intellectual  mediator  between  the  finite 
and  the  infinite.  The  philosophy  of  science,  there- 
fore, when  at  last  developed  and  matured  by  the 
universal  reason  of  the  race,  will  be  the  supreme 
wisdom  of  Man  and  the  self-evident  word  of  God. 
All  this  seems  discouragingly  abstract  and  lifeless ; 
but  life  and  light  appear  as  we  go  on,  following  the 
course  of  this  objectified  divine  self-thinking  in  the 
System  of  Nature,  with  science  still  as  our  guide. 

§  58.  The  System  of  Nature,  as  the  real  unity  of 
all  existent  things  in  the  All-Thing,  must  be,  not 


158  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

only  infinitely  intelligible,  but  also  absolutely  per- 
fect, in  every  sense  of  the  word.  It  must  be  per- 
fectly adapted  to  the  conditions  and  laws  of  Being, 
else  it  could  not  persevere  to  be.  It  must  be  perfectly 
adapted  to  the  conditions  and  laws  of  Thought,  else 
it  could  not  be  intrinsically  understandable  and  pro- 
gressively understood.  It  must  be  perfectly  adapted 
to  itself,  perfectly  self-related  in  whole  and  in  part, 
perfectly  self-constituted  as  an  infinite  relational  sys- 
tem, else  it  could  neither  be  nor  be  understood  (§  46). 
Finally,  it  cannot  be  imperfect  in  comparison  with 
any  other  and  superior  system,  whether  within  or 
without  itself ;  for  outside  of  itself  there  is  nothing 
with  which  to  compare  it,  and  inside  of  itself  there  is 
no  partial  or  finite  system  which  does  not  absolutely 
derive  from  the  universal  or  infinite  system  whatever 
little  perfection  it  may  possess.  In  short,  whatever 
is  imperfect  carries  in  its  own  imperfection  the  seed 
of  death  —  must  at  last  decay  and  altogether  cease 
to  be ;  but  whatever  exists  eternally  proves  its  own 
absolute  perfection  by  the  bare  fact  of  its  eternity. 
Hence  the  System  of  Nature  must  be  absolutely 
perfect  in  every  conceivable  sense  of  the  word. 

§  59.  The  conception  of  the  universe,  therefore,  as 
nothing  but  "  an  infinite  multitude  of  sentient  be- 
ings "  (monads,  monadology),  or  as  nothing  but  ''an 
infinite  multitude  of  non-sentient  beings"  (atoms, 
materialism),  is  a  distinctly  inferior  and  imperfect  con- 
ception, and,  consequently,  cannot  correspond  with  the 
fact.     It  is  not  one  system  at  all,  but  an  unintelligible 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  159 

a^^regate  of  systems.    It  is  a  conception  intermediate 
between  the  conceptions  of  cosmos  and  chaos,  infinite 
order  and  infinite  disorder,  Being  and  Non-Being ;  it 
posits  the  objective  existence  of  particular  relations, 
but   abrogates   that   of   the   total  relational  system 
through  which  alone   they  could   objectively  exist; 
it  establishes  the  Many,  but  abolishes  the  One  ;  it 
lacks  all  principle  of  real  unity,  and  therefore  all 
principle  of  self-existence;   it  lacks  all  principle  of 
ideal  unity,  and  therefore  all  principle  of  intelligi- 
bility.    By  thus  destroying  all  real  and  ideal  unity 
of  the  universe,  it  represents  the  universe  as  so  im- 
perfectly self-related  that,  as  a  system,  it  would  be 
immeasurably  inferior  to  each  and  every  one  of  the 
monadic  or  atomic  systems  which  are  contained  with- 
in it,  and  which,  notwithstanding,  must  derive  their 
higher  perfection  from  this  universal  system  less  per- 
fect than  themselves ;  for,  although  the  universe,  as 
a  whole,  is  not  conceived  as  self-existent  or  intelli- 
gible, each  monad  or  atom  is  necessarily  so  conceived, 
and  thus  the  part  is  conceived  as  superior  to  the 
whole.     The  conception  itself,  therefore,  is  essentially 
a   hybrid  conception,  a  cross  between  cosmos   and 
chaos,  a  philosophical  chimera,  a   monstrosity,  and 
dissolves  the  complex  unity  of  the  universe  into  a 
mob  of   disorderly  elements.     As  a  perfect  system, 
Nature   must  be,  not  an  infinite  multitude  of   self- 
existent  units,  forever  clashing  and   colliding  in  a 
turmoil  at  once  hopeless  and  eternal,  but  an  infinite 
relational  constitution,  in  which  not  only  the  infinite 


160  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

multitude  of  the  units,  but  also  the  infinite  unity  of 
the  multitude,  are,  logically  and  ontologically  alike, 
reconciled  and  conserved. 

§  60.  The  universe,  then,  is  a  self -existent,  infi- 
nitely intelligible,  and  absolutely  perfect  system. 
But  what  is  a  perfect  system?  A  system,  in  gen- 
eral, is  that  in  which  many  parts  are  correlated 
closely  enough  to  constitute  a  rational .  whole ;  and, 
purely  as  system,  it  is  more  or  less  perfect  in  pro- 
portion to  the  closeness,  complexity,  and  compre- 
hensiveness of  this  internal  correlation.  There  are 
countless  grades  of  perfection  in  the  finite  systems 
known  in  human  experience  ;  each  may  be  perfect  in 
itself,  inasmuch  as  it  may  be  perfectly  adapted  to  its 
own  immanent  end  and  its  own  place  in  the  general 
whole,  yet  at  the  same  time  relatively  imperfect, 
inasmuch  as  the  degree  of  closeness,  complexity,  and 
comprehensiveness  in  its  mternal  correlation  may  be 
greatly  inferior  to  that  of  other  finite  systems.  More- 
over, it  is  incredible,  in  the  light  of  human  experience 
itself,  that  the  vast  and  limitless  Unknown  should 
not  conceal  from  man's  perception  countless  grades 
of  perfection  in  systems  as  yet  unrevealed  to  his 
prying  eye  and  mind.  But,  so  far  as  his  knowledge 
goes,  the  supreme  perfection  of  system  is  realized  in 
that  system  of  systems  —  the  OrgoMism.  All  other 
known  systems  are  immeasurably  less  perfect  than 
this,  because  the  organism  lives  and  grows.  Nothing 
but  the  organism  either  lives  or  grows ;  the  knowl- 
edge of  life  and  growth  is  derived  from  it  alone ;  life 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE,  161 

and  growth  are  its  essential  marks,  and  constitute 
it,  within  the  sphere  of  human  knowledge,  the  one 
perfect  system. 

§  61.  Now,  in  our  analysis  of  the  knowing  faculty 
and  of  the  nature  of  intelligence,  we  found  that  the 
supreme  function  of  the  understanding  was  the  teleo- 
logical  creation  of  system.  The  creative  understand- 
ing of  man,  however,  is  powerless  to  create  the 
organism,  or  one  perfect  system;  it  cannot  project 
itself  into  the  world  of  external  existence  in  any 
hio-her  form  than  that  of  the  Machine,  or  relatively 
imperfect  system,  because  it  deals  only  with  given 
material  over  which  it  can  exercise  only  a  limited 
control.  Even  its  highest  ideal  creations  are  never 
emancipated  from  dependence  on  the  merely  given ; 
all  human  knowledge  is  drawn  from  experience  of 
the  given  Outward,  and  all  human  construction  is 
mechanical  recombination  of  the  material  it  yields. 
The  fine  arts  themselves  are  only  members  of  the 
great  sisterhood  of  the  mechanical  arts  :  the  statue, 
the  painting,  the  orchestra,  the  cathedral,  nay,  the 
book,  are  only  machines  for  producing  certain  effects 
in  the  human  mind.  The  industrial  arts  minister 
to  the  wants  of  the  body ;  the  fine  arts  minister  to 
the  wants  of  the  mind ;  but  both  are  simply  depart- 
ments of  the  mechanical  arts,  and  equally  ultimate 
in  the  production  of  machines. 

Hence  the  finite  understanding  can  create  in- 
numerable mechanical  or  artificial  systems  as  means 
for  the  enlargement  of  its  own  life,  but  never  organic 

u 


162  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

systems  as  means  for  the  creation  of  life  in  itself. 
If  it  ever  should,  it  would  only  prove  itself  more 
divine  than  it  seems.  But  the  infinite  understand- 
incf  which  creates  both  the  form  and  the  matter  of 
its  own  constructions,  creates  organisms,  and,  rightly 
interpreted  (as  will  appear  below),  organisms  alone. 
It  was  a  profound  saying  of  Strauss,  essentially  iden- 
tical with  Aristotle's  doctrine  of  the  eVreXe^eta,  that 
"life  is  an  end  that  creates  its  own  means  from  with- 
in and  realizes  itself."  ^  The  Infinite  Self-conscious 
Intellect  eternally  creates  the  Infinite  Organism  of 
Nature,  —  that  is,  the  universe  as  subject  (natura 
naturans)  eternally  creates  the  universe  as  object 
{naUim  naturata),  —  because  self -existence  or  self- 
life  is  eternally  a  self-sufficient  end  that  realizes 
itself,  an  end  in  itself  that  is  not  a  means  to  any 
further  end ;  and  it  creates  finite  organisms  because 
even  dependent  life  is  likewise,  at  least  in  part, 
a  self-sufficient  end  that  realizes  itself.  In  other 
words,  life,  whether  infinite  or  finite,  is  its  own 
justification :  you  fulfil  your  "  being's  end  and  aim  " 
by  living  your  own  life  in  all  genuineness  and  ideal 
fulness  —  by  truly  fulfilling,  that  is,  "  full-filling  "  it ; 
and  you  are  wise  indeed,  if  you  know  the  bound- 
less depth  of  meaning  and  the  vastness  of  universal 

1  "Das  Denken  kann  in  diesen  Forschungen  nicht  eher  zur 
Befriedigung  gelangen,  als  bis  es,  den  ganzen  Standpunkt  dieser 
ausserhalb  der  Natur  entworfenen  und  ihr  eingepflanzten  Zweck- 
beziehungen  verlassend,  die  Idee  des  Lebens  als  den  sich  von 
innen  herans  seine  Mittel  schaffenden,  sich  selbst  verwirklicbenden 
Zweck  begreift."     {Die  Christliche  Glauhenslehre,  I.  388,  ed.  1840.) 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  163 

obligation  which  the  word  "  full-filling "  implies. 
The  creative  understanding,  therefore,  which  is  the 
absolute  originator  of  all  relational  systems,  creates 
them  because  that  is  its  essential  function  —  because 
it  is  its  very  nature  to  create ;  all  its  creations  are 
essentially  teleological,  —  as  finite  understanding, 
machines,  and  as  infinite  understanding,  organisms ; 
and  all  its  creations  are  essentially  means  for  tlie 
"  full-filling  "  of  its  own  life  —  the  absolute  and  uni- 
versal end  of  all  Being. 

§  62.  Now  modern  science  is  rapidly  reaching, 
nay,  has  almost  reached,  this  sublime  conception 
of  the  universe  as  a  living  and  growing  organism. 
Organisms  themselves  are  of  countless  grades  of 
perfection.  In  one  sense,  every  organism  is  perfect 
which  is  perfectly  adapted  to  itself  and  its  environ- 
ment ;  yet  organisms  so  adapted,  if  considered  rela- 
tively to  each  other,  are  more  or  less  perfect  as  they 
embrace  mere  or  less  of  the  environment  in  those 
external  relations  of  their  own  life  which  constitute, 
as  it  were,  the  actual  extension  of  this  life.  Hence 
an  organism  is  higher  or  more  perfect,  the  more  it 
projects  itself  into  the  outer  world,  and  learns  to 
subordinate  outer  forces  to  its  own  uses ;  or,  in  other 
words,  in  proportion  to  the  strength  of  its  creative 
understanding  and  the  consequent  effectiveness  of 
its  machines,  —  that  is,  its  relational  systems  of  all 
kinds,  created  as  means  for  the  enlargement  and 
enrichment,  the  "  full-filling,"  of  its  own  existence. 
This  is  "  judging  the  tree  by  its  fruit,"  it  is  true,  but 


164  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

the  test  is  sound.  Man  has  no  better  title  to  his 
primacy  among  animals  than  the  potency  and  vast- 
ness  of  the  combinations  (relational  systems)  by 
which  he  has  mastered  natural  forces,  and  practi- 
cally annexed  to  his  own  being  so  immense  a  part 
of  the  planet  he  inhabits. 

Now  the  universe  has  no  environment  to  master 
or  annex.  If,  then,  it  is  to  be  conceived  as  an 
organism,  it  must  be  conceived  as  an  organism  all 
of  whose  life  and  growth  are  strictly  immanent,  and 
different  in  important  respects  from  the  finite  and 
merely  individual  organism  to  which  the  name  is 
usually  confined.  The  finite  organism  not  only 
lives,  but  also  dies  ;  it  lives  by  drawing  into  itself, 
and  subordinating  to  its  own  uses,  that  which  is  not 
itself,  and  it  dies  at  last  by  its  inability  to  convert, 
absolutely  and  permanently,  this  not-itself  into  itself. 
But  the  infinite  organism  lives,  and  dies  not ;  it  lives 
by  eternally  converting  itself  as  force  into  itself  as 
form,  and  it  dies  not,  because  it  has  no  need  to  con- 
vert the  not-itself  into  itself  —  because  its  eternal 
self-conservation  is  its  eternal  self-creation.^     Again, 

1  "  En  effet,  c'est  une  chose  bien  claire  et  bien  evidente  a  tous 
ceux  qui  considereront  avec  attention  la  nature  de  temps,  qu'une 
substance,  pour  etre  conservee  dans  tous  les  moments  qu'elle  dure> 
a  besoin  du  meme  pouvoir  et  de  la  meme  action  qui  seroit  neces- 
saire  pour  la  produire  et  la  creer  tout  de  nouveau,  si  elle  n'e'toit 
point  encore  ;  en  sorte  que  c'est  une  chose  que  la  luniiere  naturelle 
nous  fait  voir  clairement,  que  la  conservation  et  la  creation  ne  dif- 
ferent qu'au  regard  de  notre  fa9on  de  penser,  et  non  point  en 
effet."  (Descartes,  (Euvres,  I.  286.)  "  Mais  il  est  certain,  et  c'est 
une  opinion  communement  re9ue  entre  les  theologiens,  que  Taction 
par  laquelle  maintenant  il  le  conserve,  est  toute  la  meme  que  ceUe 
par  laquelle  il  I'a  cre'e."     (Ibid.,  I.  172,  173.) 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  165 

the  finite  organism  reproduces  itself  only  by  pro- 
ducing another  which  is  not  itself,  yet  Hke  itself; 
the  form  or  relational  system  abides,  but  is  subject 
to  modification,  because  the  matter  changes  under 
the  influence  of  kindred  matter  in  the  environment. 
But  the  infinite  organism  reproduces  itself  at  every 
instant,  and  does  not  produce  another ;  its  form  and 
its  matter  are  alike  eternal.  Again,  the  finite  organ- 
ism is  evolved  out  of  the  environment  and  dissolved 
back  mto  the  environment.  But  the  eternal  evolu- 
tion and  dissolution  which  constitute  the  life  of  the 
infinite  organism  are  absolutely  immanent  within 
itself,  and  do  not  affect  its  eternal  self -identity. 
These  difl'erences  are  important,  and  should  not  be 
overlooked ;  they  do  not,  however,  touch  the  essen- 
tial concept  of  the  organism  as  that  which  lives  and 
grows,  and  leave  it  compatible  with  finitude  and 
infinitude  alike. 

§  63.  This  conception,  then,  of  the  System  of 
Nature  as  an  Infinite  Organism  is  the  highest  con- 
ception which  man  has  yet  formed  of  the  immanent 
relational  constitution  of  the  universe  per  se  —  his 
nearest  actual  reproduction  in  thought  of  the  infi- 
nitely intelligible  and  absolutely  perfect  system  of 
universal  Being ;  and  it  is  precisely  the  conception 
which  modern  science  is  to-day  working  out  in  that 
marvellous  discovery  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the 
Fact  of  Evolution.  It  is  true  that  the  law  of  evolu- 
tion is  not  yet  successfully  formulated,  and  that  the 
conception  of  it  has  been  thus  far  only  imperfectly 


166  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

developed;  neither  the  formula  nor  the  conception 
has  thus  far  been  philosophically  matured  in  the 
systems  of  those  who  have  attempted  to  philosophize 
it.  In  reality,  the  greatest  battle  of  modern  thought 
turns  on  the  further  and  profounder  determination 
of  the  concept  of  Evolution,  and  this  turns  on  the 
determination  of  the  concept  of  the  immanent  rela- 
tional constitution  of  the  universe  joer  se.  On  this 
great  question,  phenomenism  has  absolutely  nothing 
to  say ;  the  answer  to  it  lies  only  in  the  scientific 
method,  its  logical  presuppositions,  and  the  theory 
of  noumenism  which  is  the  logical  development  of 
these  presuppositions  into  a  determinate  philosophy 
of  science.  It  is  my  deep  conviction  that  the  final 
issue  of  the  battle  will  be  the  permanent  and  uni- 
versally recognized  establishment  of  the  conception 
of  the  System  of  Nature  as  an  Infinite  Organism. 
Science  has  not  yet  reached  the  fulness  of  this  con- 
ception, but  it  lies  implicit  in  the  scientific  method 
as  the  flower  lies  implicit  in  the  bud,  and,  whenever 
it  shall  have  become  explicit,  science  will  liave  be- 
come philosophy  itself. 

§  64.  Now  this  organic  conception  of  Nature 
clearly  reveals  the  crudity  and  falsity  of  the  idea, 
often  broached,  that  "God  comes  to  consciousness 
in  Man."i     it  is  perfectly  true  that  the  system  of 

1  Cf.  Hegel,  Werke,  XIII.  48:  "Es  sind  viele  Wenduugen 
nothig,  ehe  der  Geist  zum  Bewusstseyn  seiner  kommend  sich 
befreit.  Nach  dieser  allein  wurdigen  Ansicht  von  der  Geschichte 
der  Philosophie  ist  der  Tempel  der  selbstbewussten  Vernunft  zu 
betrachten."    On  this  and  similar  passages  Von  Hartmann  well 


THE   RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  167 

Nature,  self-evolved  as  the  objectified  divine  tliouglit, 
has  risen  with  incalculable  slowness  from  the  un- 
conscious to  the  conscious;  but  the  whole  process 
remains  utterly  unintelligible,  nay,  an  absurdity  or 
self-contradiction,  unless  the  evolution  of  the  uni- 
verse as  Divine  Object  is  viewed  as  the  work  of  the 
universe  itself  as  Divine  Suhject,  —  that  is,  as  the 
Infinite  Life  of  God  in  Time  and  S'pace.  No  more 
can  be  evolved  than  is  already  involved:  the  con- 
scious could  not  possibly  originate  in  the  uncon- 
scious. The  notion  of  "God's  coming  to  consciousness 
in  Man,  *  if  it  means  that  no  Infinite  Self-conscious 
Intellect  existed  before  man  appeared,  arises  from 
non-perception  of  the  great  principles  already  ex- 
plained :  namely,  that  an  infinitely  intelligible  sys- 
tem, as  a  strictly  intellectual  effect,  can  have  no 
origin  but  an  infinite  creative  understanding,  as  its 
strictly  intellectual  cause,  —  and  that,  if  infinite 
intelligibility  and  infinite  intelligence  co-exist  as 
eternal  attributes  in  one  sole  and  self-caused  exist- 
ence, as  they  must  in  the  universe  of  Being,  then 
that  universe  must  be  an  infinite  subject-object,  or 
Infinite  Self-consciousness.  Intellect  itself  is  the 
only  known,  knowable,  or  imaginable  cause  of  intelli- 
gible system ;  and  Nature,  the  universal  system  of 

says,  Philosopkie  des  Unhewussten,  I.  23,  ed.  1882:  "  Der  Hegel'sche 
Gott  als  Ausgangspunct  ist  erst  '  an  sich '  und  unbewusst,  nur 
Gott  als  Resultat  ist  '  fiir  sich '  und  bewusst,  ist  Geist.  .  .  .  Die 
Theorie  des  Unbewussten  ist  die  nothwendige,  wenn  auch  bisher 
meist  nur  stillschweigende  Vormissptznn'j  jodos  ohjectiven  odor  abso- 
luten  Idealismus,  der  nicht  unzweideutiger  Theismus  ist." 


168  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

objective  relations,  is  just  as  necessarily  the  product 
of  infinite  mind,  as  philosophy,  the  universal  system 
of  subjective  relations,  is  necessarily  the  product  of 
finite  mind.  Hence  it  is  shallow  and  poverty-struck 
thinking  which  conceives  that  God  is  originally  not 
infinite  self-consciousness,  but  merely  comes  to  a 
finite  consciousness  in  man ;  and  which  thus  fails 
to  see  that  the  evolution  of  the  universe-object,  as 
intelligible  system,  is  explicable  only  by  the  universe- 
subject,  as  intelligent  origin  of  that  system  or  infinite 
creative  understanding. 

§  65.  The  organic  conception  of  Nature  reveals 
with  equal  clearness  the  crudity  and  falsity  of  the 
idea,  also  often  broached,  that  "  God  exists  outside  of 
Space  and  Time."  Space  and  Time  are  not  known 
at  all  except  as  the  universal  conditions  of  all  exist- 
ence, —  as  absolute  forms  of  all  Thought  because, 
and  only  because,  they  are  absolute  ground -forms 
of  all  Being.  Kant's  theory  of  the  exclusive  sub- 
jectivity of  Space  and  Time,  as  pure  d,  priori  forms 
of  sensuous  intuition,  is  utterly  untenable  and  self- 
destructive.^  The  noumenism  of  the  scientific  method 
establishes  their  necessary  objectivity,  as  condiciones 
sine  quibus  non  of  noumena  themselves.  The  uni- 
verse as  divine  object,  and  therefore  the  universe 
as  divine  subject,  are  thus  absolutely  conditioned 
on  Space  and  Time,  which,  far  from  being  positive 
determinations  or  limitations  of  Being,  are  only  the 

1  See  my  article  on  "  The  Philosophy  of  Space  and  Time,"  in 
the  North  American  Review  for  July,  1864. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  169 

blank  forms  of  its  possibility.  The  attempt,  there- 
fore, to  deduce  Space  and  Time  from  God  is  the 
destruction  of  all  intelligibility  in  the  philosophy 
which  attempts  it.  In  fact,  the  statement  that 
"  God  exists  outside  of  Space  and  Time  "  is  a  double- 
barrelled  contradiction  in  terms;  for  the  "exists," 
a  verb  of  present  tense,  presupposes  the  very  Time 
which  the  "outside  of  Time"  denies,  while  the 
"  exists  outside "  presupposes  the  very  Space  which 
the  "outside  of  Space"  denies.  All  existence  as 
necessarily  presupposes  Time  as  all  matter  neces- 
sarily presupposes  Space;  and  the  statement  (if  it 
had  any  conceivable  meaning)  would  affirm  at  the 
same  time  absolute  atheism  and  absolute  acosmism, 
for,  since  God  and  the  universe  are  one,  it  would 
deny  all  real  existence  to  both  in  denying  it  of  either. 
Not  even  the  phenomenist,  however,  pretends  that 
the  universe  as  such  "exists  outside  of  Space  and 
Time ; "  if  he  subjectifies  Space  and  Time,  he  no 
less  subjectifies  the  universe,  and  himself  conceives 
the  former  as  conditioning  the  latter  in  representa- 
tion or  thought.  To  claim,  then,  that  "  God  exists 
outside  of  Space  and  Time"  is,  on  any  hypothesis, 
at  least  to  banish  God  from  the  universe  altogether, 
and  condemn  man  to  be,  in  the  most  literal  sense, 
"  without  God  in  the  world."  But  it  is  a  waste  of 
criticism  to  expend  it  on  a  conception  so  dismally 
chaotic. 

§  66.  The   fact  of   evolution,  independent  of   all 
theory  about  it,  is  to-day  established  beyond  reason- 


170  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

able  doubt  as  a  permanent  result  of  modern  science. 
The  conception  of  evolution  is  at  least  as  old  as 
Aristotle,  who,  in  equal  opposition  to  the  eternal 
•'flux"  of  Herakleitos  and  the  eternal  ''rest"  of  the 
Eleatics,  taught  that  transition  from  that  which  is 
not  yet  to  that  which  is,  or  development,  was  the 
only  reality.  Prior  to  the  spotless  and  immortal 
Darwin,  however,  whose  epoch-making  book  was 
the  foundation  of  modern  scientific  evolutionism, 
the  most  influential  form  of  the  development  theory 
was  that  of  Idealistic  Evolution,  —  the  evolution 
of  the  universe  as  a  phenomenal  representation,  not 
as  a  noumenal  fact. 

The  trouble  with  Idealism  is,  and  always  has 
been,  that  it  never  dares  to  be  strictly  logical  — 
never  dares  to  march  straight,  from  its  premise  in 
the  Cartesian  "  Je  pense,  done  je  suis"  to  its  only 
logical  conclusion  in  solipsism.  Even  Schopenhauer, 
who  starts  off  so  boldly  in  his  "The  world  is  my 
representation,"  1  shows  his  timid  inconsistency  in 
the  very  same  sentence,  admits  the  existence  of 
other  thinkers,  infers  a  world  from  which  escape 
is  the  one  thing  needful,  and  thus  lands  us  in  an 
intellectual  pessimistic  quagmire  to  which  his  halt- 
ing Idealism  has  been  the  guiding  will-o'-the-wisp. 
A  valiantly  logical  Idealism  might,  perhaps,  be  ir- 
refutable,  but   it   would   certainly   be   absurd;    for 

1  " '  Die  Welt  ist  meine  Vorstellung  '  —  ist,  gleich  den  Axiomen 
Euklids,  ein  Satz,  den  Jeder  als  wahr  erkennen  muss,  sobald  er 
ihn  versteht ;  wenn  gleich  nicht  ein  solcher,  den  Jeder  versteht, 
sobald  er  ihn  hurt."     (  Werke,  III.  4.) 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  171 

a  dialogue  between  two  solipsists,  each  conceiving 
the  other  to  be  merely  a  "  thing  in  his  own  dream," 
would  be  the  very  climax  of  the  comical.  Idealism 
ought  to  be  a  monologue;  it  has  no  rational  right 
to  be  a  dialogue  at  all,  unless  after  the  fashion  of 
Dr.  Johnson,  who,  coming  to  breakfast  one  morning 
in  an  ill-humor  because  he  had  dreamed  overnight 
that  he  was  beaten  in  argument,  could  not  be  con- 
soled until  he  remembered  that  he  had  been  both 
his  antagonist  and  himself  in  one,  and  had  therefore 
only  beaten  himself  after  all.  Let  us  imagine  our- 
selves as  overhearing  what  we  will  style  the  — 

§  67.  Soliloq_uy  of  the  "  Consistent  Idealist." 

"I  think,  therefore  I  am.  I  cannot  doubt  this 
original  and  necessary  starting-point  in  my  philoso- 
phizing ;  for,  if  I  doubt,  I  think,  and,  if  I  think, 
I  am.  By  doubt  itself  I  am  brought  back  to  this 
very  starting-point,  since  from  it  my  doubt  itself 
must  start.  My  philosophy  must  evidently  begin 
with  this  immediate  knowledge  of  myself  as  think- 
ing and  existing,  knowing  and  being,  in  one  indivisi- 
ble reality ;  my  first  fact  must  be  that  of  my  own 
consciousness  as  immediately  manifesting  itself  to 
itself  in  a  real  identity  of  knowing  and  being.  I 
can  in  no  way  account  for  this  first  fact,  any  more 
than  I  can  doubt  it;  it  is  only  a  given  fact,  for 
which  no  reason  is  assignable ;  it  is  a  fact  which  is 
indubitable  simply  because  it  is  immediately  self- 
evident;  any  reasoning  I  could   devise   would   beg 


172  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

the  question,  since  it  would  presuppose  the  very 
fact  it  was  seeking  to  explain ;  I  cannot  prove  that  I 
exist  reasoning  —  I  can  only  reason.  Consequently, 
I  can  get  neither  behind  nor  below  this  first  fact 
as  my  rational  foundation  in  philosophizing. 

"  But  is  this  '  I  think,  therefore  I  am,'  the  whole 
of  my  first  fact?  Perhaps  I  have  left  something 
out  which  is  really  part  of  it.  If  so,  my  philosophy 
will  be  all  wrong.  Let  me  scrutinize  this  first  fact 
more  keenly. 

"It  is  self-evident  that  I  cannot  think  without 
thinking  somethmg.  My  thinking  is  an  activity, 
and  must  act  on  an  object.  What  is  this  something, 
this  necessary  object  of  my  thinking  ?  Whenever  I 
think,  I  discover  that  I  always  think  a  world,  now 
in  part  and  now  in  whole ;  '  I  think  a  world,'  then, 
is  the  general  formula  of  all  my  thinking.  It  is  not 
enough  to  say, '  I  think,  therefore  I  am ; '  I  must  say, 
'  I  think  a  world,  therefore  I  am.'  But  why  must 
I  not  say,  '  I  think  a  world,  therefore  I  am  and  the 
world  is '  ?  It  seems  as  if  I  must,  smce  both  I  and 
the  world  are  in  my  consciousness. 

"But  no.  I  do  not  find  that  I  am  conscious  of 
any  world ;  I  am  only  conscious  of  myself  thinking 
the  world ;  as  distinct  from  myself,  the  world  is  not 
in  my  consciousness,  after  all.  My  thought  of  the 
world  is  only  my  own  thought,  —  only  my  own 
representation;  I  do  not  find  in  it  anything  but 
itself,  anything  but  thought,  anything  but  repre- 
sentation; I  do   not   find   that  I  know  any  object 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  173 

of  my  thought  as  distinct  from  my  thought  itself. 
It  is  evidently  nothing  but  my  mere  representation. 
Indeed,  I  do  not  know  why  I  should  call  it  a  '  repre- 
sentation '  at  all ;  it  is  certainly  not  a  representation 
of  any  reality  outside  of  myself  that  I  can  imme- 
diately know.  In  the  pure  content  of  my  thought, 
nothing  is  presented,  and  therefore  nothing  can  be 
represented,  except  myself  alone.  If  it  is  a  repre- 
sentation at  all,  then,  it  must  be  a  representation 
of  myself  —  though  I  do  not  recognize  the  likeness ! 
The  world,  which  seems  to  be  represented  as  an 
object  distinct  from  myself,  can  be  in  reahty  nothing 
other  than  myself,  after  all.  Very  well,  then  ;  when 
I  say  'representation,'  I  will  keep  it  clearly  in  my 
mind  that  this  expression  must  mean,  in  all  possible 
cases,  nothing  whatever  except  a  'representation  of 
myself — never  a  representation  of  anything  other 
than  myself.  My  thought  always  gives  the  Me, 
never  the  Other. 

"But  somehow,  notwithstanding  my  irrefutable 
reasoning,  I  find  myself  in  difficulty.  This  repre- 
sentation of  the  world  I  have  just  been  demonstrat- 
ing to  be  only  a  representation  of  myself.  But,  for 
all  that,  it  quite  obstinately  refuses  to  put  on  the 
appearance  of  a  representation  of  myself  as  I  other- 
wise know  myself.  It  quite  obstinately  refuses  to 
give  me  either  a  front-view,  or  a  side-view,  or  a  back- 
view,  or  an  over-view,  or  an  under-view,  of  myself ; 
it  most  obstinately  persists  in  giving  me  a  view  of 
myself  which  I  cannot  get   otherwise  at  all, — in 


174  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

giving  me  a  view  which,  but  for  my  good  reasoning, 
I  should  certainly  believe  to  be  the  likeness  of  an 
Other.  Well,  then,  if  I  cannot  really  knovj  it  as  an 
Other,  may  I  not  at  least  infer  it  as  an  Other,  and 
thus  get  out  of  my  awkward  difficulty  ?  May  I  not 
thus,  without  committing  suicide  as  a  reasoner,  logi- 
cally attribute  to  it  a  semi-known,  but  real,  existence 
external  to  myself  ?  May  I  not  infer  that  this  ex- 
ternal existence  in  some  inscrutable  way  affects  my 
own  existence,  determines  my  representations,  and 
makes  me  think  as  I  do  ?  What  a  relief  that  would 
be!  What  an  easy  way  out  of  my  difficulty,  and 
what  an  easy  explanation  of  this  puzzling  and  very 
annoying  obstinacy  in  my  representation  of  the 
world ! 

"  Let  me  be  cautious,  however,  and  not  destroy 
the  foundation  of  my  whole  philosophy.  This  '  in- 
ference'  of  mine  is,  after  all,  only  another  of  my 
representations;  and  so,  of  course,  is  the  thing  in- 
ferred. I  am  not  conscious  of  the  thing  inferred ; 
I  am  only  conscious  of  myself  as  inferring  it.  My 
thought  of  the  thing  inferred  is  nothing  whatever 
but  merely  my  own  thought ;  it  contains  nothing 
but  my  own  thought ;  it  does  not  contain  the  thing 
inferred;  it  is  nothing  but  myself  once  more.  In 
short,  the  inference  refuses  to  infer!  It  is  just  as 
obstinate  as  the  representation  of  the  world.  The 
representation  refuses  to  represent,  and  the  inference 
refuses  to  infer.  Neither  of  them  has  the  least  pity 
on  my  perplexity.    If  I  could  say  now  that  the  thing 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  175 

i7if erred  is  an  Other,  I  could  just  as  well  have  said 
at  the  outset  that  the  world  represented  is  an  Other. 
Either  would  be  the  complete  sky-high  explosion  of 
my  philosophy.  I  must  stick  to  my  principle  and 
deny  that  Other,  whatever  siren  song  it  may  sing. 
My  whole  philosophy  is  at  stake,  and  it  calls  upon 
me  to  be  heroically  logical  at  this  critical  point. 

"  So  be  it,  then  !  Whatever  I  think,  or  represent,  or 
infer,  or  imagine,  or  believe,  contains  Me,  and  no  Other, 
as  hoth  svljjcct  and  object :  that  is  Idealism,  and 
anything  else  is  nothing  but  its  phantom  and  its 
sham.  The  philosophy  which  admits  into  my  thought 
any  Other  whatever  is  essentially  Eealism,  and  not 
Idealism.  As  an  Idealist,  1  must  confess  that  what- 
ever I  infer  is  myself  in  disguise.  I  cannot  break 
out  of  the  closed  magic  circle  of  my  own  mere 
thinking.  My  representations  of  the  world,  of  the 
inference,  of  the  thing  inferred,  are  only  representa- 
tions of  Myself.  I  must,  then,  be  something  more 
than  I  imagined!  My  consciousness  cannot  be  the 
whole  of  me ;  there  must  be  in  me  an  unconscious- 
ness too,  out  of  which  these  obstinate  representations 
of  the  Other  are  involuntarily  produced.  I  do  not 
voluntarily  or  consciously  produce  them,  yet  they 
obstinately  persist  in  appearing.  Very  well:  they 
must  emerge  out  of  some  unsuspected  depth  of  my 
own  being,  in  obedience  to  some  force  or  law  of  my 
own  being  which  I  do  not  consciously  comprehend. 
It  is  clear  that  I  am  immensely  greater  and  grander 
than  I  at  first  suspected  or  imagined ! 


176  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

"  But  some  of  my  representations  wear  the  guise 
of  intelligent  beings  like  myself;  they  seem  to  talk 
with  me,  deal  with  me,  act  upon  me.  "Whatever 
they  do  or  say,  however,  is  nothing  but  my  repre- 
sentation ;  and  my  representation,  if  I  am  an  Idealist 
at  all,  can  be  nothing  but  myself.  The  conclusion 
is  irresistible ;  these  other  intelligent  beings  I  call 
mankind  exist  only  in  my  thought ;  they  are  unreal 
except  as  I  give  them  reality ;  they  exist  in  my  per- 
ception, and  are  annihilated  in  my  non-perception ; 
they  have  absolutely  no  being  but  in  my  representa- 
tion ;  their  esse  is  percipi.  I  am  their  sole  Creator, 
as  I  am  the  sole  Creator  of  the  world  itself. 

"  I  am  equally  their  Destroyer.  I  represent  them 
as  dying,  and  therefore  I  am  the  Creator  of  Death. 
But  I  cannot  represent  myself  as  dead ;  that  would 
be  the  representation  of  something  which  is  not  Me, 
but  an  Other;  I  cannot  create  that;  therefore,  I  can- 
not die.  Death  to  me  would  be  the  non-representa- 
tion of  myself;  all  my  representations  are  of  myself; 
I  cannot  represent  my  own  death  or  non-being ;  I 
can  only  represent  myself  as  living,  and  not  dead ; 
and  all  that  I  cannot  represent  is  to  me  absolute 
nothing.  Therefore,  all  the  representations  I  call 
men  die  when  I  cease  to  represent  them ;  but  I  shall 
never  die,  because  I  cannot  cease  to  represent  my- 
self.    I  am  the  Eternal. 

"Infinite  Space  and  Time  are  no  less  my  repre- 
sentations, and  therefore  I  create  them.  Infinite 
Being  itself  is  my  representation,  and  I  creat^^  that 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  Ill 

too.  As  a  unity  of  conscious  and  unconscious  powers, 
I  create  the  world,  mankind,  Space,  Time,  God  him- 
self; for  all  these  are  nothing  but  my  representa- 
tions, and  all  my  representations  are  nothing  but 
myself.  I  am  all  that  I  create.  Hence  I  myself  am 
the  All :  I  am  the  Infinite,  I  am  the  Absolute,  I  am 
the  Eternal,  I  am  the  only  true  God ! 

"Having  arrived  at  this  satisfactory  and  only 
logical  conclusion  from  my  Idealistic  principle,  and 
having  triumphantly  and  successfully  swallowed  the 
universe,  I  will  now  take  a  nap." 

§  68.  Such  would  be  the  soliloquy  of  a  "consistent 
Idealist,"  and  it  is  modestly  suggested  as  an  object- 
lesson  in  logic  to  inconsistent  Idealists.  But,  alas, 
the  "consistent  Idealist"  is  himself  an  absolutely 
ideal  being :  he  is  nothing  but  "  my  representation," 
and  I  have  never  met  him  either  in  real  literature 
or  in  real  Hfe.  The  real  Idealist  I  meet  is  always 
inconsistent — always  dilutes  his  Idealism  with  a 
dash  of  Eealism ;  he  boldly  apphes  it  to  the  world 
of  matter,  but  never  dares  to  apply  it  unflinchingly 
to  his  fellow-men  in  general,  or  to  his  interlocutor 
in  particular;  he  boldly  applies  it  to  Space  and 
Time,  but  seldom  or  never  to  God.  Now,  as  has 
been  said  above  (§  66),  "  a  valiantly  logical  Idealism 
might,  perhaps,  be  irrefutable,  but  it  would  certainly 
be  absurd;"  and  few  would  deny  that  the  above 
soliloquy  ends  in  absurdity.  But  any  philosophy 
becomes  absurd  and  unworthy  of  intellectual  respect, 
when  it  wilfully  shirks  the  logic  of  its  fundamental 

12 


178  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

principles  and  makes  arbitrary  exceptions  to  them ; 
and  real  Idealism,  in  a  different  way,  is  just  as 
absurd  as  solipsism.  The  only  "consistent  Idealist" 
is  the  solipsist  himself ;  there  is  no  other ;  and  our 
overheard  soliloquy  shows  what,  if  he  could  be 
found,  he  would  say.  But  the  solipsist  himself,  if 
he  ventured  to  say  it  to  "an  Other"  than  himself, 
would  thereby  concede  that  "  Other's "  existence, 
and  therefore  forfeit  the  laurels  due  to  his  courage 
and  consistency  so  long  as  he  only  soliloquized.  In 
the  determined  silence  of  the  solipsist  lies  the  only 
irrefutability  of  Idealism.  Eeal  Idealism  is  already 
refuted,  if  the  detection  of  self-contradiction  is  refu- 
tation ;  but  who  can  refute  a  man  who  refuses  all 
dialogue  ? 

§  69.  The  whole  plausibiHty  of  Idealism  lies  in 
its  assumption  of  its  unscientific  "first  fact:"  the 
Idealist  begins  with  his  individual  consciousness 
alone  as  the  only  certain  or  indubitable  datum, 
while  science  begins  with  universal  human  con- 
sciousness and  the  universe  it  has  discovered.  Des- 
cartes, who  unwittingly  launched  modern  philosophy 
upon  its  Idealistic  voyage  by  his  "  I  think,  therefore 
I  am,"  was  himself  a  Conceptuahst,  a  product  of  the 
Extreme  Nominalism  which  was  championed  by  Eos- 
cellinus  and  his  companions  hundreds  of  years  be- 
fore ;  ^  and  Kant  and  his  successors,  men  of  mighty 

1  "  De  meme,  le  nombre  que  nous  considerons  en  gene'ral,  sans 
faire  reflexion  sur  aucune  chose  creee,  n'est  point  hors  de  notre 
pensee,  non  plus  que  toutes  ces  autres  ide'es  ge'ne'rales  que  dans 
i'e'cole  on  comprend  sous  le  nom  d'universaux."    (Descartes,  (Euvres, 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE,  179 

genius,  could  but  follow  the  general  direction  thus 
imparted  to  all  modern  philosophic  thought.  Hegel, 
the  greatest  of  the  post-Kantian  Ideahsts,  says: 
"Thought,  by  its  own  free  act,  seizes  a  standpoint 
where  it  exists  for  itself,  and  generates  its  own 
object;  "1  and  again:  "This  ideality  of  the  finite  is 
the  chief  maxim  of  philosophy  ;  and  for  that  reason 
every  true  philosophy  is  Idealism."  ^  This  is  the 
absolute  sacrifice  of  the  objective  factor  in  human 
experience.  Hegel  sublimely  disregards  the  distinc- 
tion between  Finite  Thought  and  Infinite  Thought: 
the  latter,  indeed,  creates,  while  the  former  finds,  ite 
object.  And,  since  human  philosophy  is  only  finite, 
it  follows  that  no  true  philosophy  is  Idealism,  except 
the  Infinite  Philosophy  or  Self-thinking  of  God. 

But  all  modern  scientific  thought  has,  in  spite 
of  Bacon's  seeming  hostility  to  Aristotle's  influence, 
substantially  held  the  Aristotelian  ground.  Cutting, 
like  Alexander,  the  Gordian  knot,  it  has,  like  Alex- 
ander, conquered  a  world:  it  construes  experience 
as  inclusive  of  object  and  subject  both,  and  refuses 
to  construe  it,  as  Idealism  does,  as  inclusive  of  the 
subject  alone.     Here  is  the  exact  point  of  divergence 

III.  99,  ed.  Cousin.)  "On  compte  ordinairement  cinq  universaux, 
a  savoir,  le  genre,  I'espece,  la  difference,  le  propre,  et  Taccident." 
(Ibid.,  III.  101.)  This  principle  of  Conceptualism  denies  by  neces- 
sary implication  the  objectivity  of  relations,  and  therefore  of  all  the 
objective  relational  systems  discovered  by  the  scientific  method.  Logic 
and  history  alike  show  that  every  possible  philosophy  is  built  either 
on  the  sul)jectivity  or  the  objectivity  of  relations,  and  the  world 
will  yet  find  out  this  fact. 

1    Werke,  VI.  25.  2   Werke,  VI.  189. 


180  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

between  the  Idealistic  and  Scientific  Hypotheses,  for 
hypotheses  they  equally  are ;  the  truth  of  perception 
cannot  be  logically  proved.  But  if  the  wonderful 
increase  of  human  knowledge  by  the  use  of  the 
scientific  method  be  not  verification  of  the  original 
scientific  hypothesis,  then  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
verification,  and  all  human  knowledge  is  a  melan- 
choly lie. 

§  70.  To-day,  then,  if  science  can  establish  any- 
thing, it  has  established  the  principle  of  Eealistic 
Evolution,  to  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  Idealistic  Evolution;  and  scientific  realism 
treats  the  evolution  of  the  universe,  not  as  a  merely 
phenomenal  fact,  but  as  a  fact  which  is  at  once  both 
phenomenal  and  noumenal.  Let  us  take  up  once 
more  the  thread  of  our  argument  at  this  point,  and 
go  on  to  determine  the  conception  of  Universal 
Eealistic  Evolution  in  a  way  that  shall  satisfy  the 
demands  of  science  and  philosophy  alike. 

Two  possible  views  of  Universal  Eealistic  Evolu- 
tion, to  which  all  others  are  logically  reducible, 
present  themselves  for  consideration:  namely,  the 
Mechanical  and  the  Organic.  The  triumph  of  the 
profounder  view  at  last  will  be  the  determination 
of  the  concept  of  the  immanent  relational  constitu- 
tion of  the  universe  per  se  as  either  a  Machine  or  an 
Organism.  The  one  theory  conceives  the  universe 
as  a  machine,  and  seeks  to  explain  it  on  simply 
mechanical  principles ;  the  other  theory  conceives 
the  universe  as  an  organism,  and  seeks  to  explain 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  181 

it  on  organic  principles.  The  eternal  warfare  of 
ideas  by  which  all  intellectual  progress  is  effected 
centres  to-day  in  the  struggle  between  these  two 
opposing  theories  or  tendencies.  What  has  nou- 
menism,  the  genuine  philosophy  of  science,  to  say 
respecting  them  ? 

§  71.  First  of  all,  this :  that,  just  as  noumenism 
itself  affirms  all  that  phenomenism  affirms  (the 
reality  of  phenomena),  and  affirms  also  what  phe- 
nomenism denies  (the  reality  of  noumena),  so  the 
organic  theory  of  evolution  affirms  all  that  the  me- 
chanical theory  affirms  (the  facts  and  principles  of 
mechanism),  and  affirms  also  what  the  mechanical 
theory  denies  (the  facts  and  principles  of  teleology 
and  the  absolute  failure  of  mechanism  to  explain  the 
universe  without  them).  In  other  words,  the  me- 
chanical theory  covers  only  a  part  of  the  facts,  while 
the  organic  theory  covers  them  all. 

§  72.  Both  theories  accept  the  fact  of  an  objective 
and  intelligible  relational  constitution  of  Nature, 
totally  independent  of  human  representation  for  its 
existence;  both,  therefore,  so  far  as  they  are  self- 
consistent  and  worthy  of  philosophical  recognition, 
accept  without  question  the  principles  of  noumenism, 
and  are  equally  bound  to  accept  their  logical  results. 
Both,  furthermore,  accept  the  fact  that  this  objective 
relational  constitution  of  Nature  is  a  veritable  sys- 
tem, in  which  all  the  parts  are  so  closely  correlated 
as  to  constitute  a  rational  whole.  But  here  their 
divergence  begins.      The  mechanical  theory  denies 


182  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

that  the  system  of  Nature  is  a  perfect  system,  and 
heaps  up  proofs  of  its  imperfection  in  the  existence 
of  evil ;  the  organic  theory  affirms  that  the  system 
of  Nature  is  perfect  within  the  limits  of  possibility, 
and  claims  that  the  existence  of  evil  results  from  the 
absolute  conditions  and  logical  necessities  of  finite 
existence  as  such  — does  not,  therefore,  prove  any 
avoidable  or  real  imperfection  in  the  system  of  Na- 
ture. Furthermore,  the  mechanical  theory  takes,  as 
type  of  the  actual  system  of  Nature,  the  machine ; 
while  the  organic  theory  takes  the  organism.  It  is 
evident  enough  that  the  mechanical  theory  conceives 
the  real  and  rational  unity  of  Nature  in  a  far  lower 
and  cruder  form  than  the  organic  theory;  for  the 
organism  is  a  machine  plus  a  great  deal  more,  and 
yields  a  concept  of  far  higher  closeness,  complexity, 
and  comprehensiveness  of  internal  relationship,  and 
therefore  of  far  superior  richness  of  content. 

§  73.  No  little  light  is  thrown  upon  the  nature 
and  relative  value  of  these  two  theories,  viewed  as 
mere  hypotheses,  by  a  critical  analysis  of  the  two 
fundamental  concepts  on  which  they  are  based,  and 
to  which,  despite  all  special  pleading,  they  must  be 
ultimately  reduced.  The  fact  that  no  machine  either 
lives  or  grows,  while  emry  organism  both  lives  and 
grows,  shows  at  once  the  formidably  embarrassing, 
nay,  the  overwhelmingly  crushing,  difficulty  under 
which  the  mechanical  theory  labors,  in  trying  to 
work  out  an  intelligible  and  complete  concept  of 
evolution  as  the  life  and  growth  of  the  universe ;  for 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  183 

the  very  concept  of  evolution  as  life  and  growth  is 
essentially  organic,  has  been  derived  only  from  the 
organism,  and  is,  in  truth,  utterly  incompatible  with 
that  rigid  exclusion  of  all  but  mechanical  principles 
which  it  is  the  specific  purpose  of  the  mechanical 
theory  to  establish.  All  is  easy  enough,  so  long  as 
this  theory  deals  with  the  purely  physical  or  me- 
chanical facts  of  Nature ;  but,  the  moment  it  ap- 
proaches the  domain  of  biology,  its  difficulties  begin, 
and  soon  grow  so  formidable,  in  the  domain  of 
psychology,  sociology,  and  ethics,  that  the  theory 
itself,  even  m  the  hands  of  really  able  champions, 
obtrusively  and  hopelessly  breaks  down.  The  fact 
is  that  the  extension  of  the  idea  of  evolution  to  the 
inorganic  world,  and  to  the  system  of  Nature  as 
a  whole,  betrays  unmistakably  the  inward  (though 
perhaps  unconscious)  pressure  of  the  organic  idea  in 
the  scientific  mind;  and  hence  nothing  but  intel- 
lectual confusion  has  resulted,  or  possibly  could  re- 
sult, from  the  attempt  to  conceive  evolution  as 
exclusively  mechanical.  No  wonder,  then,  that  it  is 
impossible  to  find  an  ostensibly  mechanical  interpre- 
tation of  Nature  which  does  not,  the  moment  it 
approaches  biology,  yield  to  the  temptation  of  sur- 
reptitiously introducing  organic  elements  into  its 
professedly  mechanical  system,  and  thereby  demon- 
strate its  inability  to  remain  faithful  to  the  facts 
without  surrendering  its  own  fundamental  principle. 
This  result  is  simply  inevitable  from  the  nature  of 
the  case.     It  is  the  fault  of  the  facts,  which  persist 


184  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

in  not  being  purely  mechanical.  The  concept  of 
evolution,  applied  to  the  universe  as  a  whole,  is 
necessarily  the  concept  of  it  as  a  living  and  growing 
whole;  it  must  include  all  facts,  physical  no  less 
than  biological  and  psychical,  under  this  concept 
of  life  and  growth ;  and  the  concept  of  life  and 
growth,  in  which  alone  the  Many  and  the  One  are 
absolutely  reconcilable,  is  essentially  and  necessarily 
that  of  the  organism.  The  search  for  the  One  in 
the  Many  and  the  Many  in  the  One  has  been  from 
antiquity  the  essential  task  of  philosophy;  and  I 
feel  perfectly  safe  in  asserting  that  no  idea  ever  has 
been  or  ever  will  be  found  which  shall  absolutely 
reconcile  the  Many  and  the  One  except  the  idea  of 
the  organism  itself.  Most  certainly  the  idea  of  the 
machine,  no  matter  how  elaborated  or  how  expanded, 
can  never  be  made  by  any  degree  of  ingenuity  or 
acumen  to  cover  those  facts  which  are  of  supreme 
interest  to  philosophy,  and  which  are  just  as  deeply 
inwrought  into  the  warp  and  woof  of  the  universe  as 
the  plainest  facts  of  chemistry,  physics,  or  mechanics. 
When  Alexander  von  Humboldt,  in  his  Kosmos, 
called  the  universe  "a  living  whole,"  he  showed  a 
flash  of  philosophic  insight  in  a  purely  scientific  man 
which  puts  to  shame  the  obtuseness  of  more  than 
one  reputed  philosopher.^     Science  itself,  as  science, 

1  "  Die  Natur  ist  fiir  die  denkende  Betrachtung  Eiuheit  in  Viel- 
heit,  Verbindung  des  Mannigfaltigen  in  Form  und  Mischung,  In- 
begriff  der  Naturdinge  und  Naturkrafte  als  ein  lebendiges  Ganze." 
{Kosmos,  I.  5,  6,  ed.  1845.)  (Compare  Hegel,  Werke,  VII.  38: 
"  Die  Natur  ist  an  sich  ein  lebendiges  Ganzes.") 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  185 

is  now  brought  face  to  face,  by  the  established  fact 
of  universal  evolution,  with  a  question,  also  of  fact, 
which  yet  admits  only  of  a  philosophical  solution : 
namely,  is  this  universe  a  machine  or  an  organism  1 

§  74.  The  old  distinction  of  Nature  as  "  organic 
and  inorganic,"  conceived  as  two  departments  of 
existence  which  can  be  really  and  exactly  demar- 
cated, has  become  utterly  discredited  and  outgrown, 
as  a  distinction  which  is  intrinsically  misleading, 
artificial,  and  false  in  itself.  It  is  no  longer  possible 
to  point  out  where  the  line  is  to  be  run  between 
animal  and  plant,  or  between  living  and  non-living 
matter.  The  old  fence  is  down,  and  no  man  has 
skill  enough  to  rebuild  it.  But  what  follows?  A 
most  momentous  consequence :  namely,  that  the 
universe  is  either  wholly  organic  or  wholly  inorganic. 
Which  shall  it  be?  "Inorganic!"  says  the  me- 
chanical theory.  "  Organic  !  "  says  the  organic  the- 
ory. The  one  would  level  all  things  down  to  the 
grade  of  the  machine;  the  other  would  level  all 
things  up  to  the  grade  of  the  organism.  The  one 
would  explain  the  organism  itself  as  merely  a  more 
complicated  machine ;  the  other  would  explain  the 
machine  itself  as  merely  a  lower  and  less  developed 
form  of  the  organism  —  as  an  artificial  organism 
created  by  the  natural  organism.  The  issue  is  a 
vital  one,  and  it  is  hotly  fought  to-day  all  over  the 
civilized  world,  wherever  thought  is  not  swamped  in 
mere  brute  existence.  There  is  no  possibility,  how- 
ever, of  finally  settling  this  profound  and  vital  issue 


186  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

by  appealing  to  any  discoveries  made  by  the  empiri- 
cal use  of  the  scientific  method ;  nothing  but  the 
settlement  of  what  was  called  at  the  outset  (§  8)  the 
"  previous  question  "  of  phenomenism  and  noumen- 
ism,  —  nothing  but  the  philosophizing  of  the  scien- 
tific method  itself,  —  will  ever  lead  to  a  permanent 
settlement  of  the  question  whether  the  universe 
must  be  viewed  as  wholly  organic  or  wholly  inor- 
ganic. And  on  the  right  settlement  of  this  question 
at  last  depend  all  the  highest  ideal  hopes,  all  the 
highest  moral  interests,  all  the  highest  religious 
aspirations  of  mankind.^ 

§  75.  But  the  close  comparison  or  analysis  of  the 
two  concepts  of  the  machine  and  the  organism  still 
remains  to  be  made. 

If  the  results  of  our  inquiry  into  the  nature  of 
intelligence,  in  the  preceding  chapter,  are  valid, 
every  relational  system  is  a  product  of  the  creative 
understanding,  and  every  product  of  the  creative 
understanding  is  essentially  a  means  or  an  end. 
Now  both  the  machine  and  the  organism  are  re- 
lational systems ;  that  is  agreed.  Both  of  these 
relational  systems  are  teleologically  constituted,  as 
means  or  ends  ;  but  that  is  disputed,  since  the  mod- 
ern mechanical  theory  stoutly  denies  all  teleology, 
even  in  the  structure  of  the  organism.     Analysis, 

1  "  But  this  I  do  say,  and  would  wish  all  men  to  know  and  lay  to 
heart,  that  he  who  discerns  notliing  but  Mechanism  in  the  Uni- 
verse has  in  the  fatalest  way  missed  the  secret  of  the  Uni^-erse 
altogether."  (Carlyle,  On  Heroes,  Hero-  Worship,  and  the  Heroic  in 
History,  p.  160,  New  York,  1872.) 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  187 

however,  shows  that  teleology  is  just  as  deeply 
wrought  into  the  system  of  the  machine  itself  as 
into  that  of  the  organism,  and  is  the  only  possible 
explanation  of  either.  Consequently,  even  if  the 
mechanical  theory  is  correct  in  maintaining  that 
every  organism  is  a  mere  machine,  its  contention  is 
tantamount  to  an  unconscious  confession  that  every 
organism  is  teleologically  constituted,  —  tantamount, 
therefore,  to  an  unconscious,  yet  absolute,  surrender 
of  its  own  fundamental  idea.  This  criticism  is  a 
fatal  one,  but  I  will  waive  it  for  the  present. 

§  76.  The  machine  is  a  system  in  which  the  parts 
are  so  related  that  the  whole,  as  a  cause,  is  adapted 
to  the  accomplishment  of  purely  external  ends,  as  an 
effect ;  and  the  pure  externality  of  these  ends  proves 
an  external  mechanist,  in  whose  mind  the  ends  exist, 
and  by  whose  hand  the  machine  has  been  made 
what  it  is,  in  order  to  accomplish  those  ends.  It 
does  not  effect  those  ends  by  itself,  but  only  as  used 
by  the  mechanist  to  effect  them ;  it  does  not  form 
itself,  repair  itself,  or  reproduce  itself ;  it  exists  only 
by  another,  and  for  another ;  it  is  purely  artificial  — 
the  work  of  art  for  purposes  of  art.  Such  is  every 
machine  certainly  known  by  man  to  be  a  machine, 
from  a  simple  nail  to  a  vast  railroad  system :  the 
only  concept  of  it  drawn  from  human  experience  is 
that  of  a  means  adapted  to  exhrnal  ends.  So  over- 
whelmingly strong  is  the  induction  based  on  this 
experience  that  a  mere  bit  of  flint,  rudely  resembling 
the  head  of  an  axe  or  arrow,  and  dug  out  of  a  deep 


188  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

excavation  together  with  innumerable  other  stones, 
carries  conviction  to  every  civilized  mind  that  this 
crude  machine  is  demonstration  of  the  existence  of 
prehistoric  savages,  by  whom  it  was  fashioned,  as  a 
means,  for  chopping  or  slaying,  as  an  end  external  to 
itself.  The  machine,  however,  is  itself  an  organism 
of  lower  grade,  —  an  artificial  extension,  as  it  were, 
of  the  living  organism;  as,  for  instance,  the  car- 
penter's tool  is  an  extension  of  the  human  hand, 
creatively  conceived  by  the  human  mind  and  crea- 
tively wrought  by  the  human  hand  itself.  But  the 
tool  does  not  explain  itself,  much  less  the  hand; 
while  the  hand  and  the  mind  do  explain  the  tool. 
In  short,  the  machine  is  an  irresistible  proof  of  the 
mechanist,  and  is  both  inexplicable  and  inconceiv- 
able without  him;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
machine  and  the  mechanist  together  constitute  in 
truth  only  a  larger  organism  which  has,  by  art,  ex- 
tended the  boundaries  of  its  own  existence.  Conse- 
quently, the  machine,  though  in  no  sense  an  organ- 
ism in  itself  alone,  is  yet,  in  a  very  true  sense,  an 
organism  of  a  lower  grade,  inasmuch  as  the  true  or 
living  organism  has  annexed  it  to  itself  as  a  con- 
quered province  of  the  not-itself,  and  so  far  given 
it  a  temporary  and  imperfect,  though  strictly  sub- 
ordinate, organic  being.  Hence  it  is  clear  that  the 
machine  cannot  be  made  to  explain  the  organism, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  can  itself  be  explained  by  the 
organism  alone ;  it  does  not  exist  as  an  end  in  itself, 
but  solely  as  a  means  to  an  end  external  to  itself ; 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE,  189 

and  it  becomes  an  organism  of  a  lower  or  non-living 
grade,  only  when  used  by  a  true  or  living  organism 
as  an  artificial  extension  of  itself  in  the  execution  of 
its  own  organic  ends. 

§  77.  Now,  when  the  mechanical  theory  applies 
this  concept  of  the  machine  to  the  philosophical 
explanation  of  the  universe,  it  must  of  course  con- 
form to  the  requirements  of  philosophy ;  it  must  not 
logically  violate  the  essential  nature  of  the  concept 
it  employs.  Consequently,  as  a  mere  machine,  the 
universe  should  be  conceived  by  the  mechanical 
theory  as  simply  a  means  to  an  end,  and  as  im- 
plying, like  every  other  machine,  its  own  external 
mechanist.  The  only  way  to  realize  this  concept, 
logically  or  philosophically,  is  to  complete  it  by 
conceiving  God  as  the  external  mechanist  or  crea- 
tor of  the  universe,  and  the  "  glory  of  God  "  as  the 
end  for  which  he  has  created  it.  Hence  the  me- 
chanical theory  in  its  only  logical  form  is  pure  and 
absolute  Dualism ;  and  its  Dualism  is  in  the  form 
of  an  old-fashioned,  artificial,  truly  mechanical,  and 
wholly  outgrown  type  of  theology.  If,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  mechanical  theory,  in  order  to  deny  tele- 
ology, discards  Dualism  and  professes  Monism  (as, 
curiously  enough,  it  does  in  all  modern  mechanical 
philosophies),  it  thereby  reduces  itself  to  the  utterly 
unreasonable  and  unintelligible  position  of  declaring 
the  universe  to  be  a  means,  yet  a  means  to  no  end  ! 
For  the  machine  is  essentially  nothing  but  a  means 
to  an  external  end,  as  has  just  been  shown;  and 


190  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

there  can  be  no  end  external  to  the  universe.  From 
this  conclusion  there  is  no  possible  escape.  The 
mechanical  theory,  when  logical,  is  either  old- 
fashioned  supernaturalism,  or  else  natural  teleology 
of  the  Paley  type ;  and,  if  it  presumes  to  stigmatize 
its  rival  as  "  anthropomorphism,"  the  retort  is  crush- 
ing that  it  is  the  mechanical,  not  the  organic,  theory 
which  likens  the  universe  to  the  machine  —  that  is,  to 
the  "  work  of  men's  hands!'  It  would  be  safe  for 
the  mechanical  theory  not  to  indulge  itself  in  that 
particular  sarcasm.  As  a  professedly  "  Monistic 
Philosophy  of  Evolution,"  this  theory  philosophically 
destroys  itself  by  adopting  the  machine  as  its  con- 
cept of  the  universe ;  for  the  concept  of  the  machine, 
if  applied  logically  to  the  universe  as  a  whole,  is  the 
necessary  denial  of  Monism.  And,  finally,  since  both 
the  machine  and  the  organism  necessarily  presuppose 
teleology  and  are  equally  inconceivable  without  it,  the 
mechanical  theory  of  evolution  utterly  breaks  down  : 
its  denial  of  teleology  is  its  suicide  as  a  philoso'phy. 

§  78.  Such  is  the  concept  of  the  machine,  and 
such  is  the  philosophical  result  of  the  attempt  to 
apply  it  to  the  explanation  of  the  universe.  AVhat, 
then,  is  the  concept  of  the  organism,  and  what  will 
be  the  philosophical  result  of  the  attempt  to  apply 
that  to  the  explanation  of  the  universe  ?  It  would 
be  impracticable,  within  the  necessary  limits  of  the 
plan  of  this  book,  to  go  fully  into  this  subject ;  but 
enough  can  be  said  in  a  reasonable  compass  to  serve 
our  present  purpose. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  191 

The  organism  is  a  system  in  which  the  parts  are 
so  related  that  the  whole,  as  a  cause,  is  adapted  to 
the  accomplishment  of  either  external  ends,  internal 
ends,  or  both.  The  non-living  artificial  organism 
(the  machine)  has  only  external  ends;  the  living 
natural  organism  (the  plant,  animal,  man)  has  both 
external  and  internal  ends;  the  living  cosmical 
organism  (the  universe)  has  only  internal  ends. 
The  machine  has  already  been  explained :  it  is  only 
a  means  to  an  end,  and  the  end  is  not  its  own,  but 
only  that  of  the  natural  organism  which  has  created 
it,  and  which  gives  it,  by  using  it,  the  only  life 
which  it  can  be  conceived  to  have.  But  the  natural 
organism  is  created  by  the  cosmical  organism,  first,  as 
an  end  in  itself,  and,  secondly,  as  a  means  to  an  end 
which  is  not  its  own,  but  that  of  the  cosmical  organ- 
ism which  has  created  it.  As  an  end  in  itself,  the 
natural  organism  lives  simply  to  "  full-fill "  its  own 
life ;  as  a  means  to  an  end  which  is  not  its  own,  but 
that  of  the  cosmical  organism,  it  is  simply  a  machine 
with  reference  to  the  latter,  in  precisely  the  same 
sense  in  which  the  pure  machine  is  a  mere  means  to 
an  end  of  the  natural  organism  itself.  The  cosmical 
organism  eternally  creates  itself  simply  to  "  full-fill " 
its  own  life ;  every  relational  system  which  it  thus 
creates  within  itself,  whether  mechanical  or  organic, 
is  from  this  point  of  view  merely  a  means  to  this 
supreme  end  of  all  Being,  and,  therefore,  merely  a 
machine ;  but,  in  freely  or  creatively  "  full-filling " 
its  own  life,  so  far  the  natural  organism  freely  or 


192  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

creatively  helps  to  "  full-fill "  the  universal  life.  The 
pure  machine,  then,  or  artificial  organism,  is  a  pure 
means  to  an  end  not  in  itself ;  the  natural  organism 
is  both  an  end  in  itself  ("  full-filling  "  its  own  life) 
and  a  means  to  an  end  which  is  not  in  itself  (helping 
to  "  full-fill "  the  cosmical  life) ;  while  the  cosmical 
organism  is  at  once  an  absolute  end  in  itself  and  an 
absolute  means  to  this  end  in  itself. 

The  natural  organism  must,  therefore,  be  con- 
ceived as  havhig  both  an  Indwelling  or  Immanent 
End  and  an  Outgoing  or  Extent  End.  Its  immanent 
end  (formative  and  reparative)  is  the  "full-filling" 
of  its  own  life,  renders  it  at  once  both  cause  and 
effect  of  itself,  and  constitutes  the  principle  of  ego- 
ism, legitimate  selfishness,  or  self-preservation  and 
self-development.  Its  exient  end  (reproductive  and 
co-operative)  is  the  helping  to  "  full-fill "  the  uni- 
A'ersal  divine  life,  and  constitutes  the  principle  of 
altruism,  legitimate  unselfishness,  or  self-sacrifice 
and  self-devotion.  These  two  principles  show  them- 
selves in  active  exercise  in  all  organisms  which  have 
reached  even  a  low  position  in  the  scale  of  being. 
In  man,  particularly,  the  immanent  end  shows  itself, 
in  the  individual,  by  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  of 
knowledge,  of  moral  and  religious  culture  in  general, 
no  less  than  of  lower  personal  aims,  —  in  society,  by 
the  foundation  and  fostering  of  institutions  of  all 
sorts  for  the  preservation  and  spread  and  progress 
of  civilization,  and  so  forth;  while  the  exient  end 
shows  itself  in  the  reproductive  and  philoprogenitive 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  193 

instincts,  in  patriotism,  in  philanthropy,  in  devotion 
to  the  discovery  of  truth,  and  so  forth,  but  above  all 
in  the  supreme  activity  of  love,  veneration,  and  self- 
consecration.  The  way  in  which  this  exient  end  in 
the  natural  organism  is  used  by  the  cosmical  organ- 
ism, in  the  furtherance  of  cosmical  ends  irrespective 
of  the  individual,  is  manifested  with  especial  clear- 
ness in  making  it  subservient  to  the  preservation  of 
the  species  and  the  perpetuation  of  life  in  general. 
The  reproductive  system  is  no  benefit,  but  rather  a 
detriment,  to  the  individual  as  an  individual ;  it  is 
a  diversion  of  individual  vitality  to  the  service  of  the 
general  good ;  it  is  the  subordination  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  the  self-preservation  and  self-development 
of  a  higher  individual,  or  relational  system,  in  the 
species  or  kind.  In  this  is  shown  how  the  natural 
organism  is  used  by  the  cosmical  organism  as  a  mere 
machine  —  a  mere  means  for  the  realization  of  ends 
in  which  the  individual  has  no  individual  interest, 
and  in  which  he  can  sympathize  only  through  a 
high  religious  sympathy  in  the  "  full-filling  "  of  the 
cosmical  life  itself,  the  general  well-being  of  the 
universe  as  a  whole. 

§  79.  Thus  the  organic  conception  extends  itself 
from  the  atom  or  molecule,  the  simplest  discoverable 
machine,  up  to  the  universe  of  Being  as  a  whole, 
the  supreme  cosmical  organism ;  and  the  idea  of  the 
organism,  as  that  in  which  alone  the  Many  and  the 
One  are  reconcilable,  covers  and  includes  all  the  facts 
which  science  has  discovered  or  may  yet  discover. 

13 


194  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

While,  therefore,  the  mechanical  theory  proves  itself 
utterly  unable  to  explain  even  its  own  fundamental 
concept,  that  of  the  machine,  and  much  less  that  of 
the  organism,  without  calling  in  the  assistance  of  the 
teleological  idea  which  it  claims  to  reject,  the  organic 
theory  finds  in  this  very  idea  the  "open  sesame" 
of  philosophy  —  the  rational  and  real  unity,  not 
only  of  all  organic  facts,  but  of  all  facts  whatever ; 
and  it  shows  that  teleology,  so  far  from  being  over- 
thrown by  the  fact  of  Evolution  or  the  theory  of 
Darwinism,  is  the  only  principle  which  renders 
either  Evolution  or  Darwinism  philosophically  in- 
telligible. It  is,  in  truth,  the  only  principle  which 
lights  up  the  universe  from  within,  and  renders  it 
luminous  and  transparent,  so  to  speak,  from  centre 
to  circumference. 

§  80.  If  any  further  proof  is  wanted  of  the  abso- 
lute necessity  of  the  principle  of  teleology  in  science 
itself,  it  is  forthcoming  in  the  fact  that  no  mechani- 
cal theory  of  evolution  has  yet  appeared,  so  far  as 
my  knowledge  goes,  which  does  not  deny  itself,  beg 
the  question,  and  surrender  the  whole  point  at 
issue,  by  consciously  or  unconsciously,  overtly  or 
covertly,  introducing  of  itself  the  teleological  prin- 
ciple, the  moment  it  approaches  the  province  of 
biology.  I  will  only  mention  Herbert  Spencer  and 
Ernst  Haeckel,  the  two  ablest  defenders  of  the 
mechanical  philosophy. 

§  81.  What  is  Spencer's  definition  of  life?  "Life," 
he  says,  on  the  one  hand,  "  is  definable  as  the  con- 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  195 

tinuous  adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  external 
relations."^  On  the  other  hand,  he  distinctly  and 
unequivocally  rejects  all  teleology,  as  a  principle 
of  scientific  explanation  of  the  universe.^  But  "  ad- 
justment" is  a  concept  which  is  absolutely  iden- 
tical with  the  teleological  principle.  "Adjustment 
of  internal  relations  to  external  relations  "  can  only 
be  a  change  in  internal  relations,  made,  as  a  means, 
to  effect  a  correspondence  with  external  relations,  as 
an  end.  The  change  is  the  means,  the  correspond- 
ence is  the  end ;  and  that  is  teleology  in  undiluted 
strength.  The  very  essence  of  life,  then,  consists  in 
teleological  activity ;  and  this  teleological  activity 
must  be  conceived,  according  to  Spencer,  as  that  of 
the  very  "  Unknowable  Power  "  which,  still  according 
to  Spencer,  cannot  be  conceived  as  acting  teleologi- 
cally.  No  machine  ever  "adjusts"  itself  to  anything 
not  foreseen  and  provided  for  in  the  mechanism  it- 
self by  the  mind  which  has  created  it ;  it  simply 
suffers  damage  or  destruction.  "  Adjustment "  has  no 
conceivable  meaning  but  the  adaptation  of  means 
to  ends;  and,  if  the  power  of  "adjustment"  is  ad- 
mitted to  be  so  wrought  into  the  organic  structure 
as  not  to  be  referable  to  the  organism's  own  con- 
sciousness, that  is  an  admission  that  an  external 
mind  has  wrought  it  there,  —  that  the  organism  is 
not  a  mere  machine,  —  that  Nature  works  teleologi- 

1  First  Principles,  p.  84,  4th  Ed.     So  Principles  of  Psychology, 
I.  293. 

2  Principles  of  Biology,  I.  340. 


196  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

cally,  and  not  mechanically,  in  providing  beforehand, 
in  the  very  organism  itself,  for  the  exigencies  of 
organic  life.  Thus  Spencer  has  written  down  the 
absolute  and  irretrievable  failure  of  his  whole  phi- 
losophy, as  a  mechanical  theory  of  evolution,  in  that 
one  word  "  adjustment." 

§  82.  Haeckel,  likewise,  the  bolder  and  more  se- 
quent thinker,  does  the  same  thing  just  as  conspicu- 
ously in  his  own  philosophy.  On  the  one  hand,  he 
says :  "  Moreover,  we  shall  have  good  reason  to  hope 
that  at  some  future  time  we  shall  learn  to  explain 
the  first  causes  at  which  Darwin  has  arrived,  namely, 
the  properties  of  Adaptation  and  Inheritance ;  and 
that  we  shall  succeed  in  discovering  in  the  composi- 
tion of  albuminous  matter  certain  molecular  relations 
as  the  remoter,  simpler  causes  of  these  phenomena. 
There  is  indeed  no  prospect  of  this  in  the  immediate 
future,  and  we  content  ourselves  for  the  present 
with  the  tracing  back  of  organic  phenomena  to  two 
mysterious  properties,"  etc.^  "  Inheritance  is  the  cen- 
tripetal or  internal  formative  tendency  which  strives 

1  History  of  Creation,  I.  32,  Amer.  ed.  The  italics  above  are  as 
there  printed.  Prof.  Enrico  Caporali,  in  his  brilliant  series  of 
articles  on  "  La  Formola  Pitagorica  della  Cosmica  Evoluzione,"  still 
publishing  in  La  Nuova  Scienza  (which  is  the  organ  of  the  most 
hopeful  intellectual  movement,  in  the  direction  of  a  truly  scientific 
and  yet  truly  religious  philosophy,  which  appears  within  the  philo- 
sophical horizon  of  the  present),  adds  to  Haeckel's  two  causes  the 
missing  third  —  "  Heredity,  Adaptation,  and  Selection  "  —  by  which 
"  Selection  "  Caporali  means,  not  the  action  of  mere  mechanical 
causes,  but  the  teleological  activity  of  the  "  Unita  Madre,"  or  Nature 
as  Prolific  Unity.  {La  Nuova  Scienza,  I.  75  :  "  —  tre  processi  cosmici, 
Eredita,  Adattamento,  e  Cernita.'") 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  197 

to  keep  the  organic  form  in  its  species,  to  form  the 
descendants  like  the  parents,  and  always  to  pro- 
duce identical  things  from  generation  to  generation. 
Adaptation^  on  the  other  hand,  which  counteracts 
Inheritance,  is  the  centrifugal  or  external  formative 
tendency,  which  constantly  strives  to  change  the 
organic  forms  through  the  influence  of  the  varying 
agencies  of  the  outer  world,  to  create  new  forms 
out  of  those  existing,  and  entirely  to  destroy  the 
constancy  or  permanency  of  species.  Accordingly 
as  Inheritance  or  Adaptation  predominates  in  the 
struggle,  the  specific  form  either  remains  constant 
or  changes  into  a  new  species.  The  degree  of  con- 
stancy of  form  in  the  different  species  of  animals 
or  plants,  which  obtains  at  any  moment,  is  simply 
the  necessary  result  of  the  momentary  predominance 
which  either  of  these  two  formative  powers  (or  physi- 
ological activities)  has  acquired  over  the  other."  ^ 
On  the  other  hand,  Haeckel  says  with  reference  to 
the  Theory  of  Descent:  "As  soon,  in  fact,  as,  accord- 
ing to  this  theory,  we  acknowledge  the  exclusive 
activity  of  physico-chemical  causes  in  living  (organic) 
bodies,  as  well  as  in  so-called  inanimate  (inorganic) 
nature,  we  concede  exclusive  dominion  to  that  view 
of  the  universe  which  we  may  designate  as  the 
mechanical,  and  which  is  opposed  to  the  teleologi- 
cal  conception."  ^     And,  in  his  General  Morphology  of 

1  History  of  Creation,  I.  253,  254. 

2  Ibid.,  I.  17.     So,  also,  pp.  69,  100,  167,  176,  262,  337  —  in  fact, 
passim. 


198  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

Organisms,  Haeckel  devotes  a  whole  chapter  to  what 
he  calls  the  "  Purposelessness,  or  Dysteleology,"  of 
Nature. 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  same  contradiction  which 
we  have  just  found  in  Spencer.  "  Inheritance,"  the 
first  of  the  two  formative  causes  which  he  beheves 
to  explain  the  whole  fact  of  organic  evolution,  is 
nothing  but  the  means  by  which  Nature  reproduces 
the  organic  structure  of  the  species,  which  is  her 
end ;  and,  strangely  enough,  Haeckel  himself  admits 
this  in  the  very  passage  above  quoted,  when  he  de- 
fines Inheritance  as  the  natural  "tendency  which 
strives  to  keep  the  organic  form  in  its  species  " !  For, 
plainly  enough,  the  striving  is  the  means,  and  the 
keeping  is  the  end.  Could  anything  be  more  evident 
than  the  fact  that  Haeckel  unconsciously  conceives 
"  Inheritance  "  itself  as  a  natural  teleological  activ- 
ity ?  So,  also,  "  Adaptation,"  the  other  formative 
cause,  is  the  means  by  which  Nature  secures  the 
gradual  appearance  of  new  species,  which  also  is 
her  end;  and  here  again  Haeckel,  with  amusing 
unconsciousness,  himself  describes  it  as  the  natural 
*'  tendency  which  strives  to  change  the  organic  forms" 
—  the  striving  being  the  means  and  the  changing 
the  end!  Machines  do  not  propagate  their  kind, 
do  not  inherit  ancestral  forms,  do  not  adapt  them- 
selves to  circumstances.  Strike  out  the  teleological 
significance  from  these  two  words,  "  Inheritance " 
and  "Adaptation,"  and  they  lapse  into  absolute  mean- 
inglessness.     By  using  them,  or  rather  by  not  under- 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  199 

standing  them  (for  the  petitio  p7'incipii  is  in  the 
essential  conceptions  of  them,  as  their  above  given 
definitions  prove),  Haeckel  shows  once  more  the 
utter  impossibility  of  explaining  biology  without  the 
help  of  teleology,  and,  like  Spencer,  disproves  his 
own  mechanical  theory.  Not  by  any  chance  slips 
or  careless  expressions,  but  by  the  most  fundamental 
concepts  of  their  systems,  these  two  foremost  cham- 
pions of  the  mechanical  theory  tear  down  with  the 
one  hand  what  they  build  up  with  the  other,  and 
demonstrate  the  impossibility  of  constructing  a  me- 
chanical philosophy  of  evolution  which  shall  not 
fundamentally  assume  the  very  teleology  it  professes 
to  reject. 

§  83.  The  truth  is,  neither  Spencer  nor  Haeckel 
ever  yet  clearly  conceived  any  form  of  teleology 
except  the  old-fashioned,  dualistic,  supernatural, 
and  really  mechanical  teleology  of  the  Calvinistic 
or  of  the  Paley  school;  neither  of  them  has  the 
faintest  conception  of  the  new,  monistic,  strictly 
natural,  and  purely  organic  teleology  of  scientific 
philosophy.  Their  systems,  therefore,  are  out  of 
date  already ;  they  are  not  abreast  of  the  age. 
Haeckel  shows  this  incontrovertibly  in  the  follow- 
ing passage,  and  it  is  no  less  evident  in  Spencer: 
"  The  artificial  discord  between  mind  and  body,  be- 
tween force  and  matter,  which  was  maintained  by 
the  erroneous  dualistic  and  tcleological  philosophy 
of  past  times  has  been  disposed  of  by  the  advances 
of  natural  science,  and  especially  by  the  theory  of 


'200  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

development,  and  can  no  longer  exist  in  face  of  the 
prevailing  mechanical  and  monistic  philosophy  of 
our  day."  ^  (The  italics  are  mine.)  The  "  dualistic 
and  teleological "  philosophy  of  Paley  belongs  indeed 
to  the  past ;  the  "mechanical  and  monistic  "  philoso- 
phy of  Spencer  and  Haeckel  belongs  to  the  present, 
but  is  rapidly  moving  into  the  past ;  the  teleological 
and  monistic  philosophy  of  the  scientific  method 
and  the  organic  theory  of  evolution  belong  to  the  fu- 
ture, and  will  soon  be  here.  But,  apparently,  neither 
Haeckel  nor  Spencer  ever  dreamed  of  that.  The 
true  relations  of  Dualism,  Monism,  and  Teleology 
have  been  alluded  to  earlier  in  this  chapter  (§  77), 
and  it  is  sufficient  to  refer  here  to  that  former  state- 
ment. The  organic  theory  of  evolution,  which  is 
monistic  and  teleological  at  the  same  time,  is  the 
only  form  of  Monism  which  can  logically  exist  at 
all.  The  teleology  which  it  presents  is  endocosmic, 
not  exocosmic,  —  immanent  in  the  universe  as  its 
omnipresent  thought  and  life,  not  external  to  it  as 
that  of  a  Mechanical  Creator,  workingr  in  material 
alien  to  and  other  than  himself.  Inasmuch  as  every 
machine  logically  implies  a  machinist,  mechanist,  or 
mechanic,  the  mechanical  theory  of  evolution  obsti- 

1  Ibid.,  II.  361.  The  only  theism  Haeckel  can  conceive  is  "the 
unscientific  idea  of  a  creator  existing  out  of  matter  [die  unwissen- 
schajlliche  Vorstellung  von  einem  ausserholb  der  Materie  stehenden  und 
dieselbe  umbildenden  Schopfer)."  (Ibid.,  I.  10.)  Spencer  shows 
scarcely  more  insight  in  his  very  shallow  treatment  of  "  the  athe- 
istic, pantheistic,  and  theistic  h}T)otheses  "  in  his  First  Principles, 
pp.  30-36.  It  only  takes  six  pages,  in  his  opinion,  to  exhaust  that 
subject ! 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  201 

nately  implies  and  requires  Dualism,  —  a  Machine 
Universe  here,  a  divine  Master  Mechanic  there ;  and 
the  arbitrary  denial  of  teleology,  instead  of  making 
it  Monism,  unmakes  it  as  philosophy  altogether. 
The  only  Monism  which  is  logically  possible  is  tele- 
ological  through  and  through;  and  Monistic  Tele- 
ology, the  Organic  Theory  of  Evolution,  is  the  heir 
of  the  future. 


202  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   GOD   OF   SCIENCE. 

§  84  The  immanent  relational  constitution  of 
the  universe  per  se  is,  then,  not  that  of  an  infinite 
machine,  which  is  a  self-destructive  concept,  but 
that  of  an  infinite  self-created  and  self-evolving  or- 
ganism, which  is  the  only  concept  capable  of  effect- 
ing an  absolute  reconciliation  of  the  Many  and  the 
One.  The  immanent  life-prmciple  of  this  cosmical 
organism  is  endocosmic  and  monistic  teleology,  the 
omnipresent  and  eternal  teleological  activity  of  the 
infinite  creative  understanding  or  Infinite  Self-con- 
scious Intellect;  for  the  free  creation  of  ends  and 
means  (relational  systems  both  subjective  and  ob- 
jective) has  been  shown  to  be  at  once  the  essential 
Method  of  all  Being  and  the  essential  Method  of  all 
TJiought,  and  therefore,  through  this  unity  of  method, 
the  absolute  Ground  of  the  Identity  of  Being  and 
Thought  (§  46).  The  absolute  end  of  Being-in-itself, 
therefore,  is  the  absolute  "full-filling"  of  Though t- 
in-itself,  —  that  is,  creation  of  the  Real  out  of  the 
Ideal ;  and  the  absolute  realization  of  this  end  is  the 
Eternal  Teleological  Process  of  the  Self-Evolution  of 
Nature  in  Space  and  Time,  —  in  a  word,  the  Infinite 
Creative  Life  of  God. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  203 

§  85.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the  principle  that 
the  universe  is  an  organism,  and  not  a  machine,  —  a 
principle  which  is  the  logically  necessary  result  of 
the  thorough  philosophizing  of  the  scientific  method. 
It  shows  that  the  whole  universe  of  Being  is  instinct 
with  an  infinitely  intelligible  and  infinitely  intelligent 
Energy,  working  actively,  in  every  point  of  Space 
and  every  moment  of  Time,  according  to  the  intel- 
ligible principle  of  Ends  and  Means  —  ends  that  are 
cosmical  in  their  reach  and  scope,  means  that  are 
cosmical  in  their  dignity  and  effectiveness.  It  shows 
that  this  "  Infinite  and  Eternal  Energy  from  which 
all  things  proceed"  effectively  reveals  itself  in  Na- 
ture to  the  human  understanding  —  is  in  no  sense 
"  Unknowable,"  but  essentially  knowable  per  se,  and 
actually  known  to  the  precise  extent  to  which  sci- 
ence has  discovered  the  immanent  relational  constitu- 
tion, or  organic  idea,  of  Nature  itself.  It  shows  that 
Nature  is  not  a  "  manifestation  "  which  does  not  mani- 
fest, but  rather  the  veritable,  natural,  and  infinitely 
intelligible  self-revelation  of  the  noumenal  in  the 
phenomenal,  of  the  absolute  in  the  relative,  of  the 
infinite  in  the  finite,  of  the  eternal  in  the  temporal. 
It  shows  that  there  is  a  fundamental  spiritual 
identity  between  man  and  the  universe  in  point  of 
essential  nature;  that  free  creativeness  is  the  su- 
preme characteristic  of  intellect,  whether  finite  or 
infinite,  and  effectuates  itself  in  the  actual  creation 
of  ends  and  means,  as  subjective  or  ideal  relational 
systems ;  that  free  executiveness,  or  will,  is  the  neces- 


204  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

sary  concomitant  of  intellect,  whether  finite  or  in- 
finite, and  effectuates  itself  in  the  realization  of  these 
ends  and  means  in  Nature,  as  objective  or  real  rela- 
tional systems.  This  is  the  profound  truth  under- 
lying the  crude  conception  of  primitive  religions 
that  "  God  created  man  in  his  own  image."  Anthro- 
pomorphism and  anthropopathism  are  no  absolute 
errors,  but  contain  elements  of  truth  which  philoso- 
phy will  earnestly  seek  to  find,  and  reverently  cher- 
ish when  found.  Infinite  Wisdom  and  Infinite  Will 
are  characteristic  attributes  of  God  which  stand  lumi- 
nously revealed  in  the  organic  or  teleological  con- 
ception of  the  universe  per  se.  But  teleology  has 
not  yet  yielded  its  richest  fruit. 

§  86.  In  our  study  of  the  concept  of  the  organism 
(§  78),  we  found  that  every  organism  has  a  twofold 
end  —  the  Indwelling  or  Immanent  End  and  the 
Outgoing  or  Exient  End.  Nature  provides  for  the 
realization  of  this  exient  end  of  the  finite  organism, 
so  far  as  it  is  her  own  immanent  end  as  the  infinite 
organism,  by  implanting  in  every  finite  organism  of 
the  higher  orders  the  love  of  its  own  kind,  the  desire 
of  offspring,  the  divine  passion  of  maternal  and  pater- 
nal affection,  the  deep  and  indestructible  yearning  to 
repeat  itself  in  that  whose  life  is  a  renewal  and  con- 
tinuation of  its  own  —  in  that  which  is  at  once  both 
itself  and  not  itself.  Now,  if  the  universe  of  Being 
is  indeed  an  organism,  nay,  the  one  supreme  and 
infinite  organism,  this  exient  end,  it  would  seem, 
must  needs  be  defeated ;  for  there  is  nothing  beyond 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  205 

itself  to  which  it  can  go  out,  and  it  cannot  repro- 
duce itself  in  another  infinite.  But  it  is  not,  for  all 
that,  lost.  This  exient  priaciple  of  the  universal 
organism,  this  self-abnegating  and  sublimest  and 
most  exquisitely  beautiful  element  in  the  organic 
idea,  constitutes  that  attribute  in  the  character  of 
God  which  is  the  rational  foundation  of  religious 
trust  and  hope  and  love.  For,  far  from  vanishing 
or  expiring  in  impotency,  it  reappears  with  re- 
doubled power ;  it  diffuses  itself  internally  through- 
out the  infinite  organism  itself,  as  a  deepened 
energy  and  enhancement  of  the  immanent  end;  it 
manifests  itself  as  that  Natural  Providence  of  Law 
and  Love  in  One  which  is  the  support  of  every  in- 
structed, steadfast,  and  rehgious  mind;  it  returns, 
so  to  speak,  into  the  bosom  of  the  universe  as  il- 
limitable love  of  itself,  —  as  ineffable  satisfaction 
in  its  own  fulness,  beauty,  and  perfection,  and  as 
boundless  tenderness  for  the  spiritual  offspring, 
veritable  "children  of  God,"  who  "live  and  move 
and  have  their  being  "  in  itself  alone.  What  is  this 
but  infinite  beatitude,  infinite  benignity,  infinite 
love,  —  the  All-Embracing  Fatherhood-and-Mother- 
hood  of  God  ? 

§  87.  If  such  is  the  form  in  which  the  principle  of 
exiency  must  show  itself  in  the  infinite  organism,  no 
less  sublime  and  glorious  is  the  form  taken  by  the 
principle  of  immanency.  "  The  absolute  end  of  Be- 
ing-in-itself  is  the  absolute  '  full-filling '  of  Thought- 
in-itself,  —  that  is,  the  creation  of  the  Real  out  of 


206  SCIENTIFIC    THEISM. 

the  Ideal : "  this  we  saw  at  the  opening  of  this  last 
chapter.  Now  the  Ideal  appears  as  the  subjective 
relational  system  freely  created  by  the  creative 
understanding;  and  the  Eeal  appears  as  the  objec- 
tive relational  system  effectuated  in  Nature  by  the 
subordinate  realizing  activity  of  the  executive  will. 
The  blindly  executive  will,  however,  is  nothing  but 
the  objectively  creative  potency  of  the  understand- 
ing itself :  Thought  is  Force,  and  Force  is  Substance. 
The  absolute  " full-filling"  of  Thought-in-itself,  there- 
fore, or  the  embodiment  of  the  Ideal  in  the  Eeal,  is 
the  eternal  self-legislation  of  Thought-in-itself  into 
Thought-in-Being  —  of  the  subjective  relational  sys- 
tem into  the  objective  relational  system  of  the  Eeal 
Universe.  The  ground  of  this  realization  can  only 
be  the  inherent  and  uncreated  fitness  of  the  Abso- 
lute Ideal  to  Be  —  that  is,  to  become  the  "Absolute 
Eeal;  and  the  perception  of  this  absolute  fitness  of 
the  Ideal  to  become  the  Eeal  —  a  profoundly  ethical 
perception  —  is  the  ground  of  the  Eternal  Creative 
Act.  Here,  then,  the  infinite  organism  manifests 
itself  essentially  as  Moral  Being  —  as  a  universe 
whose  absolute  foundation  is  Moral  Law,  of  such 
absolutely  self-inherent  sanctity  that  the  creative 
understanding  itself  obeys  it  and  the  whole  fabric 
of  creation  embodies  and  enforces  it ;  and  the  moral 
nature  of  man,  derived  from  this  moral  nature  of  the 
universe  itself,  is  the  august  revelation  of  the  in- 
finite purity,  rectitude,  and  holiness  of  God.  The 
unspeakable  sublimity  of  the  moral  nature  of  man 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  207 

is,  therefore,  testimony  to  the  immeasurably  vaster 
sublimity  of  the  moral  nature  of  the  universe  it- 
self;  for,  as  the  atom  is  to  infinite  Space,  so  is  the 
grandest  virtue  of  man  to  the  infinite  holiness  of 
God. 

§  88.  I  do  not  forget  the  problem  of  evil :  alas, 
who  that  is  human  can  forget  that  ?  But  neither 
do  I  forget  that  evil  is  simply  the  pressure  of  our 
own  finitude,  and  that  even  the  Infinite  Love  and 
Compassion  could  not  relieve  us  of  that  without 
accomplishing  the  inherently  impossible,  to  which 
omnipotence  itself  cannot  extend ;  for,  just  as  om- 
niscience, rationally  conceived,  is  the  knowledge  of  all 
that  is  knowable,  but  not  of  the  unknowable  (the 
non-existent  or  nonsensical),  so  omnipotence,  ration- 
ally conceived,  is  power  to  do  all  that  is  doable, 
but  not  to  do  the  inherently  undoable  —  that  which 
involves  self-contradiction  or  violates  the  necessary 
nature  of  things.  Derivative  being  cannot,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  either  be  or  become  infinite ;  and 
nothing  short  of  infinitude  could  bring  to  us  release 
from  all  evil.  Evil  is  no  end  in  itself ;  it  cannot 
exist  in  the  universe  as  an  infinite  whole,  but  only 
in  the  mutual  relation  of  its  parts,  as  the  inevitable 
shadow-side  of  all  finite  reality.  If  it  could  be 
avoided,  —  if  the  finite  real  could  possibly  exist  at 
all  without  the  finitude  which  weighs  upon  it  and  is 
the  source  of  all  its  woes,  —  then  might  we  justly 
blame  the  universe  for  the  evil  that  is  simply  in- 
evitable.    Is  it  not  enough  to  lay  this  "  spectre  of 


208  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

the  mind  "  to  know  that,  without  this  finitude,  finite 
being  could  not  be ;  that  finite  being  is  better  than 
non-being ;  and  that,  between  these  two  grim  but 
sole  possibilities,  Infinite  Goodness  and  Love  itself 
would  choose  the  former?  If  that  is  not  precisely 
optimism,  neither  is  it  pessimism  ;  and  it  is  theodicy 
enough  to  satisfy  at  least  one  not  easily  satisfied 
mind.  ' 

§  89.  Let  us  now  review  the  general  course  of 
thought  which  we  have  been  pursuing  in  these 
investigations,  and  gather  together  in  a  brief  sum- 
mary the  large  elements  of  that  noumenal  concep- 
tion of  the  universe  which  naturally  flows  from 
the  philosophized  scientific  method. 

1.  Because  the  universe  is  in  some  small  measure 
actually  known  in  human  science,  it  must  be  in 
itself  both  absolutely  self-existent  and  infinitely  in- 
telligible; that  is,  it  must  be  a  noumenon  because 
it  is  a  phenomenon. 

2.  Because  it  is  infinitely  intelligible,  it  must  be 
likewise  infinitely  intelligent. 

3.  Because  it  is  at  the  same  time  both  infinitely 
intelligible  and  infinitely  intelligent,  it  must  be  an 
infinite  subject-object  or  self-conscious  intellect. 

4.  Because  it  is  an  infinitely  intelligible  object, 
it  must  possess  throughout  an  immanent  relational 
constitution. 

5.  Because  it  possesses  an  infinitely  intelligible 
relational  constitution,  it  must  be  an  absolutely  per- 
fect system. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  209 

6.  Because  it  is  an  absolutely  perfect  system,  it 
cannot  be  an  infinite  machine,  but  must  be  an 
infinite  organism. 

7.  Because  it  is  an  infinite  organism,  its  life- 
principle  must  be  an  infinite  immanent  Power,  act- 
ing everywhere  and  always  by  organic  means  for 
organic  ends,  and  subordinating  every  event  to  its 
own  infinite  life,  —  in  other  words,  it  must  be  in- 
finite Will  directed  by  infinite  Wisdom. 

8.  Because  it  is  an  infinite  organism,  its  exient 
organic  end  disappears  as  such,  but  reappears  as 
infinite  Love  of  itself  and  infinite  Love  of  the 
finite. 

9.  Because  it  is  an  infinite  organism,  its  imma- 
nent organic  end  appears  as  the  eternal  realization 
of  the  Ideal,  and  therefore  as  infinite  Holiness. 

10.  Because,  as  an  infinite  organism,  it  thus  mani- 
fests infinite  Wisdom,  Power,  and  Goodness,  or 
thought,  feeling,  and  will  in  their  infinite  fulness, 
and  because  these  three  constitute  the  essential 
manifestations  of  personality,  it  must  be  conceived 
as  Infinite  Person,  Absolute  Spirit,  Creative  Source 
and  Eternal  Home  of  the  derivative  finite  person- 
alities which  depend  upon  it,  but  are  no  less  real 
than  itself. 

§  90.  Such  appears  to  me  to  be  the  conception 
of  the  universe  which  flows  naturally,  logically,  in- 
evitably, from  the  philosophized  scientific  method; 
and  such,  therefore,  appears  to  me  to  be  the  Idea 
OF  God  which  is  the  legitimate  outcome  of  modern 

u 


210  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

science.  In  truth,  it  is  the  scientific  and  strictly 
a  posteriori  proof  of  God's  existence,  attributes,  and 
character,  based  solely  upon  the  data  of  universal 
human  experience  of  universal  Nature,  as  organized 
into  the  living  process  of  the  scientific  method,  and 
upon  the  strictly  legitimate  philosophizing  of  that 
method.  New  England  Transcendentalism^  denies 
on  a  priori  grounds  the  possibility  of  any  such 
proof ;  but  the  proof  itself  now  lies  before  the  world, 
and  the  world  will  judge  its  conclusiveness. 

§  91.  The  further  question,  whether  this  idea  of 
God  is  Pantheism,  is  a  question  of  the  proper  defi- 
nition of  the  word,  and  of  far  less  significance.  A 
score  of  years  ago  I  named  and  promulgated  this 
essential  idea  as  Scientific  Theism,  and  I  still 
judge  that  to  be  the  most  appropriate  designation  of 
it.     If  all  forms  of  Monism  are  necessarily  deemed 

1  "  It  is  my  belief  that  reason  in  its  original  capacity  and  func- 
tion has  no  knowledge  of  spiritual  truth,  not  even  of  the  first  and 
fundamental  truth  of  religion,  the  being  of  God.  ...  I  deny  the 
ability  of  the  human  intellect  to  construct  that  ladder,  whose  foot 
being  grounded  in  irrefragable  axiom,  and  its  steps  all  laid  in 
dialectic  continuity,  the  topmost  round  thereof  shall  lift  the  climb- 
ing intellect  into  vision  of  the  Godhead.  Between  the  last  truth 
which  the  human  intellect  can  reach  by  legitimate  induction  and 
the  being  of  God  there  will  ever  lie — 'deserts  of  vast  eternity.' 
Not  by  that  process  did  any  soul  yet  arrive  at  that  transcendent 
truth;  not  from  beneath,  but  from  above,  —  not  by  intellectual 
escalade,  but  by  heavenly  condescension,  —  comes  the  idea  of  God, 
even  by  the  condescending  Word,"  etc.  (F.  H.  Hedge,  Reason  in 
Religion,  p.  208,  Boston,  1865.)  Dr.  Hedge's  distrust  and  fear  of 
the  understanding,  or  "  human  intellect,"  Avhich  is  shared  by  most 
of  the  Transcendentalists,  arises  from  defective  comprehension  of 
the  spirit,  tendency,  and  immanent  philosophical  creativeness  of  the 
scientific  method. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  211 

Pantheism,    on   the   ground    that   Pantheism    must 
include  all  systems  of   thought  which  rest  on   the 
principle  of  one  sole  substance,  then  Scientific  Theism 
must  be  conceded  to  be  Pantheism ;  for  it  certainly 
holds  that  the  All  is  God  and  God  the  All,  —  that 
the  Dualism  which  posits  Spirit  and  Matter  as  two 
incomprehensibly  related  substances,  eternally  alien 
to  each  other  and  mutually  hostile  in  their  essential 
nature,  is  a  defective   intellectual   synthesis  of  the 
facts,  and  therefore  greatly  mferior  to  the  Monism 
which  posits  the  absolute  unity  of   substance   and 
absolute  unity  of   relational  constitution  in  one  or- 
ganic universe  per  se,  and  which  conceives  God,  the 
Infinite  Subject,  as  eternally  thinking,  objectifying, 
and  revealing  himself  in  Nature,  the  Infinite  Object. 
Dualism   is   inevitably   driven   to   Deism,   with    its 
clumsy  makeshift  of  creation  ex  nihilo ;  and  Deism 
is  the  only  form  of  the  mechanical  theory  of  evolu- 
tion which  does  not  flatly  contradict  the  mechanical 
concept.     Abundant  reasons  have  already  been  given 
why   the  "monistic"  mechanical   theory  should  be 
rejected ;  but  whatever  cogency  they  may  have  tells 
with  equal  force  against  Dualism  itself,  except  in 
the  one  point  of  teleology. 

§  92.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Pantheism  is  the 
denial  of  all  real  personality,  whether  finite  or  in- 
finite, then,  most  emphatically.  Scientific  Theism  is 
not  Pantheism,  but  its  diametrical  opposite.  Tele- 
ology is  the  very  essence  of  purely  spiritual  per- 
sonality ;  it  presupposes  thought,  feeling,  and  will ; 


212  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

it  is  the  decisive  battle-ground  between  the  personal 
and  impersonal  conceptions  of  the  universe.  There 
is  no  such  thing  as  unconscious  teleology;  if  it  is 
not  conscious  in  the  finite  organism,  as  of  course  it 
is  not  in  the  organic  structure  as  distinguished  from 
the  organic  consciousness  and  action,  then  it  must 
be  conscious  in  the  infinite  organism  which  creates 
the  finite.  Ends  and  means  are  inconceivable  and 
impossible,  except  as  ideal  or  subjective  relational 
systems  which  the  creative  understanding  absolutely 
produces,  and  which  the  will  reproduces  in  Nature 
as  real  or  objective  relational  systems ;  hence  the 
recognition  of  Teleology  in  Nature  is  necessarily  the 
recognition  of  purely  spiritual  Personality  in  God. 
Yet  Teleology,  say  what  one  will,  cannot  be  escaped 
by  any  device  in  the  comprehension  of  Nature;  it 
is  either  openly  confessed  in,  or  else  surreptitiously 
introduced  into,  all  philosophical  systems  of  evolu- 
tion, as  has  been  instanced  above  in  the  systems 
of  Haeckel  and  Spencer.  Teleology  conjoined  with 
Dualism,  however,  yields  only  the  most  awkward 
and  artificial  form  of  the  mechanical  theory  —  that 
of  Deism,  or  the  theory  of  an  external  creator, 
creation  ex  nihilo,  and  meaningless  "  second  causes ;  " 
while  Teleology  conjoined  with  Monism  yields  the 
organic  theory  of  evolution  or  Scientific  Theism, 
which  includes  only  so  much  of  Pantheism  as  is 
really  true  and  has  appeared  in  every  deeply  re- 
ligious philosophy  since  the  very  birth  of  human 
thought. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  213 

§  93.  For  every  deeply  religious  philosophy  must 
hold  fast,  at  the  same  time,  the  two  great  prin- 
ciples of  the  Transcendence  and  the  Immanence  of 
God;  and  that  of  his  Immanence,  thought  down  to 
its  foundation,  is  Monism.  If  God  is  not  conceived 
as  transcendent,  he  is  confounded  with  matter,  as 
in  Hylozoism,  Materialism,  or  Material  Pantheism. 
But,  if  he  is  not  conceived  as  immanent,  he  is  ban- 
ished from  his  own  universe  as  a  Creator  ex  nihilo 
and  mere  Infinite  Mechanic.  Scientific  Theism  con- 
ceives him  as  immanent  in  the  universe  so  far  as 
it  is  known,  and  transcendent  in  the  universe  so 
far  as  it  remains  unknown,  —  immanent,  that  is,  in 
the  world  of  human  experience,  and  transcendent 
in  the  world  which  lies  beyond  human  experience. 
This  is  the  only  legitimate  or  philosophical  meaning 
of  the  word  transcendent ;  for  God  is  still  conceived 
as  immanent  alone,  and  in  no  sense  transcendent, 
in  the  infinite  universe  iKr  se.  Hence  the  merely 
subjective  distinction  of  the  Transcendence  and  Im- 
manence of  God  perfectly  corresponds  with  that  of 
the  "Known"  and  the  "Unknown,*'  as  absolutely 
one  in  Eeal  Being ;  God  is  "  Known  "  as  the  Imma- 
nent, and  "  Unknown  "  as  the  Transcendent ;  but  he 
is  absolutely  knowable  as  both  the  Inmianent  and 
the  Transcendent.  It  is  really  denial  of  him  to  con- 
found him  with  the  "  Unknowable  "  or  Unintelligible 
—  that  is,  the  Non-Existent.  Scientific  Theism  does 
not  insult  and  outrage  the  human  mind  by  calling 
upon  it  to  worship  what  it  cannot  possibly  under- 


214  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

stand  —  an  unreal  quantity,  a  surd,  a  square  root  of 
minus  one,  an  "  Unknowable  Eeality  "  which  is  only 
a  synonym  for  Impossible  Eeality  or  Absolute  Un- 
reality ;  for  that  is  the  quintessence  of  superstition. 
But  it  gives  an  idea  of  God  which  not  only  satisfies 
the  demands  of  the  human  intellect,  but  no  less 
those  of  the  human  heart. 

§  94.  In  vain  will  the  soul  of  man  strive  to  w^or- 
ship,  to  venerate,  to  love,  that  which  has  no  intel- 
ligible being :  the  clear  idea  must  precede  the  vivid 
and  deep  and  strong  emotion,  just  as  necessarily  as 
the  fountain-head  must  precede  the  beautiful  river 
with  its  glory  of  smiling  banks.  So  long  as  man  is 
finite,  so  long  indeed  will  the  Mysterious,  the  Tran- 
scendent, the  Unknown  abide,  as  the  infinite  Beyond 
to  which  the  finite  cannot  reach ;  and  the  presence 
of  this  ever-abiding  Mystery  perpetually  excites 
those  sentiments  of  sublimity  and  awe  which  are 
indeed  the  unfailing  concomitant  of  all  true  wor- 
ship. But  every  sentiment  of  true  worship  is  abso- 
lutely extinguished  in  the  intelligent  mind  where  no 
clear  idea  is  presented  —  where  no  luminous  thought 
shoots  its  radiance  into  the  fathomless  abyss  of 
Being,  but  where  all  is  black  with  impenetrable 
darkness.  If  the  glorious  thought  of  a  universe  in 
which  God  is  at  once  the  Self-Manifesting  and  the 
Self -Manifested,  the  Self-Eevealing  and  the  Self- 
Eevealed,  —  a  universe  in  which  the  adoring  Kepler 
might  well  exclaim  in  awe  unspeakable,  "  0  God,  I 
think  Thy  thoughts  after  Thee!"  —  a  universe  which 


THE  RELIGION   OF  SCIENCE.  215 

is  the  eternally  objectified  Divine  Idea,  illumining 
the  human  intellect,  inspiring  the  human  conscience, 
warming  the  human  heart,  —  if,  I  say,  this  glorious 
thought  begotten  of  science  has  no  power  to  stir  the 
depths  of  the  human  soul  and  lift  it  up  to  the  sub- 
limest  heights  of  worship  and  self-consecration  to  the 
service  of  the  Most  High,  then  religion  is  dead  indeed, 
and  the  light  of  the  universe  is  gone  out  forever. 
But,  if  this  thought  of  God,  the  reflected  glory  of  its 
divine  source,  has,  as  in  truth  it  has,  such  a  divine 
force  and  energy  in  itself  as  to  soothe  the  woes  of 
life,  and  dull  the  pangs  of  sorrow,  and  minister  new 
strength  to  the  soul  faltering  in  the  path  of  painful 
duty,  then  religion  is  not  dead,  but  sleeping,  and 
will  yet  rise  from  its  bier  at  the  commanding  word 
of  Science. 

§  95.  Ealph  Waldo  Emerson,  whose  great  memory 
hovers  like  a  benediction  over  the  heads  of  this 
mighty  and  happy  people,  uttered,  in  one  of  the 
latest,  if  not  the  very  latest,  of  his  public  addresses 
(and  it  was  my  signal  privilege  to  listen  to  it),  this 
dignified  lament  over  one  of  the  immediate,  yet  I 
believe  transient,  effects  of  the  spread  of  the  scientific 
spirit  in  our  day  :  — 

*'  In  consequence  of  this  revolution  in  opinion,  it 
appears,  for  the  time,  as  the  misfortune  of  the  period 
that  the  cultivated  mind  has  not  tlie  happiness  and 
dignity  of  the  religious  sentiment.  We  are  born 
too  late  for  the  old,  and  too  early  for  the  new,  faith. 
I  see  in  those  classes  and  those  persons  in  whom  I 


216  SCIENTIFIC   THEISM. 

am  accustomed  to  look  for  tendency  and  progress, 
for  what  is  most  positive  and  most  rich  in  human 
nature,  and  who  contain  the  activity  of  to-day  and 
the  assurance  of  to-morrow,  —  I  see  in  them  char- 
acter, but  scepticism ;  a  clear  enough  perception  of 
the  inadequacy  of  the  popular  religious  statement  to 
the  wants  of  their  heart  and  intellect,  and  explicit 
declarations  of  this  fact.  They  have  insight  and 
truthfulness ;  they  will  not  mask  their  convictions ; 
they  hate  cant;  but  more  than  this  I  do  not  readily 
find.  The  gracious  motions  of  the  soul  —  piety, 
adoration  —  I  do  not  find.  Scorn  of  hypocrisy,  pride 
of  personal  character,  elegance  of  taste  and  of  man- 
ners and  of  pursuit,  a  boundless  ambition  of  the 
intellect,  willingness  to  sacrifice  personal  interests 
for  the  integrity  of  the  character,  —  all  these  they 
have ;  but  that  religious  submission  and  abandon- 
ment which  give  man  a  new  element  and  being,  and 
.  make  him  sublime,  —  it  is  not  in  churches,  it  is  not 
in  houses.  I  see  movement,  I  hear  aspirations,  but 
I  see  not  how  the  great  God  prepares  to  satisfy  the 
heart  in  the  new  order  of  things." 

§  96.  The  great  seer  saw  not  deeply  enough  into 
the  recesses  of  this  new  scientific  spirit;  the  great 
prophet  of  New  England  Transcendentalism  read 
not  deeply  enough  that  mighty  striving  after  tnith 
which  is  born  of  the  scientific  method,  and  in  turn 
bears  fruit  in  the  bewildering  scientific  discoveries  of 
this  new  time.  He  saw  not  the  slow  and  obscure 
beginnings  of  a  new  form  of  faith,  sprung  not  from 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  217 

the  "ecstatic  intuition"  of  Transcendentalism,  but 
from  a  closer  contact  of  the  human  intellect  with 
the  real  universe  than  was  ever  possible  before,  — 
heralded,  not  by  the  earthquake  and  the  wind  of  the 
great  discoveries  themselves,  but  by  the   "  still,  small 
voice  "  of  their  creator,  the  Scientific  Method,  which 
only  those  can  hear  who  are  patient  enough  to  pon- 
der, to  meditate,  and  to  muse.     If  I  have  rightly 
divined  the  inner  character,  spirit,  and  tendency  of 
this  philosophy  fated  to  be,  it  will  not  only  "  satisfy 
the  heart  in  the  new  order  of  things,"  but  also  (con- 
dition antecedent  to  this  heart-satisfaction  ^ )  satisfy 
the  head  as  well.     For  the  head  has  been  too  long 
sacrificed  to  the  heart  in  religion;  and  the  result 
to-day   is    the    satisfaction    of    neither.      Scientific 
Theism  is  more  than  a  philosophy :   it  is  a  rehgion, 
it  is  a  gospel,  it  is  the  Faith  of  the  Future,  founded 
on  knowledge  rather  than  on  blind  belief,  —  a  faith 
in  which  head  and  heart  will  be  no  more  arrayed 
against   each   other   in   irreconcilable    feud,   as   the 
world  beholds  them  now,  but  will  kneel  in  worship 
side  by  side  at  the  same  altar,  dedicated,  not  to  the 

1  Dante  {Paradiso,  XXVIII.  106-111)  beautifuUy  expresses  this 
thought  that  the  vision  of  Divine  Truth  must  precede  the  love  of  it, 
and  constitute  the  foundation  of  beatitude :  — 

"  E  dei  saver  che  tutti  hanno  diletto, 
Quanto  la  sua  vcduta  si  profonda 
Nel  Vero,  in  che  si  quota  ogn'  intelletto. 
Quinci  si  pub  veder  come  si  fonda 
JJ  esser  bcato  nell'  atto  che  vede, 
Non  in  quel  ch'  ama,  che  poscia  seconda.'* 


218  SCIENTIFIC  THEISM. 

"  Unknown  God,"  still  less  to  the  "  Unknowable  God," 
but  to  the  Known  God  whose  revealing  prophet  is 
Science. 

For  the  idea  of  God  which  science  is  slowly,  nay, 
unconsciously,  creating  is  that  of  no  metaphysical 
abstraction  spun  out  of  the  cobwebs  of  idealistic 
speculation,  but  rather  that  of  the  immanent,  or- 
ganific,  and  supremely  spiritual  Infinite  Life,  reveal- 
ing itself  visibly  in  Nature,  and,  above  all,  invisibly 
in  Nature's  sublimest  product  —  human  nature  and 
the  human  soul.  Scientific  Theism  utters  in  intel- 
ligible speech  the  very  heart,  the  Infinite  Heart,  of 
the  universe  itself,  and  speaks  with  resistless  per- 
suasion to  the  heart  of  all  who  can  comprehend  it. 
He  who  can  firmly  grasp  the  torch  of  this  self- 
luminous  Knowledge  of  God  possesses  an  "  Inner 
Light "  beside  wdiich  all  other  lights  are  wander- 
ing wills-o'-the-wisp,  and  knows  himself  to  be  in 
absolute  security,  come  what  may,  so  long  as  he 
walks  the  paths  of  destiny  by  the  clear  and  steady 
radiance  it  sheds,  and  lifts  up  his  soul  in  secret 
loyalty  and  adoration  to  Him  from  whose  infinite 
being  all  human  knowledge  itself  is  a  shining  ray. 
With  all  reverence  and  tenderness  for  the  illustrious 
dead  be  it  spoken :  I  do  "  see  how"  the  great  God 
prepares  to  satisfy  the  heart  in  the  new  order  of 
things."  For  Scientific  Theism  is  the  Philosophy 
OF  Free  Religion  and  the  Religion  of  Free 
Philosophy. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  219 


Art  Thou  the  Life  1 
To  Thee,  then,  do  I  owe  each  beat  and  breath, 
And  wait  thy  ordering  of  my  hour  of  death 

lu  peace  or  strife. 

Art  Thou  the  Light  ? 
To  Thee,  then,  in  the  sunshine  or  the  cloud, 
Or  in  ray  chamber  lone  or  in  tlie  crowd, 

I  lift  my  sight. 

Art  Thou  the  Truth '« 
To  Thee,  then,  loved  and  craved  and  sought  of  yore, 
I  consecrate  my  manhood  o'er  and  o'er, 

As  erst  my  youth. 

Art  Thou  the  Strong  1 
To  Thee,  then,  though  the  air  be  thick  with  night, 
I  trust  the  seeming-unprotected  Right, 

And  leave  the  AVrong. 

Art  Thou  the  Wise  1 
To  Thee,  then,  avouM  I  bring  each  useless  care, 
And  bid  my  soul  unsay  her  idle  prayer. 

And  hush  her  cries. 

Art  Thou  the  Good  ? 
To  Thee,  then,  with  a  thirsting  heart  I  turn. 
And  at  Thy  fountain  stand,  and  hold  my  urn, 

As  aye  I  stood. 

Forgive  the  call ! 
I  cannot  shut  Thee  from  my  sense  or  soul, 
I  cannot  lose  me  in  the  boundless  whole  — 

For  Thou  art  All. 


DATE  DUE 

JUIULU 

m 

CAVLORD 

pniNTEOIN  USA 

